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Introduction
The classic economic theory of ﬁsheries management was concerned with two contrasting
systems of property rights: (i) sole ownership and (ii) open access. With regard to
economic rents, these two systems yield unique outcomes. First, sole ownership results in
rent maximization, where the marginal productivity of the factors of production equals
the marginal cost, such that the condition for economic eﬃciency is satisﬁed. Second,
open access results in what one of the pioneers of modern ﬁsheries, H. Scott Gordon,
characterized as bionomic equilibrium (Gordon, 1954). Here the marginal productivity
is less than marginal cost, such that there will be an overuse of factors of production.
Driving the ﬁsh stock below its economically optimal level implies a disinvestment in the
ﬁsheries' natural capital (overexploitation) (Clark, 1990). Hence bionomic equilibrium is
to be seen as a benchmark of poor resource management.
Rapid advances in ﬁshing technology, for example the introduction of the power block,
along with acoustic ﬁsh detection devices, revolutionized the purse seine ﬁshery, reduced
harvesting costs and thereby increased the vulnerability of pelagic ocean ﬁshery resources.
While the overexploitation of the great ocean ﬁshery resources was not a concern until the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century because these resources were seen as being inexhaustible
(Munro, 2008); with the collapse of many commercial ﬁsheries, e.g. the Northeast Atlantic
herring ﬁsheries in the 1960s and 1970s, it became evident that regulations of some kind
were needed to avoid rent dissipation in commercial ﬁsheries.
Following the end of World War II, several coastal states attempted, unilaterally, to
extend their jurisdiction over seabed resources beyond their territorial seas. In order
xiii
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to prevent a chaotic extension of coastal state marine jurisdiction, the United Nations
convened a series of Conferences on the Law of the Sea. The First and Second Conferences
failed to reach agreement on jurisdiction over the living resources of the sea (Hannesson,
2004), despite spending much time on ﬁsheries issues. The Third Conference (1973-82)
revolutionised the jurisdictional regime for marine capture ﬁsheries, and led, through the
establishment of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), to a massive erosion of the freedom
of the seas doctrine1, as it relates to ﬁsheries. With only 10 % of capture ﬁshery harvests
being accounted for by ﬁshery resources in the remaining high seas, the freedom of the
seas seemed, as far as ﬁsheries were concerned, to be all but irrelevant in 1982 (Munro,
2008).
One can distinguish between three types of internationally shared ﬁsh stocks. First,
there are the transboundary ﬁshery resources; ﬁsh stocks that migrate between the EEZs
of two or more coastal states. Second, we have the so-called `straddling' ﬁsh stocks, i.e.,
those stocks that migrate between the EEZ of one or more coastal states and the high
seas (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). Third, there are the highly migratory ﬁsh stocks, i.e,
ﬁsh stocks that are conﬁned to the remaining high sea, and which in eﬀect refers to tuna
(Sumaila, 1999).
Economists cannot analyse the economics of the management of internationally shared
ﬁshery resources, with the hope of providing useful insights to policymakers, without
recognising that there will be strategic interaction between states sharing a ﬁshery
resource. The harvesting activities of one state will, except under unusual circumstances,
have an impact upon the harvesting opportunities of other states, and vice versa; hence
the strategic interaction. For this reason, economic models of shared ﬁsh stocks blend
the bioeconomic models, used to analyse the economics of the management of ﬁshery
resources conﬁned to the EEZ of a single state, with game theory.
1Under this doctrine, as propounded by the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, in his
volume Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), the oceans are classiﬁed either as the territorial sea of coastal
states or (the remainder) as the high seas. The territorial sea is a narrow strip of water, by tradition no
wider than three nautical miles, but extends now to 12 nautical miles (Munro, 2008).
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With this in mind, when approaching the issue of the management of transboundary
ﬁsh stocks, one has to address the two following questions:
i) What are the consequences of coastal states sharing such a resource managing the
resource noncooperatively?
ii) What conditions must be met if a cooperative ﬁsheries management arrangement is
to be stable in the long run?
The ﬁrst question is addressed by drawing upon the theory of noncooperative games,
with the model of Nash (1951) being the most popular among economists. The question
was ﬁrst examined in 1980 in two articles appearing almost simultaneously, one by Clark,
and another by Levhari and Mirman. Both come to essentially the same conclusion,
namely that one can anticipate a prisoner's dilemma type of outcome, in which the
coastal states will be driven to adopt policies that will lead to overexploitation of the
resource. Clark goes as far as to argue that if the coastal states are symmetric, the
outcome will be comparable to the bionomic equilibrium in open access ﬁsheries conﬁned
to a single EEZ (Clark, 1980).
Chapter 1 of my thesis, The Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Strategic Variables in Noncooperative
Fisheries Games2, addresses, by extending the harvest game model of Clark (1980), the
principal question of what the choice of strategic variable has to say for this result. In
the paper I use stock size, harvest quantity, and ﬁshing eﬀort as strategic variables.
Eﬀort is the product of eﬀort ﬂow and the duration of the ﬂow, which is referred to as
ﬁshing capacity and season length, respectively. The model is a two-agent noncooperative
ﬁshery game, where the agents (the coastal states) harvest a common ﬁsh stock. The
planning horizon is inﬁnite. The net present values of ﬁshing and the escapement stock
level from using stock size, harvest quantity, ﬁshing capacity and season length one at
a time as strategic variables show how the choice of variables aﬀects the results. The
2A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in Natural Resource Modeling.
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results show that using ﬁshing capacity as the strategic variable produces the lowest net
present value and the lowest escapement level, whereas the ﬁxed harvest quantity strategy
has the highest economic value and the highest escapement level. Further, using stock
size as the strategic variable produces a net present value and escapement level slightly
higher than when using ﬁshing capacity as the strategic variable, whereas using season
length as the strategic variable produces a net present value and escapement level slightly
lower than with the ﬁxed harvest quantity as the strategic variable. In all these cases,
the harvest elasticity with respect to stock size equals one. However, as this elasticity
approaches zero, the results change when it comes to the escapement levels. Now, with
ﬁshing capacity, stock size, and harvest quantity as strategic variables, the escapement
levels approach zero, whereas the season length strategy maintains a strictly positive
and viable escapement level even when the so-called stock eﬀect is low and the risk of
extinction is high.
The basic nature of the prisoner's dilemma outcome, in a ﬁsheries context, can be
illustrated as follows. Consider a ﬁshery resource shared by two coastal states, A and
B, and suppose further that there is no resource management cooperation between the
two. A and B manage their respective ﬂeet segments harvesting the resource on their
own. If A were to restrict harvest in order to invest in the resource, the beneﬁts from this
action would not be enjoyed by A alone, but would be shared with B. What assurance
would A have that B would also undertake conservation? Since there is no cooperation,
the answer is none. It is possible that B would be content to be a free rider, taking
advantage of A's resource investment eﬀorts. In these circumstances, it is likely that A
will conclude that the return on its resource investment would be less than the cost, and
that the best course of action would be to do nothing. B could be expected to come to
the same conclusion. Worse, A has to allow for the possibility that B might deliberately
deplete the resource. If A believes this to be true, then it could ﬁnd that its best interest
is to strike ﬁrst. Once again, B could follow the same line of reasoning (Clark, 1990).
Thus one can conclude that a failure by neighbouring coastal states to cooperate could
xvi
have severe consequences.
In analysing cooperative resource management arrangements, economists naturally
draw upon the theory of cooperative games, with the model of Nash (1953). The number
of coastal states involved in a typical transboundary ﬁshery arrangement is small, so that
considerable progress can be made with simple two-player models (Munro, 1979).
The simple two-player cooperative game models bring to light two fundamental
conditions that must be met if the cooperative resource management arrangement is
to be stable. The ﬁrst condition is straightforward, and easily described. The solution
to the cooperative game; the cooperative management agreement, must be collectively
rational, in the sense that there does not exist another agreement that could make one
player better oﬀ without harming the other players.
The second condition is that the solution must be individually rational, in the sense
that each and every player has to be assured of receiving a payoﬀ from the cooperative
arrangement at least as great as it would receive under noncooperation. This assurance
has to last throughout the life of the arrangement. In game-theoretic terms, these
minimum payoﬀs are referred to as threat point payoﬀs, and are normally assumed to be
those arising from the solution of a noncooperative game.
The anticipation that ﬁshery resources in the remaining high seas beyond the EEZs
would be of minor importance proved to be dramatically wrong. Following the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, there was extensive exploitation of
the high seas segments of straddling stocks, which undermined coastal state attempts to
manage those stocks found within the EEZs.
An example is provided by blue whiting, one of the most abundant ﬁsh species in
the Northeast Atlantic. The blue whiting stock straddles the EEZs of the EU, the Faroe
Islands, Iceland and Norway, and the high sea areas of the Northeast Atlantic. During
the period 1970-1997, the blue whiting ﬁshery was dominated by the Russian Federation
(former Soviet Union) and Norway, which developed it. Since the late 1990s there has been
an increased interest in the blue whiting ﬁshery, and the total landings increased from
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about 650 thousand tons in 1997 to 2.4 million tons in 2004. Iceland, which previously
had for a large part ignored the blue whiting ﬁshery, began to substantially increase its
blue whiting landings from 1998 on. Since 1999, there have been several attempts among
the coastal states of the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland, and Denmark (on behalf
of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), and Russia to reach an agreement and set a common
maximum total allowable catch (TAC). Anticipating that an agreement would be reached
some time in the future, the nations competed in catching blue whiting in an attempt to
establish rights in the ﬁshery and the best possible bargaining position for a future TAC.
Meanwhile, the negotiations failed because each nation demanded a higher share of the
quota than the others were willing to accept (Standal, 2006).
The growing concern over the state of the world's straddling ﬁsh stocks led the United
Nations to convene an international conference to address the issue, the United Nations
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1993-1995),
which in 1995, adopted what is commonly referred to as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
The agreement, which achieved the status of international treaty law in late 2001, is not
meant to replace any part of the 1982 Convention, but is rather designed to supplement
and support the Convention (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003).
Under the terms of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, straddling stocks are to be
managed on a region-by-region basis through regional ﬁsheries management organizations
(RFMO). The precursors of today's RMFOs appeared ﬁrst in the form of international
conventions designed to put restrictions on ﬁshing activities in certain segments of the
high seas3. The RFMOs are to have as members both coastal states and distant water
ﬁshing nations (DWFN)4.
The question then becomes, to what extent do the economic game theory models
developed for transboundary ﬁsh stocks have to be modiﬁed when dealing with straddling
3An example is the 1953 Permanent Commission, from 1964 known as the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), which attempted to impose some management rules over the high seas
ﬁsheries in the Northeast Atlantic (Engesæter, 2003).
4Examples are provided by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission, and the Western Central Paciﬁc Fisheries Convention (Munro, 2008).
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ﬁsh stocks? One part of this question has already been answered. The model of
noncooperative management of transboundary ﬁsh stocks can be applied with some
modiﬁcation to straddling ﬁsh stocks (Sumaila, 1999).
However, when we turn to the cooperative management of the resources, the answer
is quite diﬀerent. The economic game theory model of cooperative management of
transboundary stocks requires substantial modiﬁcation when the issue of cooperative
management of straddling ﬁsh stocks is confronted. First, one can anticipate that the
number of players in the typical straddling stock game will be large. In the analysis
of transboundary ﬁsh stock management, considerable progress can be made using
two-player models. Two-player models are simply inadequate for straddling stocks.
Economists are compelled to employ models in which the number of players exceeds two,
often by a wide margin. This, in turn, means that they have to allow for the possibility
that players will form subcoalitions. The coalition of all players together in a ﬁsheries
game is referred to as the grand coalition.
With subcoalitions possible, it is no longer suﬃcient to be concerned about the
individual rationality condition being satisﬁed. For the solution of the cooperative game
to be stable through time, the solution must also be such that no subcoalition believes that
it would be better oﬀ on its own, playing competitively against the remaining members
of the grand coalition.
Second, in contrast to transboundary stock management, the number and nature of
the players cannot be expected to be constant through time. Some members of the
RFMO are DWFN. An orginal member of an RFMO may withdraw. More importantly,
a DWFN, until now not a member of the RFMO, may apply for membership. The UN
Fish Stocks Agreement makes it clear that the existing members of an RFMO cannot bar
prospective new member outright. This gives rise to the so-called new member problem
(Kaitala and Munro, 1993).
The third diﬀerence falls under the heading of free riding, which can be deﬁned as
enjoyment of the fruits of cooperation by nonparticipants in the cooperative management
xix
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arrangement.
Applied game theorists, using what is known as a coalition bargaining approach, have
addressed the free-riding problem in straddling stock management (Pintassilgo, 2003;
Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008). The fundamental concept of stand-alone stability is
introduced. The grand coalition, i.e., an RFMO, is stand-alone stable if no player is
interested in leaving the cooperative agreement to adopt free-rider behavior (Pintassilgo,
2003: 183).
Pintassilgo (2003) applies this coalition bargaining analysis to the case of the blueﬁn
tuna ﬁshery of the Eastern North Atlantic and Mediterranean, which is currently under
the management of an RFMO in the form of the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna. He argues convincingly that, if there are no eﬀective
curbs on unregulated ﬁshing, the grand coalition of the players in the Eastern North
Atlantic and Mediterranean blueﬁn tuna ﬁshery game is not stand-alone stable. In other
words, the RFMO can be expected to collapse. If unregulated ﬁshing would be eﬀectively
curbed, the prospects for the RFMO are much brighter.
Three of the four chapters of my thesis elaborate on the management of internationally
shared ﬁsh stocks, in particular, the blue whiting (Micromesistius Poutassou Risso) stock.
This stock migrates between the EEZs of the coastal states, consisting of the EU, the
Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway, and the high sea areas in the Northeast Atlantic,
where it is harvested by ﬁshing vessels from the Russian Federation, in addition to the
coastal states' ﬁshing ﬂeets. However, due to the lack of international agreement for
many years on how to divide a TAC among the nations, there was no agreed catch limit.
This led to catches (and TACs) well above the ICES advice, and the blue whiting ﬁshery
is thus not considered sustainable.
On 16 December 2005, after six years of negotiations, the coastal states (the EU,
the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway) reached consensus on the management and
allocation of the blue whiting stock through an Agreed record of conclusions of ﬁsheries
consultations, limiting the catches of blue whiting for the coastal states to no more than
xx
2 million tonnes for 2006. Pursuant to the agreement, until the ﬁshing mortality has
reached a set target level, the Parties agree to reduce their TAC of blue whiting by at
least 100,000 tonnes annually. When the target ﬁshing mortality rate has been reached,
the Parties shall limit their allowable catches to levels consistent with a precautionary
ﬁshing mortality rate as deﬁned by ICES. The agreed TACs for 2007 and 2008 were 1.7
million tonnes and 1.25 million tonnes, respectively. These catch levels are expected to
lead to ﬁshing mortality rates well above the precautionary level.
Chapter 2, The Blue Whiting Coalition Game, is an application of Pintassilgo's
(2003) framework for analysis of coalition, in particular the partition function approach,
to the Northeast Atlantic blue whiting ﬁshery. The blue whiting stock migrates between
the EEZs of diﬀerent countries and also straddles into the high seas where it is accessible
for all countries. Only recently was an agreement reached about the division of a global
catch between the countries ﬁshing the stock. The work done on this issue looks at all
possible coalitions of countries ﬁshing the stock. The main ﬁnding is that coalitions will
typically be unstable, which means that agreements on sharing the stock are unlikely to
be attained and, if attained, may be expected to fall apart. The possibility that a subset
of coastal states will be able to form a partial coalition is most threatening to a stable
coalition, while a coalition of coastal states is most likely to be stable if one member's
defection would cause it to fall apart entirely.
The blue whiting stock is expected to change its distribution, spawning areas and
migration pattern due to climate change. Recently, in years with a relatively warm ocean
climate, juvenile blue whiting has appeared in great abundance in the southwesterly parts
of the Barents Sea. Currently, the blue whiting stock's main spawning areas is west of
the British Isles, but some spawning takes place along the coast of Norway as well as in
the Norwegian fjords (Anon., 2008). An interesting question regarding the distribution
of the stock is how cooperative agreements on the blue whiting are likely to be aﬀected
by climate change.
Chapter 3, Climate Change and the Blue Whiting Agreement, investigates this. Two
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climate scenarios are considered: 1) warming that causes the stock to move into the
Barents Sea and makes Russia a coastal state; 2) cooling that leads to a more westerly
distribution of the stock, in which case Russia is not a coastal state. Scenario 1) increases
the likelihood of a stable coalition.
Until recently, the blue whiting ﬁshery was unregulated. Unlike the other papers
in my thesis, the focus of chapter 4, Increased Fishing Pressure on Unregulated Species:
The Norwegian Blue Whiting Fishery, is not on the game-theoretic aspects of the ﬁshery.
The purse seine ﬂeet analysed also harvests other species, some of which are regulated
while others are not. In an empirical, application the study analyses how landings of blue
whiting depend on their own price, prices of other species, and the price of fuel as well
as quotas and landings of other ﬁsh stocks. The results presented are, of course, ﬁshery-
speciﬁc. Nevertheless, a ﬂeet harvesting a straddling stock may also exploit other stocks,
outside or inside an EEZ. The contribution of this paper is to show that knowledge about
these interactions is necessary for eﬃcient management.
National jurisdiction over the ﬁshery resources within the EEZ can be seen as an
opportunity to overcome the problem of open access within the EEZs, but not on the
high seas. Traditionally, it has been everybody's right to exploit the resources there. This
right is now possibly under threat, cf. the UN Fish Stocks Agreement; however, it is still
very much a juridical twilight zone. On the high seas, to some degree at least, open access
is still the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, agreements between nations have
to be based on voluntary cooperation, because there is no mechanism forcing nations to
agree to something that would not be in their own interests. Therefore, this work is to
a large degree about the possibility of overcoming the problem of open access through
voluntary agreements.
Summing up, the questions analysed in the thesis covers several topics relevant to the
ﬁsheries economics literature. First, exploitation of internationally shared ﬁsh stocks is
considered under diﬀerent assumptions about the regulatory regime, coalition formation,
climatic conditions etc. In this part of the thesis (chapters 1-3), bioeconomic modelling
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and game theory are fundamental tools. Second, the production structure and capacity
utilisation in a segment of a ﬁshing ﬂeet is analysed by means of duality theory and
econometric methods (chapter 4). The span in topics and methods are perhaps large,
but the topics have at least one important common feature; they are all related to
the management of internationally shared ﬁsh stocks and the consequences of strategic
behaviour. The aim of the thesis is thus to contribute to the understanding of the
economic management of shared ﬁshery resources.
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Chapter 1
The Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Strategic
Variables in Noncooperative Fisheries
Games
1
CHAPTER 1. STRATEGIC VARIABLES IN NONCOOPERATIVE FISHERIES GAMES
Abstract
In this paper we use stock size, harvest quantity, and ﬁshing eﬀort as strategic
variables. We model a two-agent noncooperative ﬁshery game, where the
agents (nations) harvest a common ﬁsh stock. The planning horizon is
inﬁnite. The model is solved successively using one instrument at a time as
the strategic variable in the game. The net present values of ﬁshing and the
escapement stock level from the three diﬀerent models are compared to show
how the choice of variables aﬀects the results. The choice of strategic variable
is not a trivial one, as the results are shown to be sensitive to the discounting,
the stock's rate of growth, and the assumptions about the distribution of the
ﬁsh in response to harvesting.
Keywords: Noncooperative resource games, open loop, strategic variables, regula-
tion.
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q20, H73, C72, Q22.
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1.1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we will look at the implications of choosing diﬀerent strategic variables,
harvest quantity, stock size, and ﬁshing eﬀort, in noncooperative ﬁsheries games. We will
model a two-agent game, where the agents (nations) harvest a common ﬁsh stock. The
planning horizon is inﬁnite. The model will be solved successively using one instrument
at a time as the strategic variable in the game. The net present values of ﬁshing and the
escapement1 stock level from the three diﬀerent models will be compared to show how
the choice of variables aﬀects the results.
The choice of strategic variables, be it ﬁshing eﬀort, harvest rate, or stock level, has
rarely been discussed in the literature on ﬁsheries and games. The choice of variables
seems to be rather ad hoc. We came across only two papers that address the question of
the choice of strategic variable and attempt to analyze what this choice might imply.
Vincent (1981) pointed out that diﬀerent control variables can lead to diﬀerent game
solutions. He used a preypredator model based on May et al. (1979) to analyze the
vulnerability of a species to extinction by comparing the equilibrium solutions under
an eﬀort harvesting and a rate harvesting program. The analysis demonstrated that, in
many cases, solutions from a constant harvest quantity strategy will not secure the species
against possible extinction, and an adjustment of the harvest levels may be necessary.
The second paper addressing the choice of strategic variables is by Hämäläinen and
Kaitala (1982), who analyzed a ﬁshery divided between two countries. The model is
an extension of the harvest game model of Clark (1980) (Kaitala, 1986). Each country
manages the ﬁshery as a sole owner within its respective exclusive economic zones. The
authors asked how the sole-owner ﬂeets should choose their policy variables (strategic
variables) in the negotiations. The two countries have three options in their choice
of policy variables: stock size, harvest rate, and ﬁshing eﬀort. Of the possible steady
state Nash equilibria, the one where both countries have the harvest rate as their policy
1Escapement: the stock left behind after ﬁshing.
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variable produces the largest joint revenue ﬂows and the largest stock levels. As perfect
cooperation cannot be guaranteed, the Nash solution of the game is that both countries
choose the stock level strategy, which results in an equilibrium with the lowest revenue
ﬂow of all the nine possible equilibria and the lowest stock levels.
As with Hämäläinen and Kaitala (1982), this paper analyzes a deterministic model
where prices, costs, harvest, and growth functions are known and the same for all
periods. However, while Hämäläinen and Kaitala considered a ﬁshery divided into two
interdependent subﬁsheries, each exploited by a sole owner, we examine a shared ﬁsh stock
exploited by two nations in the same waters. Furthermore, Hämäläinen and Kaitala
ignored the eﬀects of transience of the strategic variables during the approach path,
assuming that the stock is in a steady state initially. In this work, however, we assume
that the stock is in a pristine state initially. When the ﬁshing commences, the stock size
approaches a new steady state. Reaching this new steady state might take several periods,
depending on the strategic variable chosen.2 For instance, with stock size as the strategic
variable, the optimal steady state is independent of the initial stock size.3 When either
harvest quantity or ﬁshing eﬀort is chosen as the strategic variable, the optimal steady
state does depend on the initial stock size.4 Finally, another feature separating this paper
from Hämäläinen and Kaitala's (1982) work is that while these authors assumed that the
ﬁsh maintain a uniform distribution when harvested, we allow the harvest elasticity with
respect to stock size to vary between zero and one. As the harvest elasticity with respect
to stock size approaches zero, we obtain results similar to those found by Vincent (1981).
2When one assumes an initial steady state, it is clear that the choice of strategic variable is trivial,
as is the case when the strategic variables are allowed to vary over time. However, if the stock is not in
the steady state initially, and the strategic variables are held ﬁxed over all periods, the steady state will
depend on the choice of strategic variable.
3This means that as long as the initial stock size is larger than the steady state stock size, and stock
size is the strategic variable, only one period of harvesting is needed to bring the stock size down to its
optimal level. However, if the initial stock size for some reason is less than the steady state size, i.e., if
it is assumed that the stock is not in a pristine state initially, then a moratorium is needed in order to
bring the stock size up to its optimal level. This might take more than one period, depending on the
initial level and the growth of the stock.
4Fixing the harvest quantity or the ﬁshing eﬀort for all future periods may not be optimal in the
long run, but it takes time to change at least some strategic variables, and it is appropriate in order to
illustrate the diﬀerence between the variables.
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How the players' strategy spaces are formulated is also an issue that should be
addressed when modelling dynamic games. Two approaches have been adopted: the
open loop solution, which assumes that commitment to a strategy extends over the entire
future horizon; and the feedback solution, where the assumption is that no commitment at
all is possible (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). This choice can be crucial, and care should
be taken to choose a strategy space that is appropriate for the situation in question
(Reinganum and Stokey, 1985).
With stock size as the strategic variable, both the harvest rate and ﬁshing eﬀort will
change from the initial period until a steady state is achieved in both the stock size and
the harvest rate. Harvest rate or ﬁshing eﬀort are not as ﬂexible as stock size as strategic
variables, although choosing either of them means that the other changes as the size of
the stock is changed by the ﬁshery. Because equilibria in both the harvest rate and the
stock size are achieved so quickly when the escapement level is the strategic variable, we
can assume that the formulation of the strategy space is of minor importance, i.e., it is
not particularly signiﬁcant whether the solution is open loop or feedback. When using
harvest rate or ﬁshing eﬀort as the strategic variable, however, it is harder to make the
same justiﬁcation.5
Amir and Nannerup (2006), however, considered the well-known Levhari and Mirman
(1980) discrete-time model where the resource extraction is equal to consumption. This is
equivalent to having the harvest rate as the strategic variable. Comparing the open loop
and the feedback equilibria, Amir and Nannerup found that the open loop equilibrium
coincides with the symmetric Pareto-optimal solution.6 The feedback equilibrium leads
5Eswaran and Lewis (1985) compared the open loop and feedback Nash equilibria that are obtained in
oligopolistic resource markets when the resource is exhaustible and privately owned, and demonstrated
that there exist cases in which the open loop and feedback equilibria are identical. This is true when
the demand function facing the industry is isoelastic and extraction costs are zero, or when a symmetric
oligopoly faces linear demand and quadratic extraction costs. Moreover, in circumstances where the two
equilibria do not coincide, simulation results revealed that the quantitative diﬀerences between the two
equilibria are small.
6Finding the symmetric Pareto-optimal solution, Amir and Nannerup (2006) considered the sum of
two agents' utilities, each of which were given equal weights. This is equivalent to the single agent
problem and is solved in a feedback framework. Moreover, they stated that the open loop equilibrium
coincides with a symmetric Pareto-optimal solution if, and only if, the externality under consideration
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to overconsumption and a lower total discounted utility level for each agent relative to
the symmetric Pareto-optimal solution. Moreover, Amir and Nannerup pointed out that
if all players are using open loop strategies, a given player cannot unilaterally improve
on his or her payoﬀ by using more complex strategies.
We see that when the harvest rate, or ﬁshing eﬀort, is the strategic variable, the open
loop equilibrium is Pareto-eﬃcient, whereas with the escapement level as the strategic
variable, the open loop and feedback equilibria coincide. When the solution concept is a
closed loop (feedback), rather than an open loop, this means that harvest rate or ﬁshing
eﬀort will not be ﬁxed, but allowed to vary between periods. Thus, the choice of strategic
variable will have no eﬀect on the equilibrium, resulting in the solution being found in
an open loop with the escapement level as the strategic variable.
How ﬁshing eﬀort ﬁts into this picture will depend on how eﬀort is deﬁned. We deﬁne
eﬀort as the product of eﬀort ﬂow and the duration of the ﬂow, and specify two cases:
both nations can ﬁsh for an equally long time, but one ﬁshes with a greater capacity than
the other, or alternatively, one nation has a longer ﬁshing season than the other, but each
ﬁshes with the same capacity. The ﬁrst case, with capacity as the strategic variable, leads
to lower net present values and an escapement level lower than that attained when stock
size is the strategic variable. The second case, with season length as the strategic variable,
leads to net present values and an escapement level slightly lower than that attained if
harvest quantity was the strategic variable. A mixture of both strategies is possible, but
this becomes too complicated to be attempted here. However, as the strategies pull in
opposite directions, we imagine that a combination of both would result in net present
values and an escapement level between that of the harvest quantity and the stock size
strategies.
Another question relates to decisions being made under uncertainty, which is a very
is the dynamic externality (Levhari and Mirman, 1980), and that this result would survive an extension
to more general functional forms for the utility and growth functions. Amir and Nannerup noted that
the Pareto optimality of the open loop equilibria also holds for certain continuous time formulations of
the extraction model; see Chiarrella et al. (1984) and Dockner and Kaitala (1989).
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important characteristic of the ﬁshery problem (see Sethi et al. (2005) for a good analysis
of the issues involved). When the movement of the state variable (stock size) is not fully
deterministic, but subject to stochastic disturbance, the optimal control must be stated
in feedback form, in terms of the state of the system, rather than in terms of time alone
(open loop). Owing to the stochastic disturbance, the stock size that will be obtained
cannot be known in advance (Kamien and Schwartz, 1992).
Although not dealing with uncertainty, our results show that using the constant
capacity as the strategic variable produces the lowest net present value and the lowest
escapement level, whereas the ﬁxed harvest quantity strategy has the highest economic
value and the highest escapement level. Further, using the escapement level as the
strategic variable produces a net present value and escapement level slightly higher than
when using the constant capacity as the strategic variable, whereas using the season length
as the strategic variable produces a net present value and escapement level slightly lower
than with the ﬁxed harvest quantity as the strategic variable. This is when the harvest
elasticity with respect to stock size equals one. However, as this elasticity approaches
zero, the results change when it comes to the escapement levels. Now, with constant
capacity, stock size, and harvest quantity as strategic variables, the escapement levels
approach zero, whereas the ﬁxed season length strategy maintains a strictly positive
and viable escapement level even when the so-called stock eﬀect is low and the risk of
extinction is high. Hence, season length will probably be the safest strategic variable
under uncertainty.
Some strategic variables are not easily changed in the short run. For example,
much non-resource capital used in the ﬁshery (ﬂeet, processing, human) is not readily
shiftable out of the ﬁshery, i.e., non-malleable (Clark et al., 1979). The existence of such
non-malleable capital is of substantial signiﬁcance in real world ﬁsheries management
(Bjørndal and Gordon, 2007), and having ﬁshing eﬀort deﬁned as capacity, as opposed
to season length, illustrates a case where changing the strategic variable takes time.7
7A ﬁxed harvest quantity might also be justiﬁed based on practical problems arising in certain ﬁsheries.
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In most cases, pure feedback or open loop strategies, are extremes. In reality, making
a decision implies some kind of commitment over a period of time, although, not for
all eternity. However, we will not go further in to this but use the open loop solution
method to answer our question of how the choice of diﬀerent strategic variables aﬀect the
outcome.
Open loop solutions bring out the diﬀerence between the strategic variables, whereas
feedback solutions implies that all the strategic variables are easily changed, and that the
choice of variable should not have any inﬂuence on the solution, resulting in a solution
equal to the one obtained in open loop with escapement level as the strategic variable.
Moreover, open loop allows us to analyze the eﬀect of rigid strategic variables and the
potential implications of choosing one particular variable as the strategic variable over
the others. Hence, we will use the open loop solution and look at the stylized case where
decisions are made once and for all.
Choosing the harvest quantity as the strategic variable is comparable to Cournot
competition (Tirole, 1988).8 That is to say, each nation, in choosing its current harvest
quantity, takes into account the other nation's harvest quantities, as the stock size and
growth rate depend on the simultaneous actions of all nations involved in the ﬁshery. Here,
Cournot competition is analogous to Cournot oligopoly. The solution in each period is a
Cournot solution to the game, but the ﬁsh stock responds to the quantity harvested by
both nations and there may be a change in the size of the ﬁsh stock in future periods
(Levhari and Mirman, 1980). Eventually, in the deterministic case, a steady state is
attained in which both harvest quantity and the stock size are in an equilibrium.
Limitations and restrictions on transport capacity or processing on shore can be a limiting factor on the
amount harvested; the ﬁshermen will not be able to land and sell as much as they would if it was not
for these restrictions beyond their control. Example of ﬁsheries where such factors might matter is the
Norwegian small coastal ﬁshing boats ﬁshing for saithe, herring, and sprat. The small boats depends on
larger vessel to come and collect their catch and bring it to processing plants. Meanwhile, the ﬁshermen
have to store the ﬁsh alive in net pens and wait for a transport vessel to arrive.
8In a game with Bertrand competition, on the other hand, the ﬁrms decide on setting the price rather
than production. The production capacity is not constrained, and enables the ﬁrms to produce any
quantity they choose; a price reduction enables them to sell more of their product. The ability for a
ﬁrm to rapidly change its price in response to its competitors' price setting makes Bertrand competition
stronger than Cournot competition (Tirole, 1988).
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With the escapement level as the strategic variable, an underlying assumption is that
the ﬁshing ﬂeet has a suﬃciently large capacity that it is able to reduce the stock size
from its initial level to the optimal escapement level in just one period of ﬁshing, i.e., the
initial period. The nations' ability to rapidly reduce the stock size, as implied by choosing
escapement as the strategic variable, makes the competition between the nations more
intense than it would be if the strategic variable were harvest quantity or ﬁshing eﬀort.
Stronger competition implies that the stock will be depleted further than it would in a
less competitive environment.
The actual control variable used by managers of ﬁsheries need not be the same as
the strategic variable used to analyze the problem. Harvest rate and ﬁshing eﬀort are
possible control variables, whereas stock size is not. However, using the stock size as a
strategic variable does not require that it is the direct control variable (Kaitala, 1986).
The desired stock size can be reached by controlling the harvest quantity or ﬁshing eﬀort,
i.e., harvest quantity and ﬁshing eﬀort are ﬂexible from one period to another, as opposed
to when they are ﬁxed once and for all.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1.2, we model a ﬁshery divided
between two nations and the problems faced by the nations when stock size, harvest
quantity, ﬁshing capacity, or season length, respectively, are chosen as the strategic
variable. We numerically solve the model successively for the four strategic variables,
and perform a sensitivity analysis in Section 1.3. Finally, in Section 1.4, we conclude the
paper.
1.2 The Model
Consider a ﬁsh stock where the stock growth depends on the stock size left in the sea
after ﬁshing has ceased. That is, the stock size at the beginning of the ﬁshing season (t)
is a function of the stock left to grow at the end of the previous season (t− 1). Ignoring
the natural mortality of the ﬁsh as long as the ﬁshing season lasts, the seasonal harvest
9
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quantity, ht, will equal the diﬀerence between the stock size at the beginning of the
season, X(St−1), and the stock size at the end of it, St. Taking the price of the harvest
landed, p, as given, the per period revenue is:
Rt = p[X(St−1)− St]. (1.1)
The instantaneous harvest production function will be speciﬁed as ht = ES
b
t , where E
stands for ﬁshing eﬀort, and St is the stock size. The parameter b is the harvest elasticity
with respect to the stock size, which takes a value of one if the stock maintains a uniform
distribution, and zero if the stock keeps its density constant when harvested. The total
cost becomes C = cE, where c is a cost parameter. The instantaneous cost per unit
harvested is ch =
c
Sbt
.
Total harvest costs can now be expressed as follows9
Ct = c
∫ X(St−1)
St
u−bdu
=

c[logX(St−1)− logSt] for b = 1
c
1−b [X(St−1)
1−b − S1−bt ] for 0 < b < 1
c[X(St−1)− St] for b = 0 ,
(1.2)
where the case where 0 < b < 1 is for the intermediate values of the harvest elasticity
with respect to the stock size, u denotes the integrand, and log is the natural logarithm,
with the number e as the base.
The present value of the proﬁt is:
9As harvest is H = X − S, with X given initially in every period, S ≤ X, S = X − H, SH < 0,
and C(S) = C(S(H)), and H = EX, S = X(1− E), SE = −X, the properties of the cost function are
CH = CSSH ≥ 0 and CHH = −CSSSH = CSS ≥ 0, and CE = −CSS ≥ 0 (where subscripts denote the
derivatives).
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V =
∞∑
t=0
(Rt − Ct)δt, (1.3)
where δ = 1
1+r
is the discount factor, and r is the interest rate.
We let the stock dynamics be described by the discrete variant of the logistic growth
function, as follows:
X(S) = S + aS[1− S], (1.4)
where a is the intrinsic rate of stock growth. The carrying capacity usually associated
with the logistic growth function is set equal to one.
After substituting Equation 1.4 into Equation 1.3, nation i set its control variable,
taking the settings of the other nation as ﬁxed. The nations can choose among three
possible control variables: the escapement level Si and S¯, the harvest quantity hi and h¯,
and the ﬁshing eﬀort Ei and E¯, where the bar above Nation Two's controls means that
Nation One treats these as constants. We have three objective functions, one for each
control variable, that can be maximized with respect to the respective control variable
over an inﬁnite planning horizon.
1.2.1 Stock Size
Nation i's problem with respect to the escapement level is:
max
S
{
p
[
X0 − S¯
2
]
+ p
[
S¯ − S
]
− c
2
∫ X0
S¯
u−bdu− c
∫ S¯
S
u−bdu
+
1
r
{
p
[
S + aS[1− S]− S¯
2
]
+ p
[
S¯ − S
]
− c
2
∫ S+aS[1−S]
S¯
u−bdu− c
∫ S¯
S
u−bdu
}}
,
(1.5)
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with the initial stock size, X0, given.
10
We look at a solution where one nation chooses the length of its ﬁshing period, given
the length of the other nation's ﬁshing period, and then at a solution where both nations
have a ﬁshing period of the same length. This will be the equilibrium solution, given
that the nations are identical, i.e., they face the same price and costs.11 The escapement
level, S∗, should be chosen such that it maximizes the net present value of each i's proﬁts
over all periods.
The stock size that maximizes nation i's present value of the stock given the other
nation's harvest can be found by taking the ﬁrst derivative of Equation 1.5 with respect
to S. We show this and the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to harvest quantity and
ﬁshing eﬀort in the Appendix.
Both nations' problems are, by the assumption of symmetry, identical.12 Iteratively
ﬁnding the optimal escapement level S for one nation, and substituting it as S¯ into the
other nation's problem, leads to the noncooperative solution S∗ = S = S¯. The expression
for each nation's net present value simpliﬁes to:
V i(S∗) = p
[
X0 − S∗
2
]
− c
2
∫ X0
S∗
u−bdu
+
1
r
{
p
aS∗[1− S∗]
2
− c
2
∫ S∗+aS∗[1−S∗]
S∗
u−bdu
}
, i = 1, 2.
(1.6)
Both nations take an equal share of the total harvest and make the same proﬁt.
However, this is not identical to the nations' objective functions, where each nation
continues harvesting under the assumption that the other has stopped and, by unilaterally
increasing their catch, makes extra proﬁts. Nation Two does the same as Nation One, so
10If the initial stock size is less than the optimal stock size, it will be necessary to leave the stock
unﬁshed for one or more periods, until X(St−1) > S∗.
11As long as identical nations ﬁsh simultaneously, they will end up sharing the costs equally.
12The focus of this analysis is the choice of strategic variable. The complicating cases of asymmetry
in the nations' costs and time preferences are left out. However, Hannesson (1997) analyzed the case
where one nation has a lower cost than the others. This could lead the low cost nation to exclude the
high cost nations from the ﬁshery altogether.
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the ﬁnal escapement level, S∗, is lower than if the two nations agreed to maximize joint
proﬁt, which would be equivalent to maximizing Equation 1.6.
The problem when we choose ﬁshing eﬀort or harvest quantity as the strategic variable
follows the same structure as when the escapement level is the strategic variable. The
diﬀerence is that we need to deﬁne the stock levels X, S¯, and S as functions of the initial
stock size, X0, and the ﬁshing eﬀorts, E
i and E¯ or the harvest quantities, hi and h¯.
1.2.2 Fishing Eﬀort
Eﬀort (E) is the product of eﬀort ﬂow and the duration of the ﬂow, which we refer
to as capacity (κ) and season length (τ), respectively. Therefore, E = κτ . Deviations
can occur in two ways: (i) both agents ﬁsh an equally long time, but one uses greater
capacity than the other, or (ii) one agent ﬁshes longer than the other, but with the same
capacity. These deviations will not necessarily lead to the same outcome. A mixture of
both scenarios is possible, but that becomes very complicated.
For case (i), the present value of proﬁts for agent i is:
max
Eiκ
{ ∞∑
t=0
{
Eiκ
Eiκ + E¯κ
pXt(St−1)
[
1− e−[Eiκ+E¯κ]
]
− cEiκ
}
δt
}
, (1.7)
where i = 1, 2, and X0 is given.
Note that X
[
1− e−[Eiκ+E¯κ]
]
indicates how many ﬁsh are taken during the period, but
of this amount, agent i gets the share E
i
κ
Eiκ+E¯κ
if both nations ﬁsh equally long, and the
total eﬀort is Eiκ + E¯κ =
∫ Xt(St−1)
St
u−bdu.13
Under case (ii), the present value of proﬁts for agent i is:
13For 0 < b < 1, total eﬀort is Xt(St−1)
1−b−S1−bt
1−b , and E
i
κ + E¯κ is proportional to total eﬀort by some
factor, say, 1. Thus, we can write
Xt(St−1)1−b−S1−bt
1−b = E
i
κ + E¯κ. Rearranging this expression, we obtain
the following:
St =
[
Xt(st−1)1−b −
[
1− b
][
Eiκ + E¯κ
]] 11−b
.
13
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max
Eiτ
{ ∞∑
t=0
{
p
Xt(St−1)
2
[
1− e−E¯τ
]
− cE¯τ
2
+ pXt(St−1)e−E¯τ
[
1− e−[Eiτ−E¯τ/2]
]
− c[Eiτ − E¯τ/2]
}
δt
}
,
(1.8)
where i = 1, 2, and X0 is given.
When season length is the strategic variable the intermediate stock size, S¯, is expressed
as Xt(St−1)e−E¯τ , where E¯τ =
∫ Xt(St−1)
S¯
u−bdu is the total intermediary ﬁshing eﬀort when
both nations harvest simultaneously. Whereas Eiτ =
∫ S¯
St
u−bdu is the ﬁshing eﬀort used
when nation i extend its ﬁshing season unilaterally. The escapement level of period
t is St = Xte
−[E¯τ+Eiτ ], and the stock size when ﬁshing starts in the next period is
Xt(St−1) = St−1 + aSt−1[1 − St−1]. This goes on until an escapement level is reached
where the harvest quantity and the stock size are in equilibrium.14
Having found E∗j , j = κ, τ , we can substitute this into the objective functions with
respect to ﬁshing eﬀort, and the net present value of the ﬁshery for nation i becomes:
V i(E∗j ) = p
X0
2
[
1− e−[
RX0
St
u−bdu]
]
− c
2
∫ X0
S0
u−bdu
+
∞∑
t=0
{{
p
Xt(St−1)
2
[
1− e−[
RXt(St−1)
St
u−bdu]
]
− c
2
∫ Xt(St−1)
St
u−bdu
}
δt
}
,
(1.9)
where i = 1, 2, j = κ, τ , and X0 is given.
1.2.3 Harvest Quantity
Considering harvest quantity as the strategic variable we assume that the ﬁshing eﬀort is
ﬁxed and equal for both nations, and that they face the same price, costs and technology.
14Denote the time period when equilibrium is reached by T . Then XT (ST−1)e−2E
∗
τ = S∗ is the
equilibrium stock size, which in this case maximizes the net present value. However, before S∗ is reached
there are several Ss that maximize the present value.
14
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Both nations harvest will be equal as long as they ﬁsh simultaneously for the same
amount of time. Then the only way for a nation to harvest more (less) than the other is
by extending (shorten) its ﬁshing season relative to the other. Hence, we have to apply
the same solution method as with escapement level and season length (ﬁshing eﬀort case
(ii)) as the strategic variable to ﬁnd the equilibrium solution.15
The problem of nation i with respect to the harvest quantity is now:
max
hi
{ ∞∑
t=0
{
phi − c
2
∫ Xt(St−1)
Xt(St−1)−2h¯
u−bdu− c
∫ Xt(St−1)−2h¯
St
u−bdu
}
δt
}
, (1.10)
where X0 is given, and i = 1, 2.
When the optimal harvest quantity, h∗ = hi = h¯, i = 1, 2, is found and substituted
into, say, Nation One's problem, an expression of the nation's net present value simpliﬁes
to:
V i(h∗) = ph∗− c
2
∫ X0
X0−2h∗
u−bdu+
∞∑
t=1
{{
ph∗− c
2
∫ Xt(St−1)
Xt(St−1)−2h∗
u−bdu
}
δt
}
, i = 1, 2. (1.11)
Note that this is not the nation's objective function, but a result of the fact that with
the assumption of symmetry, the nations end up choosing the same harvest quantity in
equilibrium. Equation 1.11 is the resulting net present value function when the nations
have solved the noncooperative game.
Having deﬁned the problem with respect to stock size, harvest quantity, and ﬁshing
eﬀort, we are able to ﬁnd numerical solutions to the strategic variables and compare the
resulting stock sizes remaining after ﬁshing has stopped and the net present values of the
ﬁshery for the four strategic variables in question.
15When harvest quantity is the strategic variable the intermediate stock size, S¯, is expressed as X−2h¯.
2h¯ is the total intermediary harvest quantity when both nations harvest simultaneously. The escapement
level of the initial period is S0 = X0 − hi0 − h¯, and the stock size when ﬁshing starts in the next period
is X1 = S0 + aS0[1− S0].
15
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Table 1.1: The benchmark parameters of the model
Parameter Initial stock Growth rate Price Costs Discount rate
Symbol X0 a p c r
Value 1 1 1 0.5 0.05
1.3 Results
In this section, we present the numerical solutions of the problems presented in the
previous section. We start by choosing some values of the parameters: price, the initial
stock size, the intrinsic rate of stock growth, costs, and the discount rate. We will refer
to these parameters as the benchmark set. The benchmark values are shown in Table
1.1.
By setting the price, p, equal to one, we measure the value of the ﬁsh in the same
units as the stock size. An initial stock size, X0, equal to one means that the stock is in
pristine condition when the ﬁshery starts in the initial period. Growth diﬀers from one
population to another, and this aﬀects the harvest. In order to account for this, we will
perform a sensitivity analysis where we solve the models for values of the intrinsic growth
rate between one and 0.10. We will also present sensitivity analyses of the interest rate,
r, and the cost parameter, c.
1.3.1 Reference Solutions
Table 1.2 reports the results from the numerical solutions of the models using the
benchmark parameter values in Table 1.1, where the harvest elasticity with respect to
the stock size, b, takes the values 1 and 0.1. The variables S, Eij, and h
i, i = 1, 2, and
j = κ, τ , are the respective strategic variables of each model satisfying the ﬁrst-order
necessary conditions. The NPVs are the net present values found by substituting the
respective optimal, noncooperative values of the strategic variables into Equations 1.6,
1.11, and 1.9. The harvest quantities are the equilibrium harvest quantities.
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Table 1.2: Noncooperative solution: net present values for the strategic variables
escapement level, ﬁshing eﬀort, and harvest quantity, using the benchmark values in
Table 1.1
Variables NPV Escapement Harvest Fishing
level quantity eﬀort
b = 1.00
S 0.778 0.592 0.121 -
Eiκ 0.773 0.582 0.122 0.175
Eiτ 0.819 0.619 0.118 0.162
hi 0.831 0.632 0.116 -
b = 0.10
S 0.435 0.065 0.003 -
Eiκ 1.265 0.000 > MSY 0.132
Eiτ 1.221 0.344 0.113 0.252
hi 1.263 0.000 > 0.125 -
From Table 1.2, for the case where b = 1, we see that selecting the constant capacity,
Eκ, as the strategic variable in the game produces the lowest net present value and
the lowest escapement level of the four variables, followed by the constant escapement
strategy S. The constant harvest quantity strategy, h, has the highest economic value,
as well as the highest escapement level. The ﬁxed season length strategy, Eτ , has the
second largest NPV and escapement level.
For the case where b = 0.1, the order of the net present values and the escapement
levels are changed relative to when b = 1. The constant capacity strategy has the highest
NPV, and the harvest quantity strategy has the second highest. Although the net present
values are higher than when b = 1, the harvest rates, for both the harvest quantity
strategy and the constant capacity strategy, are above the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY).16 Continually harvesting more than the MSY will eventually lead to the stock's
extinction.
The NPV of the season length strategy is now less than those of the harvest quantity
and constant capacity strategies, but is higher than the NPV when b = 1. However,
16The MSY is maxS{aS[1−S]}, which is satisﬁed for SMSY equal to 0.5, giving an MSY of 0.25 for an
intrinsic growth rate, a, equal to one. The harvest quantity strategy, reported in the lower panel of Table
1.2, is only marginally larger than the MSY, and the associated net present value is only marginally
larger than the NPV produced if the harvest rate was identical to the MSY.
17
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the escapement level remains well above the stock size where price equals costs. The
escapement strategy's NPV is now reduced relative to when b = 1, and the corresponding
escapement level is very low, close to zero.
As the harvest elasticity with respect to stock size approaches zero, the strategies of
a ﬁxed escapement level, a ﬁxed harvest rate, or a constant capacity all make the stock
vulnerable to extinction. However, the constant ﬁshing season length strategy turns out
to be the most conservative strategy when the harvest elasticity approaches zero, with a
relatively high escapement level and a proﬁtable, sustainable ﬁshery. This is in accordance
with the results found by Vincent (1981), namely, that an adjustment of the harvest level
may be necessary in order to prevent extinction.
For comparison, Table 1.3 present the results from the sole-owner case, where the
nations cooperate on maximizing the joint proﬁt, which is equivalent to maximizing
Equation (1.3) with escapement level, S, ﬁshing eﬀort, E,17 or harvest quantity, h, as
the alternative strategic variables.18 Note that the NPV, the harvest quantity, and the
ﬁshing eﬀort reported are half of the total value, the total harvest, and the total eﬀort as
they are shared equally between the two nations. This is done to make the comparison
between a noncooperative management (Table 1.2) and a cooperative management (Table
1.3) easier.
If the resource is managed as a sole-owner property and joint long-term proﬁts are
maximized, the ﬁxed escapement strategy19 is the most proﬁtable as well as the most
conservative strategy with respect to the escapement level. The constant harvest quantity
strategy, on the other hand, is the least proﬁtable and is less conservative than the other
strategies. This result, which is true for both b = 1 and b = 0.1, is the opposite of the
17When a sole owner manages the stock, the NPV and the escapement level are the same regardless
of how ﬁshing eﬀort is deﬁned, i.e., regardless of whether there is a constant capacity Eκ or a constant
ﬁshing season length Eτ . Hence, the ﬁshing eﬀort reported in Table 1.3 is actually Eτ .
18The sole owner optimization is carried out by deciding on the level of the strategic variable and
keeping it ﬁxed over the entire planning horizon, assuming a pristine stock size initially. Thus, the
results from the optimization will depend on the choice of strategic variable.
19Reed (1979) found a policy of maintaining a constant escapement level to be optimal in the presence
of growth uncertainty.
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Table 1.3: Sole-owner (cooperative) solution: net present values for the strategic variables
escapement level, ﬁshing eﬀort, and harvest quantity, using the benchmark values in Table
1.1
Variables NPV Escapement Harvest Fishing
level quantity eﬀort
b = 1.00
S 0.852 0.683 0.108 -
E 0.849 0.679 0.109 0.139
h 0.846 0.677 0.109 -
b = 0.10
S 1.310 0.498 0.125 -
E 1.301 0.485 0.1249 0.170
h 1.263 0.000 > 0.125 -
result that we obtained under a noncooperative management.
The relatively low NPV found under noncooperative management with the escape-
ment level as the strategic variable may seem somewhat surprising; reaching the steady
state after only one period from a pristine stock means that the proﬁt earned in the
initial period is high. In contrast, the equilibrium stock size is reached after 38 periods
for the harvest quantity strategy, and after about 20 periods with constant capacity and
season length as strategic variables (for b = 1). We can think of the harvest rate and
ﬁshing eﬀort as control variables that put constraints on our decision making, which is
locked in by a constant harvest or eﬀort. Proﬁts in every period, except the initial one,
are discounted, and even with a high initial proﬁt, the net present value from the game
played with stock size as the strategic variable is the lowest of the three possible strategic
variables.
A comparison between the initial proﬁts from choosing the harvest rate (or the season
length) as the strategic variable, setting b = 1, and the initial proﬁt from the game
where stock size is the strategic variable, shows that the initial proﬁt is 69% (79%) of
the escapement strategy's initial proﬁt for the harvest rate and season length strategies,
respectively. However, from period one onwards, the escapement strategy's proﬁt is more
than halved, relative to its initial proﬁt. For the harvest rate and season length strategies,
on the other hand, the reduction in each period's proﬁts is less pronounced and, after
19
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a few periods, the harvest rate strategy has the highest per period proﬁt. Thus, even
though stock size as a strategic variable yields a high initial proﬁt, the strong competition
implied when stock size is chosen as the strategic variable in the game forces the nations
to reduce the stock size to such a low level that the initial gain is oﬀset by the future
losses from having to ﬁsh the stock at a low level. As the stock size is reduced, the cost
of harvesting goes up at an increasing rate. If we are free to choose the optimal levels,
a ﬁxed harvest rate or a ﬁxed season length, as opposed to choosing a ﬁxed stock size,
does not necessarily mean that we are worse oﬀ.
Table 1.2 also shows that the constant capacity stock size strategies have the lowest
escapement levels and the highest harvest rates in equilibrium. Selecting harvest quantity
as the strategic variable, on the other hand, produces the highest escapement level and the
lowest equilibrium harvest rate. Selecting a constant ﬁshing season length as the strategic
variable results in an intermediate escapement level, and an intermediate equilibrium
harvest rate relative to the results for constant capacity, stock size, and harvest rate.
However, the results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the results obtained when the
harvest rate is selected as the strategic variable.
If we modeled ﬁshing eﬀort as a mixture of both capacity and time, we can imagine
that the two factors would work in opposite directions; capacity tends towards lower
NPVs and a lower escapement level, whereas time will lead to higher NPVs and a higher
escapement level. The combination of both will probably result in intermediate NPVs
and an intermediate escapement level relative to the results when stock size and harvest
quantity are selected as strategic variables.
1.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
As a value of the intrinsic rate of stock growth, a, equal to one is somewhat high for
most of the economically important ﬁsh stock, it is appropriate to perform a sensitivity
analysis. Moreover, the benchmark values of the discount rate and harvest costs, 0.05 and
20
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0.5, respectively, were chosen without any justiﬁcation in the literature or from empirical
evidence and thus also warrant sensitivity analyses. We report the escapement levels
and the net present values from using, respectively, stock size, harvest rate, and ﬁshing
eﬀort as the strategic variable, while changing the value of one parameter at a time and
holding the other parameters at the benchmark values reported in Table 1.1, and keeping
the harvest elasticity with respect to the stock size equal to one.
As Table 1.4 shows, the results were robust for the net present values. The eﬀects of
changing the parameter values can be summarized in the following way: the net present
values were reduced and tended to converge for all strategic variables when the growth
rate was lowered, or when the discount rate and the costs were increased. The natural
resource conservation outcome, on the other hand, was reversed for low intrinsic growth
rates and discount rates.
Starting with the benchmark value of the intrinsic growth rate and gradually reducing
it initially raised the escapement levels of the constant capacity, and season length, and
harvest quantity strategies, which reached their respective maxima at about 0.60, 0.95,
and 0.85. Thereafter, their escapement levels gradually declined, all having reached the
stock size where price equals costs at a growth rate of 0.10. However, the escapement
level of the stock size strategy declined continuously as the growth rate was lowered, but
remained well above the stock size where price equals costs, even at low rates of stock
growth.
The escapement levels of all four strategic variables are reduced by increasing the
discount rates. However, they decline at diﬀerent rates. The harvest quantity strategy
with the highest escapement level in the benchmark case has the highest rate of decrease,
reaching a stock size where price equals costs at a discount rate of about 0.30, along with
the constant capacity strategy. The stock size strategy, on the other hand, is the variable
least sensitive to discount rates, resulting in the highest escapement level at higher rates
of discount.
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1.4 Conclusions
In a competitive environment, the constant capacity and ﬁxed escapement strategies are
the least proﬁtable and have the lowest escapement levels. The constant harvest quantity,
on the other hand, is now the strategy that has the highest net present value and the
highest escapement level. The net present values and the escapement levels are lower
with noncooperation than with full cooperation.
By dividing ﬁshing eﬀort into two components, capacity and ﬁshing season length, a
striking diﬀerence between these two measures of eﬀort appears. Controlling the ﬁshing
eﬀort by setting the ﬁshing season length, assuming that the nations ﬁsh with equal
capacity, resulted in net present values and an escapement level almost as high as when
the harvest quantity strategy was used. On the other hand, assuming the duration of
the ﬁshing season is equal for both nations but allowing for diﬀerences in ﬁshing capacity
resulted in the lowest net present values and escapement level of all four possible strategic
variables. Indeed, the net present values and escapement level were even lower than those
for the stock size strategy, which we initially anticipated would give the lowest net present
values and escapement level.
In this paper, we have examined the open loop solutions where harvest/stock
size/eﬀort are ﬁxed over an inﬁnite time horizon. This means that we are committed
to the decisions made regarding our strategy. Harvest quantity, the length of the ﬁshing
season, and to some extent the escapement level, can easily be changed, even in the short
run. However, the ﬁshing capacity can only be changed in the longer run. It takes time to
accommodate a reduction or increases in the number of ﬁshing vessels, the vessels' size,
storage capacity, and so on. Hence, our future actions, bounded by our present choice
of capacity, will lead to depletion of the resource and loss of potential economic rents.
Although one might argue that controlling eﬀort consists of setting both capacity and
time, each works in opposite directions, and combining these strategies yields an outcome
set that is intermediate to the cases of harvest quantity and stock size. Nevertheless, it is
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still interesting to note that the most rigid of the variables is the most competitive one.
The assumptions about the distribution of ﬁsh in the sea, associated with the ﬁsh
stock's response to being harvested, are crucial. As the tendency to a uniform distribution
is reduced and the harvest elasticity with respect to the stock size approaches zero, the
stock becomes more vulnerable to extinction. At stock elasticities close to zero, a season
length strategy is the only strategic variable that sustains a proﬁtable stock size in the
long run.
The eﬀects of the choice of strategic variable are to some extent sensitive to the level
of the intrinsic growth rate and discounting. At lower growth rates, the ﬁxed escapement
strategy becomes the strategy with the highest escapement level, whereas the escapement
levels for harvest quantity, constant capacity, and season length strategies tend towards
the stock size level where price equals costs. In addition, a high discount rate increases
the escapement strategy's escapement level relative to the other strategies.
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Appendix
This shows the solution of the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the problems in
Equations (1.5), (1.7), (1.8), and (1.10) for b = 1.
The escapement level, S, should be chosen such that it maximizes the net present
value of proﬁts over all periods. The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for this is:
−p+ c
S
+
1
r
{
p
[
1 + a(1− 2S
2
)
]
− p−
c
[
1 + a(1− 2S)
]
2
[
S + aS(1− S)
] + c
S
}
= 0. (A1)
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Equation (A1) can be solved for S which equals the optimal escapement level S∗,
independently of the initial stock size X0, and the intermediate stock size S¯.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions with ﬁshing eﬀort or harvest quantity as the
strategic variable are functions of the initial stock size, X0, and the other nation's ﬁshing
eﬀort E¯j, j = κ, τ , or harvest quantity, h¯. In addition, the time at which the stock size
reaches its steady state, t ≥ T , depends on the strategic variable.
Fishing eﬀort, case(i):
By denoting i's share, E
i
κ
Eiκ+E¯κ
as α1, and the other nation's share, 1 − EiκEiκ+E¯κ , as α2,
and using the fact that Ht = Xt
[
1 − e−[Eiκ+E¯κ]
]
and St = Xte
−[Eiκ+E¯κ], we can simplify
the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions to:
∞∑
t=0
{
α2
Eiκ + E¯κ
pHt + α1pSt − c+ α1pX ′t(St−1)
dSt−1
dEiκ
}
δt = 0, i = 1, 2. (A2.i)
Fishing eﬀort, case(ii):
By recognizing that St = Xte
−[Eiτ+E¯τ/2], the ﬁrst-order condition can be simpliﬁed to:
∞∑
t=0
{{
pSt − c+ pX ′t(St−1)
[[
1 + e−E¯τ
2
]
− e−[Eiτ+E¯τ/2]
]
dSt−1
dEiτ
}
δt
}
= 0, i = 1, 2. (A2.ii)
The ﬁrst-order necessary condition with respect to the harvest quantity is:
∞∑
t=0
{{
p− c
St
+
cX ′t(St−1)
2
[
2
St
− 1
Xt
− 1
Xt − 2h¯
]
dSt−1
dhi
}
δt
}
= 0, (A3)
where i = 1, 2, X0 is given, and the prime denotes the ﬁrst derivative with respect to
St−1.
From period T onwards, the stock size, ST , is in equilibrium and all the expressions
in Equations (A2.i), (A2.ii), and (A3) can be treated as constants, for all t ≥ T . The
marginal beneﬁts and costs terms are clearly constant for all t ≥ T , and ∑∞t=T δt, which
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is the sum of an inﬁnite geometric series and, thus, converges to δ
T
1−δ .
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Abstract
The current paper is an application of the analysis of coalition, in particular
the partition function approach, to the North East Atlantic blue whiting
ﬁshery. In an Exclusive Membership/Coalition Unanimity game, a multi-
agent, age-structured bioeconomic model simulates the behaviour of the
agents in a setting where we allow for partial cooperation between the coastal
states consisting of the European Union (EU), the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and
Norway. We ﬁnd that in a game played by the Exclusive Membership rules
a coalition among all the coastal states is unstable, and cannot be a Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, a coastal state agreement seems an unlikely outcome.
However, under the more restricted Coalition Unanimity rules, fewer coalition
structures are feasible, and the coastal state coalition becomes stable and the
noncooperative coalition structure unstable.
Keywords: Straddling ﬁsh stocks, coalition approach, partition function, partial
cooperation, coastal state agreement, Exclusive Membership/Coalition Unanimity game,
blue whiting.
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q22, Q28, C72.
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2.1 Introduction
The blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), a small gadoid, characterized as an oceanic
semi-pelagic species living in the North East Atlantic, is one of the most abundant ﬁsh
species in the Norwegian Sea. Being a straddling ﬁsh stock1, migrating through many
countries'exclusive economic zones (EEZs) as well as into international waters, it has
been subjected to heavy exploitation by several European nations, especially since the
late 1990s. However, due to the lack of international agreement for many years on how to
divide a total allowable catch (TAC) among the nations, there was no agreed catch limit.
This led to catches well above the advice of the International Council for the Exploration
of Sea2 (ICES), and thus the blue whiting ﬁshery was not considered sustainable.
However, on 16 December 2005, after six years of negotiations, the coastal states
consisting of the European Union (EU), the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway reached
an agreement on the management and allocation of the blue whiting stock, limiting the
catches of blue whiting to no more than 2 million tonnes for 2006 (Anon., 2005). A related
regulation for international waters was adopted by the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission3 (NEAFC) for 2006. This agreement, renewed and ratiﬁed both for 2007
and 2008, can be seen as a coalition between the coastal states, while the ﬁfth player,
1Straddling ﬁsh stocks are a special category of internationally shared ﬁshery resources that straddle
exclusive economic zones (EZZ) where states have special rights over the exploration and use of marine
resources, and adjacent high seas. These species, usually targeted by both coastal states and distant
water ﬁshing nations, became increasingly disputed after the establishment of exclusive economic zones
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Anon., 1982).
2The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES, is an independent, scientiﬁc
organization that advises regional ﬁsheries organizations, the European Union, and other countries
around the North Atlantic on the marine environment and its resources. ICES consists of three advisory
committees; one on ﬁsheries management (ACFM), one on marine environment (ACME), and one on
ecosystems (ACE). The Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management collects scientiﬁc background
material and oﬀers annual advice on the catches of important ﬁsh species in the North Atlantic. Based
on the advice given, the involved countries negotiate annual quotas and other management measures for
the ﬁsh stocks.
3The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC, is intended to serve as a forum for
consultation, exchange of information on ﬁsh stocks and the management of these, and advise on the
ﬁsheries in the high seas areas mentioned in the convention on which the commission is based. Since
most of the ﬁsheries are within the jurisdiction of the coastal states, NEAFC has no real management
responsibilities beyond the fraction of the ﬁsh stocks located within the high seas areas covered by the
convention (Bjørndal, 2008).
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Russia, not recognized as a coastal state by the others, is excluded from participating in
a coastal state agreement on the management of this ﬁshery.
The United Nations (Anon., 1995) calls for for the management of straddling/highly
migratory ﬁsh stocks to be carried out through regional ﬁsheries management organiza-
tions (RFMOs), to involve both the coastal states and the distant water ﬁshing nations
(DWFNs) (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). Membership in an RFMO is open to any nation
with real interest in the relevant ﬁsheries, both coastal states and DWFNs. The term
`real interest' is not deﬁned in the Fish Stocks Agreement, but can be taken to include
nations currently engaged in exploitation of the ﬁsheries; DWFNs which are not currently
engaged in exploiting the ﬁsheries, but which have done so in the past, and would like to
re-enter the ﬁsheries; DWFNs which have never exploited the ﬁsheries, but which would
like to enter. The blue whiting agreement does not follow this rule, as membership is for
coastal states exclusively. Although membership in NEAFC is open to all nation with
real interest in the blue whiting ﬁshery, NEAFC adopts only management measures for
the high seas based on what the coastal states set aside to be divided among all nations
with real interest in the ﬁshery, both coastal states and DWFNs.
Moreover, in the context of straddling ﬁsh stock management through RFMOs,
externalities are generally present. In fact, as these organizations tend to adopt
conservative management strategies, nonmembers are typically better oﬀ when more
players become members, as free-rider strategies can be adopted. Therefore, when a
player joins an RFMO it generally creates a positive externality for nonmembers. The
purpose of this paper is to investigate the incentives of the coastal states for forming
coalitions in the ﬁrst place, and, in the second, the stability of these coalitions after they
have been formed. To do so we use the framework of economic coalition formation in the
presence of externalities.
The current paper is an application of Pintassilgo's (2003) framework to the North
East Atlantic blue whiting ﬁshery. What separates it from Pintassilgo's work is the
number of players, and thus the number of coalition structures, and instead of focusing
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on full cooperation in an Open Membership game, we consider the possibility of
partial cooperation in an Exclusive Membership/Coalition Unanimity game. The Open
Membership game is designed to describe an institutional environment in which an
outsider can join an existing coalition if it is willing to abide by its rules, without further
consent of its existing members. Under the Exclusive Membership game, on the other
hand, consent of the existing members is required for an outsider to join a coalition. In
the Coalition Unanimity game, the formation, expansion or merger of coalitions require
the unanimous approval of the prospective members (Yi, 2003).
We ﬁnd that in a game played by the Exclusive Membership rules, a coalition among
all the coastal states is unstable and cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a coastal
state agreement seems an unlikely outcome in the ﬁrst place. However, under the more
restricted Coalition Unanimity rules, fewer coalition structures are feasible, and the
coastal state coalition becomes stable and the noncooperative coalition structure unstable.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the development of the blue
whiting ﬁshery and management. Section 2.3 outlines an age structured bioeconomic
model of the ﬁshery. In Section 2.4, we discuss the games and the rules of the game and
deﬁne some fundamental concepts regarding stability. In Section 2.5, the game is applied
to the blue whiting ﬁshery. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Blue Whiting Fishery and Management
This section reviews the development of the blue whiting ﬁshery from its beginning in the
early 1970s until present. Furthermore, the process leading to the coastal state agreement
on the management of the stock is discussed.
2.2.1 The Blue Whiting Fishery
The blue whiting stock in the Northeast Atlantic migrating between the spawning areas
west of the British Isles and south of the Faroe Islands and the feeding areas in Norwegian
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Sea straddles both high seas waters is, in principle, accessible to ﬁshermen from every
country, and the EEZs of several countries, the most important being the EU, the Faroe
Islands, Iceland, and Norway. The map, Figure (4.1) names important places in relation
to the blue whiting, and later Figure (2.3) shows the spawning areas and distribution
pattern along with the migration routes. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, vessels
from the Soviet Union started exploiting blue whiting in the Norwegian Sea (Bailey,
1982). The species was not listed separately in ICES's catch statistics until 1970, but
for the ﬁrst half of the 1970s this was somewhat incomplete (Monstad, 2004). Norway
started experimental ﬁshing with pelagic trawls in the spawning area in 1972. In the
following years the technology of pelagic ﬁshing developed rapidly, with larger vessels,
more powerful engines and larger trawls ﬁtted with acoustic devices, resulting in larger
catches. From annual catches of 100 thousand tonnes in the ﬁrst half of the 1970s, the
landings more than doubled from year to year in the second half of the decade, reaching
a maximum of more than 1.1 million tonnes in 1979-1980.
However, a few years later the landings were only half of this. After that the catches
again started increasing and reached a new local maximum of about 900 thousand tonnes
in 1986 (see Figure (2.2)). Then the ﬁshery went into another decline, reaching its
minimum of less than 400 thousand tonnes landed in 1991. Since then the landings
steadily increased, until they suddenly increased from about 650 thousand tonnes in 1996
to 1.1 million tonnes the next year and continued increasing from then on more or less
steadily to about 2.4 million tonnes in 2004 (ICES, 2005).
This rapid increase in the landings is linked to changes in the environmental conditions
in the Northeast Atlantic, especially in the spawning period, described by Hátún et
al. (2007), but also to favourable living conditions for the blue whiting throughout its
distribution area (Monstad, 2004). The explanation for the changes in distribution and
abundance is not simple, and it is likely that a combination of several factors caused these
changes.
Apart from the Russian Federation (former Soviet Union) and Norway, which
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Figure 2.1: Map showing the Northeast Atlantic and adjacent waters (Bailey, 1982).
35
CHAPTER 2. THE BLUE WHITING COALITION GAME
0
250
500
750
1 000
1 250
1 500
1 750
2 000
2 250
2 500
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
T h
o u
s a
n d
 t o
n n
e s
Norw. Sea
Spawn.area+by-catch
Figure 2.2: Landings from the main ﬁsheries, 1970-2006 (adjusted from Monstad (2004)).
developed the ﬁshery, the blue whiting was mainly ﬁshed by vessels from the Faroe
Islands and countries of the European Union. Only minor ﬁshing was carried out by
Icelandic vessels until the mid-1990s, when a new Icelandic ﬁshery was initiated by a
ﬂeet of powerful vessels (Pálsson, 2005). As a consequence, the Icelandic catches of blue
whiting increased rapidly, reaching 501 thousand tonnes in 2003.
To be able to ﬁsh blue whiting in the waters of other countries, the nations have
negotiated bilateral quotas within the various zones4. Due to the lack of agreed sharing
of the quota, the negotiations did not consider the recommended TAC. In addition,
each country allowed for unlimited landings from its own as well as from international
waters. As a result, the actual harvest in 2001 was in fact almost three times more than
recommended by ICES (ICES, 2003).
4This can be seen as a sort of what Munro (1979) called side-payments, or transfer payments in Clark
(1990), page 158-164. Side-payments are essentially transfers, monetary or non-monetary, between and
among players.
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2.2.2 The Management
As the landings of blue whiting grew to signiﬁcant quantities, it became clear that
international agreement was needed on how to share this resource among the nations
involved. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC, organized a series
of meetings to this end, including workshops, discussions and negotiations. However,
despite two years of such meetings in the early 1990s, when the matter was thoroughly
dealt with, no agreement was reached on how to share the Total Allowable Catch (TAC),
i.e., the quota recommended by NEAFC on the basis of advice from ICES (Monstad,
2004).
The various countries involved have presented diﬀerent ways to show the biological
zonal attachment of blue whiting (Ekerhovd, 2003). Some countries use the concept of
`biomass by time' within their zones (stock size within a zone multiplied with the duration
of the stay) (Monstad, 2004), while others exclusively employ the catch statistics from
the zone as the basic concept (Ekerhovd, 2003). A combination of these two methods is
also used, and in some cases also the inclusion of factors such as economic dependence
on the ﬁshery. In the 2000-2001 coastal state meetings and in NEAFC (Ekerhovd, 2003),
the relevant parties presented demands for their share along with what they thought the
others' shares should be, resulting in a sum of national claims amounting to almost 180%
of a possible TAC (Standal, 2006).
The process was put aside until 1998, when NEAFC set up a Working Group to deal
with the issue and present suggestions for a solution. The Working Group consisted
of representatives from the coastal states, i.e., states that have the blue whiting stock
occurring within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). These are the EU, Norway,
Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland (formally represented by Denmark). The
Russian Federation (Russia) is also included, although not regarded as a coastal state
by the others, but in any case it is a major participant in the blue whiting ﬁsheries
(Ekerhovd, 2003).
37
CHAPTER 2. THE BLUE WHITING COALITION GAME
A great deal of work was carried out in this process. All the available relevant data
were analyzed and used as a basis for discussion and negotiation. In spite of this and the
urgent need for management measures to regulate the blue whiting ﬁsheries, an agreement
was not reach until late 2005.
However, in December 2005 the coastal states consisting of the EU, the Faroe Islands,
Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement. The agreement, starting in 2006, includes a
long term management strategy that implies annual reductions in the landings until the
management goals are reached (Anon., 2006). This arrangement provided for catches in
2006 of 2 million tonnes, allocated as follows: the EU 30.5%, the Faroe Islands 26.125%,
Norway 25.745% and Iceland 17.63%. Russia will be accommodated by transfers from
some of the coastal states and additional catches in the NEAFC area (ICES, 2007).
An interesting aspect of this agreement is how the ﬁshermen's organizations were
instrumental in preparing the ground for the agreement. During the summer of 2005,
prior to the coastal state agreement, various ﬁshermen's organizations from the European
Union, Iceland, and Norway negotiated and signed an agreement, similar to the one signed
by oﬃcials from the coastal states later that year5.
2.3 The Bioeconomic Model
In this section the three basic components of a bioeconomic model are discussed: the
production function, the population dynamics, and the economic sub-model.
2.3.1 The Harvest Production Function
Our model encompasses age groups, aged from one-year-old recruits to ﬁsh of 10 years
and older. The age groups are harvested simultaneously by applying a ﬂeet-speciﬁc
ﬁshing mortality fa,y,i to all age groups. The catch rate for each ﬂeet i is governed by
5Source: A radio interview with the president of the Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owner's Association,
Mr. Sigurd Teige, transmitted by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), 16th December 2005.
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two parameters, the eﬀort, Xi, and the catchability coeﬃcient, qa,y, where a denotes the
age group and y the ﬁshing season. This is a version of the classical Schaefer (1957)
production function, which assumes proportionality between eﬀort and ﬁshing mortality.
The selectivity of the pelagic trawls used in the blue whiting ﬁshery is one for all age
groups, meaning that the gear catches ﬁsh indiscriminately of size or age. The reason
for this lack of age-speciﬁc escapement from the gear is that in the opening of the trawl,
which covers a huge area of water, the mesh size is quite large, several meters in fact,
while at the other end where the ﬁsh ﬁnally end up the mesh size is much smaller, about
50 mm. Furthermore there are one or two extra nets outside the ﬁsh end to prevent it
from breaking due to the increased pressure generated when the swim bladder expands
as the ﬁsh is forced to the surface. Thus, any age-speciﬁc catchabilty coeﬃcient other
than one indicates that the age group composition in the area where the ﬁsh is caught
diﬀers from the age group composition for the entire stock.
The abundance of each age group in landings from speciﬁc areas varies over time and is
governed by many factors. The age distribution of the landings is not uniform across the
age groups. Instead we stylize the catchability coeﬃcients based on assumptions about the
age distribution for each area that seems reasonable. In the ﬁrst two quarters of the year,
the stock is either migrating towards or already in the spawning areas. Therefore, the
catchability coeﬃcients for quarter one and two are set equal to the age speciﬁc proportion
of the maturity ogive; that is, the age distribution of the harvest is equal to the age
distribution in the spawning stock biomass. In the third quarter, the stock has ﬁnished
spawning and has migrated to the feeding areas in the Norwegian Sea. As the older
individuals start the migration earlier and travel farther than the younger ones (Bailey,
1982), they spread too much on their migration to be caught. Furthermore, younger
individuals are reported being over-represented in the landings from the Norwegian Sea
during summer (Heino, 2006). Therefore, the catchability coeﬃcients of the third quarter
are set to unity for the younger age groups, while held at a lower level for the older ones.
In the fourth quarter we assume that the entire stock congregates before starting the
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Table 2.1: Blue Whiting: Quarterly age speciﬁc selectivity in catches
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
First quarter 0.11 0.40 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Second quarter 0.11 0.40 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Third quarter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Fourth quarter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
migration back to the spawning grounds. This results in a uniform age distribution
equal to one. The catchability coeﬃcients are shown in Table (2.1). Note that the qa,ys
distribute the overall ﬁshing eﬀort across the diﬀerent age groups.
2.3.2 Population Dynamics
All age classes are subject to natural mortality, m, which is set to 0.2 for all age groups
(ICES, 2007). It is assumed that only the older component of the population (from age
class 7 on) is fully mature, whereas the younger age classes are only partially mature.
The values for the maturityogive, given in Table (2.2), were estimated by the 1994 Blue
Whiting Working Group (ICES, 1995). The estimate of the maturity ogive deﬁnes the
proportion of the mature individuals in the age class as constant average, MOa, for each
age class. The annual spawning stock biomass is then given by
SSBt =
10+∑
a=1
MOaWaNa,t. (2.1)
where Wa is the individual weight in kilograms at age a (ICES, 2007), shown in Table
(2.2), and Na,t is number of individuals in age group a in year t.
The stock in the beginning of the ﬁrst quarter each year is equal to the recruitment
to the youngest cohort plus the ﬁsh that survived the last quarter the previous year.
The well known stock-recruitment relationships of Beverton-Holt (2.2) and Ricker
(2.3) (Hillborn and Walters, 1992) turned out to be diﬃcult to estimate, using the
available data from 1981 to 2006 (ICES, 2007). That is, most of the parameters, shown
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Table 2.2: Blue whiting: proportion of maturation, weight at age, and numbers at age
2000-2006.
Age Proportion Number of ﬁsh†
group mature Weight‡ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 0.11 0.049 39,743.1 62,497.4 45,631.2 48,220.4 33,551.6 24,040.7 1,141.0
2 0.40 0.075 16,963.6 30,681.3 47,661.7 35,374.2 33,551.6 25,544.5 18,435.0
3 0.82 0.102 16,123.1 11,916.0 21,291.1 33,737.2 25,251.3 25,948.5 18,369.9
4 0.86 0.125 12,150.7 9,579,3 6,932.3 12,869.4 2,069.6 14,962.8 15,955.9
5 0.91 0.147 3,813.6 6,318.9 4,784.9 3,602.6 6,808.6 10,467.8 7,862.8
6 0.94 0.168 909.8 1,985.9 3,153.4 2,463.2 1,835.3 3,252.9 5,220.1
7 1.00 0.185 435.0 409.8 875.3 1,427.3 1,141.5 761.2 1,440.2
8 1.00 0.200 207.4 196.0 180.6 396.2 661.6 473.5 337.0
9 1.00 0.222 138.7 93.4 86.4 81.8 183.6 274.4 209.6
10+ 1.00 0.254 384.3 235.6 145.0 104.7 86.4 112.0 171.1
†Numbers in millions
‡Weights in kilogram per individual
in Tables (2.3) and (2.4), respectively, turned out insigniﬁcant, the estimations explained
very little of the variation in the data, and the observations were serially correlated.
Instead, a serially correlated stock-recruitment relationship, estimated on the recruitment
from 1981 to 2006, reported in ICES (2007), was used in linking the number of recruits, Rt,
to the previous year's recruitment, Rt−1. An explanation for this relationship is that the
recruitment is mainly dependent on various environmental factors, such that a possible
stock-recruitment relationship drowns in the noise. In addition, the serial correlation we
found indicates that good, or bad environmental conditions occur at least two years in a
row.
Rt =
α× SSBt−1
β + SSBt−1
(2.2)
Rt = SSBt−1 × exp (α(1− SSBt−1/β)) (2.3)
Running this serially correlated recruitment process, starting from any initial
recruitment level, the recruitment will converge to a certain recruitment level given the
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Table 2.3: Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment relationship, ﬁtted to data from 1981-2006
(ICES, 2007).
Parameters∗ α β
Values 35329.5 3845.5
Standard Errors 34966.1 6551.5
R2adjusted 0.02
Durbin-Watson test statistic 0.76
∗Estimated by a non-linear regression.
Table 2.4: Ricker stock-recruitment relationship, ﬁtted to data from 1981-2006 (ICES,
2007).
Parameters α β
Values 1.999 17525.2
Standard Errors 0.423 15422.1∗
R2adjusted -0.0049
Durbin-Watson test statistic 0.77
∗The standard error of β was estimated by a non-linear regression.
parameter values, and this level is independent of the ﬁshing eﬀort applied. This means
that the steady state recruitment of the serially correlated recruitment process with the
parameter values presented in Table (2.5) will be about 21.5 billion individuals entering
the ﬁshable stock in steady state. This recruitment level is relatively strong if we compare
it with the average recruitment of the period 1981-1995, which was less than 10 billion
recruits, but moderate if we compare it with the average recruitment of about 36 billion for
the years 1996-2005. Such a strong and reliable recruitment would lead to an unrealistic
and over-optimistic valuation of the stock and leave us with the impression that the stock
can sustain a very high ﬁshing eﬀort indeﬁnitely. In order to compensate for this and in
spite of the fact that we were unable to establish any stock-recruitment relationship, we
let the recruitment process be dependent on the spawning stock biomass, as follows.
In 1998, ICES's Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) deﬁned limit
and precautionary reference points for this stock as follows. Blim (1.5 mill. t.), Bpa (2.25
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mill. t.), Flim (0.51) and Fpa (0.32) (ICES, 1998)
6. The advice of ACFM in the following
years has been given within a framework deﬁned by these reference points (ICES, 2003).
Note that we do not treat the reference points as something that the countries have
agreed upon (Lindroos, 2004b), but rather as a biological feature of the stock, and that
ﬁshing could continue even when the spawning stock is below Blim.
As long as SSB is greater or equal to Bpa we let the recruitment follow the serially
correlated process Rt = α + β × Rt−1. If SSB falls below Bpa but stays above Blim
the recruitment is ﬁxed at α and 5113.6 million individuals are recruited annually.
Further reduction of SSB below Blim leads to partial recruitment failure, with recruitment
dropping to only 500 million recruits annually. Hence
Rt =

500, if SSBt−1 < Blim
α, if Blim ≤ SSBt−1 < Bpa
α+ β ×Rt−1, otherwise.
(2.4)
The parameter values in Equation (2.4) are shown in Table (2.5).
The empirical foundation for what will happen to the recruitment if the spawning
stock biomass is severely reduced is weak. Over the period from 1981 to 2006 an SSB
below Blim has hardly been observed, was reported to be less than Bpa only a few times,
6The ICES approach is that for stocks and ﬁsheries to be within safe biological limits, there should
be a high probability that spawning stock biomass (SSB) is above a limit Blim, where recruitment is
impaired or the dynamics of the stock are unknown, and that ﬁshing mortality is below a value Flim
that will drive the spawning stock to that biomass limit. Because of the occurrence of error in the
annual estimation of F and SSB, operational reference points are required to take account of such error.
ICES therefore deﬁned the more conservative reference points Bpa and Fpa (the subscript pa stands for
precautionary approach) as the operational thresholds. If a stock is estimated to be above Bpa there is
a high probability that it will be above Blim and similarly if F is estimated to be below Fpa there is a
low probability that F is higher than Flim. The reference values Blim and Flim are used for calculation
purposes in order to arrive at Bpa and Fpa, the operational values that should have a high probability of
being sustainable, based on the history of the ﬁshery. Stocks above Bpa and below Fpa are considered
to be inside safe biological limits. Stocks both below Bpa and above Fpa are considered to be outside
safe biological limits, and stocks that are above Fpa but also above Bpa are considered to be harvested
outside safe biological limits: in both cases action is required to bring them inside safe biological limits
(ICES, 2002).
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and certainly did not collapse.
In 2001, ACFM stated that (our italics)
the stock is considered to be outside safe biological limits. In recent years the stock
has rapidly declined. SSB is estimated to have been at Bpa in 2000 and will be close to
Blim in 2001. Fishing mortality has increased from around the proposed Fpa in 1997, to
well above Fpa in 1998 and 1999, and well above Flim in 2000. Total landings in 2000
were 1.4 million t, far above the ICES recommended catch of 800 000 t. Landings in 2000
mainly consisted of the strong 1996 and 1997 year classes. The strength of incoming year
classes is unknown. ICES recommends that the ﬁshery in 2002 for blue whiting in all
areas be closed until a rebuilding plan has been implemented (ICES, 2003).
In 2002, ACFM stated that (our italics)
the stock is harvested outside safe biological limits. The spawning stock biomass for
2001 at the spawning time (April) is inside safe biological limits while the SSB for 2002
is expected to be below Bpa. Fishing mortality has increased rapidly in recent years, and
was estimated at 0.82 for 2001. Total landings in 2001 were almost 1.8 million t. The
incoming year classes seem to be strong. ICES recommends that the ﬁshing mortality be
less than Fpa = 0.32, corresponding to landings of less than 600 000 t in 2003.
Implementation of a rebuilding plan, however, was no longer necessary since, according
to the new assessment, the state of the stock was better than previously estimated.
The above illustrates the diﬃculty of predicting the development of a ﬁsh stock and
also that the period we are dealing with can be regarded as extraordinary. In hindsight,
and in spite of the high and increasing ﬁshing mortality of this period, the SSB is
estimated to have been about 4.3 million tonnes in 2000, about 4.6 million tonnes in 2001,
and increasing until at least 2005. However, evidence from other heavily exploited ﬁsh
stocks suggests that sustained harvesting outside what is considered safe biological limits
will eventually lead to recruitment failure and stock collapse, although under favourable
environmental conditions it may take some time for this to become evident. Hence, we
have decided to follow the biologists in assuming that a low SSB and a high ﬁshing
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Table 2.5: Recruitment function parameters for the blue whiting, estimated over the
period 1981-2006 (ICES, 2007).
Parameters α β
Values 5113.57 0.76
Standard Errors 3790.41 0.14
R2adjusted 0.56
Durbin-Watson test statistic 1.51
mortality indicates that the stock is harvested outside safe biological limits that will
eventually end in a recruitment failure.
Harvest within a certain year is modelled sequentially. That is, the blue whiting
stock migrates through diﬀerent waters during a year, see the map in Figure (2.3) (cf.
Figure (4.1)), and is available for harvest in diﬀerent proportions in the EEZs and the
high seas areas in the North East Atlantic, depending on the season. The model is
divided into quarterly seasons, and Table (2.6) shows the quarterly shares, Si,y (where
i = EU,FO, IS,NO,NEAFC and y denotes the season), of the stock attached to the
diﬀerent waters.
In the ﬁrst quarter of the year, we assume that the blue whiting stock has migrated to
waters west of Ireland and Great Britain and that 50% of the stock is available for harvest
by vessels from the member countries of the European Union within the EEZs around
Ireland and Great Britain. Meanwhile, ﬁshing vessels from non-EU member countries, as
well as EU vessels, can harvest on the remaining stock biomass in international waters
beyond the EU's EEZ.
In the second quarter, the blue whiting population has migrated to the spawning
grounds located within the EEZs of the EU and the Faroe Islands and is assumed to be
equally divided between the two zones and only available for harvesting by vessels from
the EU and the Faroe Islands. Meanwhile, the vessels from the other blue whiting ﬁshing
nations are excluded from participating in the ﬁshery on the spawning grounds, which
are assumed to be within the EEZs of the EU and the Faroe Islands.
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Figure 2.3: Map summarizing the migration pattern and areas of concentration of adult
blue whiting (Bailey, 1982).
In the third quarter, the remaining part of the stock spreads out into the feeding
areas in the Norwegian Sea, and is thus available for harvesting in the EEZs of Norway,
Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, while the EU and Russia only harvest the blue whiting
in the high seas areas. We assume that most of the stock (90%) has left Faroes waters
and is distributed with 25% in both international waters and the Icelandic EEZ. The
remaining 40% is found in Norwegian waters. The reason for assuming that the stock is
more concentrated in Norwegian waters is that Norway has, or claims, jurisdiction not
only over the 200 nautical miles zone surrounding mainland Norway, but also over the
200 nm zone around the island Jan Mayen and over the ﬁshery protection zone around
the Svaldbard (Spitzbergen) archipelago. Combined, these waters cover a signiﬁcant part
of the blue whiting summer feeding area.
In the fourth and last quarter, the blue whiting is still present in the Norwegian Sea,
but the stock is now distributed with 20% in the EEZ of Iceland and the high seas areas
in the Norwegian Sea. The Faroese share of the stock has risen to 25%, while Norway's
share has declined by ﬁve percentage points to 35%. The EU and Russia still have to ﬁsh
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Table 2.6: Quarterly zonal attachment of the blue whiting stock in %
First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 50 25 20
European Community 50 50
Faroe Islands 50 10 25
Iceland 25 20
Norway 40 35
on the high seas.
The numbers of ﬁsh at the beginning of a season that have survived last quarter's
harvest and avoided death by natural causes, are given as (dropping the year subscript
t)
Na,y =Na,y−1
{
SNEAFC,y−1e−[m/4+qa,y−1
P
iXi]
+
∑
j
Sj,y−1e−[m/4+qa,y−1Xj ]
}
,
(2.5)
where i = EU,FO, IS,NO,RU , and j = EU,FO, IS,NO.
Ignoring the possibility of side-payments (Munro, 1979), i.e., unilateral quota
swapping that allows foreign vessels to ﬁsh blue whiting inside other nations' exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), we assume that the vessels ﬁsh in their respective EEZs and
in the high seas areas, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission Regulatory Area,
referred to as NEAFC (RA). Although, the unilateral quota swapping is not insigniﬁcant,
and some nations ﬁsh an extensive part of their blue whiting landings in other waters
than their own EEZs, the exchange has a tendency to go both ways so that the net eﬀect
evens out. Moreover, some 25-35% of the total landings of blue whiting in the period
2000-2006 were caught in the NEAFC regulatory areas.
In order to validate the model and the parameter values presented in Tables (2.1),
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Table 2.7: Validation of the model.†
Fleets
Year EU FO IS NO RU Total
2000
Observed 86,240 138,473 260,184 552,612 211,541 1,249,050
Fitted 86,239.7 138,472.8 260,183.0 552,611.7 211,540.8 1,249,048.0
Eﬀort 0.0103 0.0189 0.0364 0.0570 0.0473
2001
Observed 157,575 189,950 365,099 496,980 315,586 1,525,190
Fitted 157,574.2 189,949.5 365,098.5 496,979.5 315,585.8 1,525,187.0
Eﬀort 0.0167 0.0226 0.0429 0.0465 0.0607
2002
Observed 180,069 205,420 286,420 558,068 298,367 1,528,344
Fitted 180,068.5 205,419.5 286,418.9 558,067.8 298,367.1 1,528,342.0
Eﬀort 0.0160 0.0208 0.0291 0.0428 0.0489
2003
Observed 307,832 335,504 501,494 851,396 360,160 2,356,386
Fitted 307,831.0 335,503.8 501,493.4 851,395.7 360,160.3 2,356,384.0
Eﬀort 0.0239 0.0315 0.0465 0.0606 0.0533
2004
Observed 358,517 322,319 422,078 957,734 346,762 2,407,410
Fitted 358,516.0 322,318.4 422,076.9 957,733.3 346,761.6 2,404,406.0
Eﬀort 0.0268 0.0298 0.0393 0.0650 0.0506
2005
Observed 376,308 265,574 265,886 738,599 332,240 1,978,607
Fitted 376,307.3 265,573.5 265,885.2 738,597.9 332,239.5 1,978,603.0
Eﬀort 0.0304 0.0271 0.0282 0.0563 0.0539
2006
Observed 293,730 327,421 314,769 642,452 329,454 1,907,826
Fitted 293,729.5 327,420.6 314,768.3 642,451.4 329,454.0 1,907,824.0
Eﬀort 0.0289 0.0435 0.0452 0.0702 0.0697
†Landings in tonnes.
(2.2) and (2.6) we have tried to reproduce the national landings between 2000 and 2006,
ﬁtting the model to the observed landings by choosing the eﬀort such that it minimizes
the error squared. The results of this ﬁt are presented in Table (2.7).
The ﬂeets are allowed to ﬁsh within their nation's EEZ and in international waters.
The eﬀorts presented in Table (2.7) are held ﬁxed within a speciﬁc year. As we can
see, the diﬀerences between the observed landings and the harvests of the model are
small, suggesting that the model using the listed parameter values is able to give a fairly
accurate description of the ﬁshery.
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2.3.3 Economic Model
ICES's ACFM Northern pelagic and blue whiting working group has conducted surveys,
and published reports on the development of the blue whiting stock. Data available on the
economics of the blue whiting ﬁshery, on the other hand, is scarce, not at all structured,
disperse and not consistent. The exception is the Norwegian revenue surveys, collected
by the Directorate of Fisheries 1991-2004, where data from vessels targeting blue whiting
along with several other important species are published (Ekerhovd, 2007). Due to the
severe data constraints, we build the model and determine intuitively those parameters
that cannot be estimated for lack of data. It is then possible to test the sensitivity of the
objective function to changes in these parameters.
The proﬁts earned by the diﬀerent national ﬂeets during a quarter of the year are as
follows (dropping the year subscript t)
pii,y =pXi
10+∑
a=1
qa,yNa,ywa
[
Sj,y(1− e−[m/4+qa,yXi])
m/4 + qa,yXi
+
SNEAFC,y(1− e−[m/4+qa,y
P
iXi])
m/4 + qa,y
∑
iXi
]
− ciXi,
(2.6)
where i = EU,FO, IS,NO,RU , and j = EU,FO, IS,NO.
Here X is purely notational, and the only modes of cooperation observed are where
the countries compete against each other, i.e., no cooperation at all, or full cooperation
among the coastal states with Russia as a nonmember. However, there are several possible
ways in which the countries can engage in partial cooperation that are not observed in
real life. Nevertheless, these intermediate, and hypothetical levels of cooperation are
important in ﬁnding the Nash equilibrium in a coalition game. Hence, to be able to
proceed with this analysis, we need a consistent method of ﬁnding cost parameters for
every coalition under every imaginable coalition structure; as follows: Assuming that all
ﬂeets apply an eﬀort, X∞, that results in a minimum recruitment such that the minimum
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Table 2.8: Cost parameters.
Coalition cost parametre†
Coalition Structure CS 3CS 2CS 2CS EU FO IS NO RU X∞
Sole-Owner 6735 0.13010
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6585 1565 0.10630
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 5903 3156 1770 0.08994
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 6540 2586 1770 0.08994
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 6064 3301 1770 0.08994
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 5845 3270 1770 0.08994
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 4745 2695 3335 1735 0.07855
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU) 3676 2673 2869 1050 0.07060
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU) 4222 2673 2322 1050 0.07060
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU) 3493 2856 2869 1502 0.07060
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU) 4039 2856 2322 1502 0.07060
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) 4296 3478 3133 1736 0.07855
(EU,FO),(IS,NO),(RU) 5046 4320 1770 0.08994
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) 4470 4895 1770 0.08994
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) 5107 4258 1770 0.08994
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 3451 3096 2673 3314 1710 0.06987
†The costs are in million NOK.
stock level is reached after 35 years. Having done this, we found cost parameters such
that the sum of the present value of the costs equals the sum of the present value of the
revenue. Since most vessels also have important activities targeting other species, ﬁxed
costs were not considered. A criticism of this procedure is that in open access, the stock
will be ﬁshed down to a break-even level in the long run, but in the meantime there
will be some proﬁt due to a large stock. However, we let this proﬁt be absorbed by the
costs. Our goal here is not to ﬁnd the inter-marginal proﬁt of open access, but intuitively
determine those coeﬃcients that cannot be estimated for lack of data. When calibrating
the cost parameters we use the age composition of 2000 as initial stock. The resulting
cost parameters are shown in Table (2.8).
2.4 The Game
A straddling stock ﬁshery usually involves many countries and ﬂeets. The analysis of
games in which the number of players exceeds two requires analysis of coalitions. A
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coalition means a subset of the set of players. Two or more countries are considered to
form a coalition if they ratify (or sign) a mutual agreement on the particular ﬁshery.
Three types of coalition scenarios may result. If all parties concerned sign the
agreement, the situation is denoted full cooperation, and a grand coalition is said to
be formed. If some countries are left outside the agreement, the situation is denoted
partial cooperation, and the outsiders may act as free riders. Finally, in the case of
noncooperation there are no agreements between the countries, and each is only interested
in maximizing individual beneﬁts from the ﬁshery.
Based on the three possible outcomes described above, a characteristic function of
the game can be established. The characteristic function assigns a value to each possible
coalition. The value in the case of straddling ﬁsh stocks is, generally, interpreted as the
net present value of the ﬁshery to a certain coalition.
The value for coalition members depends on the particular behaviour of nonmembers.
The assumption made in this paper is that nonmembers of the grand coalition can
either form smaller coalitions, or act as singleton, and adopt individually best-response
strategies against other coalitions. This results in a Nash equilibrium between the
coalitions.
Characteristic function games have been applied to straddling stock ﬁsheries since the
late 1990s (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998; Arnason et al., 2001; Lindroos and Kaitala, 2001;
Lindroos, 2004a; Burton, 2003; Duarte et al., 2000; Brasão et al., 2001). Nonetheless,
the framework of a characteristic function approach, although suﬃciently general to
encompass many contributions of coalition formation theory, is not fully satisfactory.
Most importantly, it ignores the possibility of externalities among coalitions, that is, the
eﬀects that coalition mergers have on the payoﬀs of players who belong to the other
coalitions.
According to Yi (1997), the formation of economic coalitions with externalities opened
a new strand of literature on noncooperative game theory. Most studies are centred on
ﬁnding the equilibrium number and size of coalitions and share a common two-stage game
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framework (Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008). In the ﬁrst stage players form coalitions,
whereas in the second stage coalitions compete against each other. The coalition payoﬀs
are represented by a partition function. This function assigns a value to each coalition as
a function of the entire coalition structure. Therefore, it captures the externalities across
coalitions that are assumed to be absent in the characteristic function.
The general framework of coalition ﬁsheries games has been studied in particular by
Pintassilgo (2003) who brought the theory a major leap forward. He introduced the
partition function approach to these games and hence formalized and generalized the
existing applications in the literature.
In the second stage, it is assumed that the members of the coalition act cooperatively,
by choosing a ﬁshing strategy that maximizes the net present value for the coalition, given
the strategies of the outsiders. The outsiders, or all players in the case of no cooperation,
choose the strategy that maximizes their own individual payoﬀs given the behaviour of
the other players. This noncooperative behaviour leads to a noncooperative solution for
each coalition structure, which is assumed to be unique. Thus, the coalition payoﬀs in
the second stage can be deﬁned as a partition function. This function assigns a value to
each coalition which depends on the entire coalition structure.
2.4.1 The Rules of the Game
Consider a two-stage game and a ﬁnite numbers of players. In the ﬁrst stage each player
has to decide whether to form a coalition with other players or act individually as a
singleton.
Two types of games, known from the literature on coalition formation, that could
possibly be used in the blue whiting ﬁshery case are The Exclusive Membership game
and the Coalition Unanimity game (Yi, 2003). Under the Exclusive Membership7 game,
consent of the existing members is required for an outsider to join a coalition. For
7Hart and Kurz's (1983) original name is `game ∆'. In order to contrast this game to the Open
Membership game, this game is renamed the Exclusive Membership game (Yi, 2003).
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example, Russia is not recognized as a coastal state by the other blue whiting ﬁshing
nations and, thus, excluded from the coalition.
Each player simultaneously announces a list of players (including itself) with whom it
is willing to form a coalition. The players that announce exactly the same list of nations
belong to the same coalition. Formally, player i's strategy αi 8 is to choose a set of players
Si (itself included), a subset of S ≡ {P1, P2, ..., PN}. Given the players' announcements
α ≡ (S1, S2, ..., SN), the resulting coalition structure is C = {B1, B2, ..., Bm}, where
players i and j belong to the same coalition Bk if and only if S
i = Sj, that is, they choose
exactly the same list of players (m is the number of diﬀerent lists chosen by the players).
In the Coalition Unanimity game, on the other hand, the formation, expansion or
merger of coalitions require the unanimous approval of the prospective members. In
the Exclusive Membership game, described above, when some members of of a coalition
leave to join and/or form other coalitions, the remaining members stay on as a smaller
coalition. Under the Coalition Unanimity rule, however, a members's departure results
in the dissolution of the coalition.
As in the Exclusive Membership game, each player announces a subset of players
(including itself) with which it is willing to form a coalition, but a coalition forms
only upon unanimous approval by the prospective members. Formally, for each n-
tuple of strategies α = (S1, S2, ..., SN), the resulting coalition structure is C =
{B1, B2, ..., Bm} where Pi ∈ Bk(= Si) if and only if Si = Sj for all Pj ∈ Si, and
Pi ∈ {Pi} otherwise. For example, suppose that there are four players and that
α = ({P1, P2, P3}, {P1, P2, P3}, {P3}, {P3, P4}). In the Exclusive Membership game,
P1 and P2 form a coalition, because they announce the same list of players. But in
the Coalition Unanimity game, they stay as singleton coalitions, because P3 does not
participate in their coalition. Hence, the resulting coalition structure is {1, 1, 1, 1}9. In the
8Do not mistake this with the α of the recruitment process.
9In this case the players are symmetric, that is, all players have the same strategy sets and payoﬀ
functions; and the identities of the players do not matter so that the interchange of players i's and j's
strategies results in the interchange of player i's and j's payoﬀs but does not aﬀect other players' payoﬀs.
Thus, a coalition is identiﬁed by its size.
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Exclusive Membership game, P2's announcement of {P1, P2, P3} signals his willingness to
form a coalition with any subset of players who are on his list. In the Coalition Unanimity
game, on the other hand, the same announcement by P2 means that he will form a
coalition with the players on his list if and only if all prospective members participate
in the coalition. In other words, upon the departure of some members of a coalition,
the remaining stay as a smaller coalition in the Exclusive Membership game, but they
dissolve their coalition and become singleton coalitions in the Coalition Unanimity game.
The ﬁve players of the blue whiting ﬁshery game, the European Union (EU), the
Faroe Islands (FO), Iceland (IS), Norway (NO), and the Russian Federation (RU), made
the following announcements:
α =({EU,FO, IS,NO}, {EU,FO, IS,NO}, {EU,FO, IS,NO},
{EU,FO, IS,NO}, {EU,FO, IS,NO,RU}).
Since the coastal states consisting of the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway,
choose exactly the same list of players, they belong to the same coalition. Russia, on the
other hand, forms a one-player coalition, because it announced a list diﬀerent from the
others.
The resulting coalition structure is independent of whether the game is played by
the Exclusive Membership rule or Coalition Unanimity rule. But when it comes to the
stability of the coalition the distinction might be important. In the Exclusive Membership
game, the players can leave the coastal state coalition unilaterally to form a singleton
while the other coastal states stay on as a smaller coalition. In the presence of positive
externalities, players might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to leave the coalition and act as singletons,
provided the other coastal states continue to cooperate. However, if the result of one
player leaving the coastal state coalition is the end of cooperation and all players revert
to singleton behaviour, the game is played by the Coalition Unanimity rule, and the only
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way for the coastal states to realize the gains of cooperation is to engage in it.
Notice that although Russia is not accepted as a coastal state by the others, it might
also beneﬁt from the positive externalities created by the formation of a coalition among
the coastal states.
Given the partition function, which yields the equilibrium payoﬀs of the second stage
game, the equilibrium coalition structures of the ﬁrst stage game are the Nash equilibrium
outcomes of an Exclusive Membership game or a Coalition Unanimity game of coalition
formation.
It is not clear whether it is the Exclusive Membership game or the Coalition Unanimity
game that ﬁts the blue whiting case best. One could argue that a coalition among the
remaining coastal states would continue if one of them decided to leave. On the other
hand, there is little evidence of the players forming sub-coalitions before a coastal state
agreement was reached after several years of negotiations.
The coalition is said to be stable if there is no player that ﬁnds it optimal to join the
coalition (external stability) and if no player within the coalition ﬁnds it optimal to leave
the coalition (internal stability). When determining the stability properties of the grand
coalition it is suﬃcient to check for internal stability if there are no potential entrants in
the ﬁshery (Lindroos et al., 2007).
2.4.2 Stability of the Coalition Structures
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne some fundamentals concepts, following Pintassilgo (2003), starting with
the characteristic function.
Deﬁnition 1.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of players. Any subset of N is a coalition and 2N denotes the
collection of its 2n coalitions. A coalition function (or characteristic function) V : 2N → R
is a real-valued function which assigns a value V (S) to each coalition S and which satisﬁes
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V (∅) = 0.
Let us continue the deﬁnitions with the notions of coalition structure and partition
function.
Deﬁnition 2.
A coalition structure C = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} is a partition of the set of players N =
{1, 2, ..., n} : Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j and ∪mi=1Si = N .
Deﬁnition 3.
Let Ω be the set of all partitions of N . A game in partition function form speciﬁes a
coalition value, V (S,C), for every partition C in Ω and every coalition S which is an
element of C.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the presence of externalities among coalitions, in
our game. Externalities are present, in a game in coalition form, if there is at least one
coalition whose value depends on the overall coalition structure. Formally this can be
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.
Externalities are present, in a game in coalition form, if and only if the following condition
is veriﬁed:
∃S,C and C ′ ∈ Ω :
S ⊂ C and S ⊂ C ′, C 6= C ′ and V (S,C) 6= V (S,C ′)
If the change in the coalition structure corresponds to a concentration, i.e., the ﬁnal
structure can be obtained from the initial one only by merging existing coalitions, then
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the externality on a nonmerging coalition can be qualiﬁed as positive (negative) if it
increases (decreases) the coalition value.
Well-known economic coalitions, such as output cartels in oligopoly and coalitions
formed to provide public goods, tend to create positive externalities on nonmember
players. In the management of straddling ﬁsh stocks, positive externalities are also
expected to be present. In fact, as the members of the regional ﬁshery organizations
tend to adopt conservative strategies, a nonmember player is typically better oﬀ the
greater the number of players that join the organization. In this scenario, an interesting
point to explore is the impact of externalities on the stability of coastal states agreements.
Let us continue by addressing the notion of stability. As the merger of players into
coalitions tends to create positive external eﬀects on the nonmembers, the analysis of
stability based on single player deviations emerges naturally. Moreover, in the context
of positive externalities, Yi (1997) refers to the concept of stand-alone stability as
being particularly useful, namely in characterizing equilibrium coalition structures. This
concept is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.
A coalition structure C = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} is stand alone stable if and only if
V (Sk, C) ≥
n∑
i=1
Vi(S
i, Ci), ∀i ∈ Sk, ∀k, k = 1, ...,m
where
Si represents a singleton coalition formed only by player i, and
Ci = (C\Sk) ∪ (Sk\Si) ∪ (Si), stands for a coalition structure formed from the original
coalition structure (C), in which coalition Sk is divided into two sub-coalitions: (Sk\Si)
and (Si). In other words, player i leaves coalition Sk and forms a singleton coalition,
ceteris paribus.
A coalition is, therefore, stand-alone stable if and only if no player ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
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leave its coalition to form a singleton coalition, holding the rest of the coalition structure
constant (including its former coalition). In the case of the coastal state coalition, this
occurs when no player is interested in leaving the cooperative coastal states agreement
to adopt a free-rider behaviour.
2.5 The Results.
This section presents the results of simulating the development of the blue whiting
ﬁshery under diﬀerent coalition structures. After the presentation of the payoﬀs a
partition function is deﬁned and the results are discussed in the context of the Exclusive
Membership game. Finally, following the sensitivity analysis, the results are discussed in
the Coalition Unanimity game context.
Table (2.9) presents the payoﬀs in this game from applying the constant ﬁshing eﬀort
strategy10 over a 35-year period starting in 2006, computing Nash equilibria for all the
coalition structures11. The price per kilogram of ﬁsh is NOK 0.8, and the discount rate
is set to 5%. The proﬁt-income ratios using the cost parameters in Table (2.8) are as
follows. For the coalition structure where all players act as singletons the ratios are
17%, 10%, 12%, 12%, and 15% for the EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway12 and Russia,
respectively. The coastal state coalition has a proﬁt-income ratio of 38%, while for Russia
it is 37%. Under sole-owner management, however, the proﬁts make up about 54% of the
gross income from the ﬁshery.
For the coalition structures where two players merge into a coalition while the others
continue as singletons we were unable to obtain unique equilibrium payoﬀ vectors. This
results in a large numbers of Nash equilibria, where the number of strategy combinations
10A constant eﬀort strategy corresponds to a variable catch strategy, where catch depends positively
on the stock level. This type of strategy is especially relevant when there are signiﬁcant costs of eﬀort
adjustment, as in the presence of high ﬁxed costs or diﬃculties in transferring ﬁshing eﬀort between
diﬀerent ﬁsheries.
11Lindroos and Kaitala (2001) were the ﬁrst to compute Nash equilibria for coalition ﬁsheries games.
12The cost-price ratio in the Norwegian blue whiting ﬁshery 1998 - 2001 was estimated to be in the
range from 0.087 in 1998, to 0.181 in 2000, averaging 0.148 (Ekerhovd, 2003).
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Table 2.9: Blue Whiting Game - Payoﬀs.†
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value‡
Coalition Structure Total CS 3CS 2CS 2CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6587 3495 3093
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 4465 1710 1306 1449
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 4384 1696 1317 1371
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 4654 1513 1645 1496
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 4447 1370 1542 1536
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 2223 798 469 279 677
mean 2120 732 446 398 545
max 798 510 490 677
min 616 356 279 433
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU) 3199 1861 987 169 182
mean 3703 793 803 623 1484
max 1861 2068 1403 2972
min 121 49 153 180
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU) 3327 1623 1016 150 537
mean 3683 737 841 605 1501
max 1623 2068 1405 2872
min 143 46 153 176
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU) 2826 1862 67 681 216
mean 2603 788 307 702 807
max 1862 730 1255 1584
min 223 33 308 195
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU) 2510 1432 416 284 378
mean 2543 776 339 675 753
max 1432 856 1189 1387
min 282 34 252 195
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) 3725 1093 1770 55 806
mean 2761 484 959 766 553
max 1093 1770 1137 806
min 148 337 55 438
(EU,FO),(IS,NO),(RU) 4612 1843 1256 1513
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) 4642 1644 1486 1513
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) 4483 1579 1516 1389
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 1997 1558∗ 606 331 351 271 439
†The initial stock as it was in 2006.
‡Values of NPV in million NOK.
∗The sum of payoﬀs from the coastal states acting as singletons.
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depends on how the model is discretized and is restricted by computational capacity and
time. The reason for this is that the complexity of the bioeconomic model raises the
problem nonuniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Lindroos and Kaitala, 2001). In order
to overcome the problems of nonuniqueness we assume that for a two-player coalition to
form, leaving the other countries as singletons, the merging countries have to gain by
such a coalition structure otherwise they would be as least as well oﬀ as singletons, so
the other countries will be initially caught in a situation where the two-player coalition
chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy that maximizes its own payoﬀ. Faced with this,
we assume the best response of the ones remaining as singletons is to choose the strategy
that maximizes its own payoﬀ given the strategy of the two-player coalition assuming
that their fellow singleton players do the same. In Table (2.9) we therefore present the
payoﬀs for these cases, along with the mean, maximum and minimum payoﬀs for each
coalition of the coalition structures with nonunique payoﬀ vectors. However, it is not
guaranteed that a coalition consisting of two players would be able to act as as leader in
all circumstances. As shown in Table (2.9), under some coalition structures the spread
of the payoﬀs is considerable, so it would be diﬃcult to tell what would be the actual
outcome if a {2,1,1,1} coalition structure were to form. Although not ideal, we use this
as an equilibrium selection criterion, and treat the solution as if it were unique.
2.5.1 Partition Function
From the payoﬀs presented in Table (2.9), it is now possible to deﬁne a partition function.
Let V ∗(CCS, CCS) denote the net return to be shared by the four members when the
coastal state coalition is formed. This is equal to the present value of the coastal state
cooperative strategy less the sum of the threat points of each member.
V ∗(CCS, CCS) = 3, 494.8− 1, 558.3 = NOK 1, 936.5 million (2.7)
Let the value of the players that belong to the same coalition equal the coalition value.
60
2.5. THE RESULTS.
Table 2.10: Coalition structures, partition function values, and stand-alone stability.
Coalition Structure V (Sk, C) Vi(Si, Ci) Stand-Alone Stable
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 1.00 0.48, 0.68, 0.50, 0.53 No
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 0.22 -0.28, 0.34, 0.06 Yes
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 0.25 -0.10, 0.35, 0.00 No
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 0.15 0.60, -0.10, -0.05 No
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 0.22 -0.14, -0.03, 0.21 Yes
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)† -0.07 0, 0 No
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)† 0.51 0, 0 Yes
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)† 0.39 0, 0 Yes
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU)† 0.61 0, 0 Yes
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU)† 0.43 0, 0 Yes
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)† 0.24 0, 0 Yes
(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU) 0.49, 0.58 0.60, -0.14, 0.00, 0.06 Yes
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) 0.98, 0.48 -0.10, -0.03, 0.34, -0.05 Yes
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) 0.88, 0.53 -0.28, 0.21, 0.35, -0.10 Yes
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 0 Yes
†The Nash equilibrium is not unique.
V (Si, Ci) =
pi(S,C)−∑i∈S pi(Si, CT )
V ∗(CCS, CCS)
,
where the notation stands for:
pi(S,C) - payoﬀ of coalition S under coalition structure C;
Si = {i} and CT = ∪ni=1Si,
i.e., Si stands for a singleton coalition formed only by player i and CT for the coalition
structure in which all players act as singletons.
Therefore, pi(Si, CT ) is the threat point of player i.
Let us also assume that player i will only be a member of coalition S if it receives a
nonnegative normalized value, i.e., its ﬁnal payoﬀ must not fall below its threat point.
Table (2.10) reports the partition function values and summarizes the coalition
structure's stand-alone stability.
Table (2.10) clearly shows that positive externalities do exist in this game:
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V (EU, {(FO, IS,NO), (EU), (RU)}) = 0.48
>

V (EU, {(FO, IS), (EU), (NO), (RU)}) = −0.28
V (EU, {(FO,NO), (EU), (IS), (RU)}) = −0.10,
V (FO, {(EU, IS,NO), (FO), (RU)}) = 0.68
>

V (FO, {(EU, IS), (FO), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.34
V (FO, {(EU,NO), (FO), (IS), (RU)}) = 0.35
V (FO, {(IS,NO), (EU), (FO), (RU)}) = −0.14,
V (IS, {(EU,FO,NO), (IS), (RU)}) = 0.50
>

V (IS, {(EU,FO), (IS), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.06
V (IS, {(FO,NO), (EU), (IS), (RU)}) = −0.03
V (IS, {(EU,NO), (EU), (FO), (RU)}) = −0.10,
and
V (NO, {(EU,FO, IS), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.53
>

V (NO, {(EU, IS), (FO), (NO), (RU)}) = −0.05
V (NO, {(FO, IS), (EU), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.21
V (NO, {(EU,FO), (IS), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.00.
In the presences of externalities, Pintassilgo (2003) established that A suﬃcient
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condition for a coalition structure not to be stand-alone stable is that the sum of the
normalized values of the singleton coalitions, resulting from unilateral deviations from
any of its coalitions, exceeds the value of that coalition (Lemma 2, page 185). In this
respect the coastal state coalition cannot be stand-alone stable. This can be seen by
calculating the sum of the values of the singleton coalitions, resulting from unilateral
deviations from the coastal state coalition.
n∑
i=1
Vi(S
i, Ci) = 0.53 + 0.50 + 0.68 + 0.48 = 2.20 > V (Sk, C) = 1.00
As the value of the unilateral deviations from the coastal state coalition exceeds unity,
it can be concluded that there is no sharing rule that can make the coastal state coalition
stand-alone stable. Therefore, the coastal state coalition cannot be a Nash equilibrium
of the Exclusive Membership game.
In order to ﬁnd the possible equilibrium coalition structures we need to ﬁnd those
that are not just stand-alone stable but also where the players ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to join
others in forming larger coalitions too.
Following Deﬁnition 5, the coalition structures {(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU)}, {(FO,IS,NO),
(EU),(RU)}, {(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)}, {(FO,IS),(EU),(NO)
,(RU)}, {(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU)}, {(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)}, {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)},
{(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)} and {(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)}
happen to be stand-alone stable. However, it is interesting to note that none of them is
a Nash equilibrium of the Exclusive Membership game.
Regarding the {(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU)}, Norway has incentive to join the other
coastal states if it receives at least 0.53. As the coalition (EU,FO,IS) only receives
0.22 when Norway plays as a nonmember, and the coalition consisting of EU, the
Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway, with Russia as an outsider, receive 1.00, there is
here a Pareto-sanctioned movement. Likewise for the {(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU)}, the
EU has incentive join the coastal state coalition if it at least receives 0.48, while
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the others receive 0.22 when EU plays as a nonmember. The two-player coalitions
{(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)}, {(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU)},
and {(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU)} are either better oﬀ as they are without merging with
one of the singletons to form a three-player coalition, or such a merger would not
result in beneﬁts large enough to leave all players as least as well oﬀ. What is
more attractive is for the singletons to merge and form a two-player coalition for
themselves. However, for the {(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)},
and {(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU)} this is not a Pareto-sanctioned movement, as the ini-
tial two-player coalitions are worse oﬀ in a {2,2,1} coalition structure. For the
{(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)}, on the other hand, Iceland and Norway are as least as
well oﬀ merging with the Faroe Islands forming a three-player coalition. This is not
a Pareto-sanctioned movement either since EU's payoﬀ as a singleton was 1770 under
the former coalition structure while only 1542 in the latter case. However, a move-
ment from {(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)} to {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)} would be a Pareto-
sanctioned improvement, as all players would be as well oﬀ in the latter case as in
the former. With regard to the {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)}, {(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}
and {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)}, the sum of the payoﬀ of the two-player coalitions is less
than the payoﬀ to the coastal states when they all cooperate. Finally, there is the
{(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)}, which is stand-alone stable by deﬁnition, but not a Nash
equilibrium in the game. Although not necessarily a Pareto-sanctioned movement, every
country will be at least as well oﬀ by unilaterally merging with another country to form
a two-player coalition while the other players act as nonmembers.
Be aware that most of the results derived above, and in the following, will be
contingent on our choice of equilibria selection criteria for the coalition structures with
nonunique payoﬀ vectors. However, what is certain is that a coalition of all coastal states
is not a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game.
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Table 2.11: Sensitivity analysis.
Stand-Alone Stability
Initial Discount Cost parameters
Year Rate X∞ ci
Coalition Structure 2006 2000 4% 6% -1% +1% -10% +10%
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) No No No No No No No No
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) Yes† No Yes† Yes† No† Yes† Yes† No
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† Yes†
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† Yes†
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† Yes†
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No No† Yes† No
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) Yes† No Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† No
(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
†The Nash equilibrium is not unique.
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the robustness of our results to changes in initial age group abundances,
the discount rate and in the cost parameters we have performed an sensitivity analysis.
Table (2.11) reports the results of this. For comparison, the results in the last column of
Table (2.10) are repeated.
Choosing the age distribution of the stock in 2006 as initial age group abundance in
the simulations is natural because 2006 is the ﬁrst year of the blue whiting agreement,
and investigating the stability of the coastal state coalition from this point of departure
is therefore highly relevant. However, there have been diﬃculties reaching this agreement
and the process leading up the agreement has taken several years, and so it would be of
interest to see if the prospects looked diﬀerent at the beginning of this process than at
the end of it. Therefore, Table (2.11), third column, presents the stand-alone properties
of simulations with 2000 as initial year, ceteris paribus. The coastal state coalition is not
stand-alone stable, and fewer coalition structures had multiple best response equilibria.
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Although fewer of the coalition structures are stand-alone stable compared to 2006, one
of them, the {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)}, is a Nash equilibrium. None of the countries
would be better oﬀ by any unilateral movement away from this coalition structure.
Next, we see that the main results are robust to small changes in the discount rate.
However, at discount rates of 4 and 6%, every coalition structure except the coastal state
coalition, is stand-alone stable. At 5% discount rate, on the other hand, the number
of stand-alone stable coalition structures is lower, indicating an ambiguous eﬀect of
discounting in a complex problem such as this.
We continue testing the robustness of the results to changes in the cost parame-
ters. Firstly, we change the eﬀort level X∞ by plus/minus one percentage point.
An increase (a decrease) in X∞ means that the stock is ﬁshed down to minimum
more rapidly (slowly). Having done this the cost parameters are re-calibrated. This
is equivalent to a reduction (an increase) in the cost parameters ceteris paribus, but
in fact change in the cost parameters are much higher than the original change
in X∞. By increasing X∞ we end up with ﬁve Nash equilibrium coalition struc-
tures, {(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)}, {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)},
{(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)} and {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)} while lowering X∞ result in
fewer stand-alone stable coalition structures, fewer nonunique payoﬀ vectors and one
Nash equilibrium coalition structure: the {(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}.
Secondly, since a small change in X∞ gives large and disproportionate changes in the
cost parameters, we change, ceteris paribus, the cost parameters, ci, directly. Again we
see that increased costs increases the number of coalition structures with a unique Nash
equilibrium, however, to a lesser extent than lowering X∞ would. When reducing the
cost of unit eﬀort by 10%, the (IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) emerges as a Nash equilibrium
coalition structure.
What has become evident by this exercise is that the coastal state coalition cannot
be a Nash equilibrium of the blue whiting game under the Exclusive Membership rules.
However, under some circumstances a few other coalition structures emerged as possible
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candidates for being a Nash equilibrium, but this only holds if our equilibrium selection
criteria is the correct one. Moreover, the higher the cost of ﬁshing, fewer of the coalition
structures are stand-alone stable and none is a Nash equilibrium.
2.5.3 Coalition Unanimity
In the light of the results reached so far, a successful coastal state agreement on the
management of the blue whiting ﬁshery seems an unlikely outcome. In spite of this an
agreement was reached in 2005, implemented in 2006, and is still in function.
One possible explanation for this is that the game is governed by the Coalition
Unanimity game rule rather than the Exclusive Membership rules. That is, there are
only two feasible coalition structures, the coastal states forming a coalition with Russia
as a singleton or no cooperation at all, as opposed to a continuum of partial cooperative
coalition structures between the two alternatives.
We have already shown, cf. Equation (2.7), that the coastal state cooperative
agreement has a positive present value, V ∗(CCS, CCS), under the Coalition Unanimity
game rule. Thus, imposing this restriction on the game, the {(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU)}
becomes a stand-alone stable coalition structure and the coastal state coalition a Nash
equilibrium in the blue whiting game.
However, it is not easy to decide what type of rules are best suited for describing the
blue whiting ﬁshery game. Moreover, the conditions of the game may be changing over
time due to changes in the natural environment such as climate change, changes in the
migration pattern or in the abundance of ﬁsh, or a successful management might attract
newcomers who start ﬁshing blue whiting on the high seas. Such factors might change
how the game should be played completely.
Then there is the question of what kind of game is it at present; a Coalition Unanimity
game or a Exclusive Membership game? The coastal states' initial claims of shares in
the ﬁshery is an argument in favour of the Exclusive Membership game in that they
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all seemed to demand at least their free rider payoﬀs to be willing to cooperate. This
is exactly what made the coastal state coalition unstable in the ﬁrst place. Argument
in favour of the Coalition Unanimity game is that there is little evidence of coastal
states forming coalitions consisting of only two or three members, although there was
an extensive exchange of quotas which allowed foreign vessels to ﬁsh blue whiting inside
national EEZs, including Russia. Remember that in the Exclusive Membership game a
player was willing to form a coalition with any other player that it included in its own
announcement. The probability that the remaining members of the coastal state coalition
would continue as a smaller coalition while an individual member decides to leave the
coalition and form a singleton coalition on its own is very low. In that event, the desire
to punish the free rider becomes strong and the incentive for conservation weaker.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper applies the coalition approach to management of high seas ﬁsheries in the
presence of externalities to the North East Atlantic blue whiting ﬁshery. The international
management of this ﬁshery is conducted through the coastal states and not a regional
ﬁsheries management organization. The coastal states agree on, and divide among
themselves, a total allowable catch for the stock. A fraction of this TAC is to be ﬁshed
on high seas and is supposed to be shared by both the coastal states and distant water
ﬁshing nations. The division of the high seas shares is left to the local RFMO, the North
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission.
In order to account for these features we focused on partial rather than full
cooperation, in particular coalitions among the coastal states. We found that, allowing
for multiple coalition structures, the coastal state coalition is not a Nash equilibrium
coalition structure. This was the outcome of the Exclusive Membership game.
This result is in line with previous studies using two-stage partition games. Pintassilgo
(2003), using an age-structured, multi-gear bioeconomic model, shows that for the
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Northern Atlantic blueﬁn tuna ﬁshery, there is no sharing rule that makes the grand
coalition stable and no Nash equilibrium coalition structure exists. However, if we restrict
the number of feasible coalition structures among the coastal states, such that the game
is governed by the Unanimity Coalition game rule, the coastal state coalition becomes a
stable Nash equilibrium.
The agreement among the coastal states established in 2005 does not prove that the
blue whiting ﬁshery is best described as a Unanimity Coalition game. The process leading
up to the agreement must be said to have been both long and hard. The uncertainty
about the rules of the game and its dependency on a constantly changing environment,
both in a literal, and in a political and institutional sense, makes the long term prospects
of the agreement uncertain too. Unless the individual coastal states receive a suﬃciently
high share of the gains of cooperation, the incentives to act noncooperatively will remain
strong.
The prospects of cooperation among the coastal states are low if countries can free-
ride on the cooperative agreement. This survey has shown that it is not only distant
water ﬁshing nations and interlopers that threaten the stability of ﬁsheries agreements,
the self interests of the coastal states are a major obstacle for cooperative management
of straddling ﬁsh stocks. This is the opposite of what was used as an argument for
the establishment of exclusive economic zones in the ﬁrst place, i.e., that the tragedy
of the commons in international ﬁsheries would be virtually eliminated as 90% of the
world's ﬁsheries resources would become subject to national jurisdiction. Furthermore,
the shortcomings of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas soon became
evident; as a signiﬁcant part of the ﬁsheries moved to international waters in response
to the extension of national jurisdiction. The United Nations Fish Stock Agreement was
supposed to help solve this problem by, among other measures, prohibiting states that
do not abide by the regime of the regional ﬁshery organization from ﬁshing the resource.
But it is almost impossible to prohibit any state from ﬁshing on the high seas let alone
within waters under its own jurisdiction. Perhaps the next step in trying to protect ﬁsh
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stocks from over-exploitation would be to reduce the sovereignty of the coastal state and
transferring it to the RFMOs instead?
The stability of existing coastal state agreements will be put to the test by ﬁsh stocks
changing their distribution in response to climate change. Fish stocks will migrate into
new waters and become available for harvest in EEZs of nonmember nations to the
management agreement of the stock in question, disrupting the balance of the agreed
sharing rule. This might lead to increased ﬁshing pressure as the new coastal states try
to establish so called historical ﬁshing rights. Recently, two other straddling ﬁsh stocks
distributed in the same waters as the blue whiting have experienced this.
As examples of the contemporary problem with straddling, shared stocks in this area,
we have the agreement between the coastal states on the Norwegian Spring-spawning
herring stock. This agreement broke down, and was suspended in 2003 and 2004, when
the stock did not resume its expected migration pattern. Norway, especially, was not
satisﬁed with its share in the ﬁshery when it turned out that the stock actually spent
more time in Norwegian waters then what was expected when the agreement was set up.
Luckily, the dispute did not last long and the stock was in good condition to withstand
an increased ﬁshing pressure for a short while.
Secondly, the Northeast Atlantic mackerel has moved its distribution northwards and
is currently available during summer and autumn in Icelandic waters. Iceland, which
is not a member of the management agreement of this stock, ﬁshed signiﬁcant amounts
of mackerel in 2007 and 2008. This comes in addition to the landings of the member
countries, leading to a total harvest in excess of the ICES's recommendations for this
stock. Moreover, the Northeast Atlantic mackerel stock is probably in a poorer condition
than the Norwegian Spring-spawning herring was in when its management agreement was
suspended, and when it was renewed, no new members were included.
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CHAPTER 3. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE BLUE WHITING AGREEMENT
Abstract
This paper investigates the formation, stability and success of an agreement
between the coastal states on the management of the blue whiting ﬁshery
under two opposing assumption about the distribution of the stock, based on
diﬀerent climate change scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean as a result
of global warming. Two climate change scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic
Ocean are analysed. In one scenario, increased ocean temperature expands the
blue whiting's migration pattern and its area of distribution, making Russia a
coastal state with regard to the blue whiting stock in addition to the countries
already recognized as such. In this scenario, the stability of the coastal state
coalition does not change relative to the Status Quo, i.e., Ekerhovd (2008),
although the payoﬀ to the coalition increases when Russia enters. The second
scenario looks at the consequences of a colder climate on the distribution
of the blue whiting stock. The stock no longer occupies Russian EEZs and
Russia is not regarded as a coastal state by the other countries. In this
scenario, the stability of the coastal state coalition is severely weakened such
that the formation of a coastal state coalition is an even more unlikely outcome
compared to Ekerhovd (2008).
Keywords: Straddling ﬁsh stocks, coastal state coalition agreement, cooperation,
climate change, blue whiting.
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q22, Q28, Q54, C72.
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3.1 Introduction
The ecosystem of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea is one of the world's richest,
purest, and most productive marine areas, and where the climate, both in the sea and
the atmosphere, is expected to change1 in response to global warming (Stenevik and
Sundby, 2007). Although the prevailing view seems to be that these waters will become
warmer over the next 50-70 years, to the extent that the Arctic Ocean could become
ice-free during the summer, there is also the possibility that the Gulf Stream and the
termohaline circulation could be weakened, leading to a colder climate in northwestern
Europe, despite global warming (Anon., 2004).
Higher ocean temperatures could lead to higher plankton production and, because of
ice melting, even production in previously inaccessible areas. Changes in prey availability
will inﬂuence the distribution of straddling ﬁsh stocks2 which seasonally migrate into such
areas. Furthermore, higher abundance of plankton could lead to an increased production
of plankton feeding ﬁsh, and as plankton feeding ﬁsh typically serve as important prey
for other ﬁshes, this could spill over on the higher trophic levels as well. However, the
predator-prey relationship makes it diﬃcult to predict how exactly these changes will
aﬀect a speciﬁc species, and is further complicated by the fact that individuals of the
same species may be at diﬀerent trophic levels depending on the current stage of their life
cycle. Younger and smaller ﬁsh, to a large extent, feed on plankton, but as they become
older and bigger they prefer larger organisms as prey; and even smaller individuals of
their own species.
The blue whiting stock3 (Micromesistius Poutassou Risso) in the Northeast Atlantic
1Climate change is usually linked to changes in temperature, but also other climate parameters such
as salinity, ocean currents, ice conditions, light (which depends, among other things, on the cloud cover
and season), and turbulence (which changes with the wind conditions) aﬀects the ecosystem (Anon.,
2008).
2Straddling ﬁsh stocks are a special category of internationally shared ﬁshery resources that straddle
exclusive economic zones (EZZ) where states have special rights over the exploration and use of marine
resources, and adjacent high seas. These species, usually targeted by both coastal states and distant
water ﬁshing nations, became increasingly disputed after the establishment of exclusive economic zones
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003).
3The northern stock of blue whiting migrates between the spawning grounds west of the British Isles
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migrates through the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the European Union (EU), the
Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway, considered as the coastal states with respect to the
stock, and in the international waters beyond the EEZs, where it can be harvested by
vessels from any country, not just the coastal states. Besides the coastal states, Russia
is an important player in the blue whiting ﬁshery. In 2005, the coastal states consisting
of the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement starting in 2006
which includes a long term management strategy that implies annual reductions in the
landings until the management goals are reached. Russia will be accommodated by
transfers from some of the coastal states and additional catches in the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commissions' (NEAFC)4 regulatory areas, i.e., the international waters in the
Northeast Atlantic (Ekerhovd, 2008).
The blue whiting stock is expected to change its distribution, spawning areas and
migration pattern due to climate change. Recently, in years with a relatively warm ocean
climate, juvenile blue whiting has appeared in great abundance in the southwesterly parts
of the Barents Sea. Currently, the blue whiting stock's main spawning area is west of the
British Isles, but some spawning takes place along the coast of Norway as well as in the
Norwegian fjords. The northerly distribution of blue whiting might also be an eﬀect of
stock abundance caused by the successful recruitment in the 1996-2004 period. The poor
recruitment after this period, along with a high ﬁshing mortality, has led to considerable
reduction in the blue whiting abundance in the Barents Sea in 2007, even though the
temperature was well above its long term mean. This means that the distribution of the
and the feeding areas in the Norwegian Sea, cf. Figure (4.1). After the spawning period in March-May,
the majority of the post-spawning ﬁsh pass the Faroe Islands either on the western side through the
Faroe Bank Channel or on the eastern side through the Faroe-Shetland Channel. The stock size of the
blue whiting has ﬂuctuated substantially during the last three decades, and is currently estimated to be
high, at approximately four million tonnes (Bailey, 1982; ICES, 2007). For more details about the blue
whiting ﬁshery, see Ekerhovd (2008).
4The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC, is a regional ﬁsheries management
organization, with membership open to all parties with real interests in the ﬁsh stocks within the areas
covered by the convention. NEAFC is intended to serve as a forum for consultation, the exchange of
information on ﬁsh stocks and the management of these, and advise on the ﬁsheries in the high sea areas
mentioned in the convention on which the commission is based. Since most of the ﬁsheries take place
within the jurisdiction of the coastal states, NEAFC has no real management responsibilities beyond the
fraction of the ﬁsh stocks located within the high seas areas covered by the convention (Bjørndal, 2008).
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species is also connected with the abundance of the stock.
This paper investigates the formation, stability and success of an agreement between
the coastal states on the management of the blue whiting ﬁshery under two opposing
assumptions about the distribution of the stock, based on diﬀerent climate change
scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean as a result of global warming. Because
the EEZs are ﬁxed upon the map, an expansion of the blue whiting stock could aﬀect
the distribution of the stock between the EEZs of the coastal states and international
waters. These changes could put the coastal state agreement under strain. Some of the
coastal states might be discontented with their share of the stock, based on an earlier
distribution of the stock, so that they ﬁnd themselves better oﬀ leaving the coalition of
coastal states and harvesting the stock taking the others' actions as given. The expansion
of the distribution area could make Russia a coastal state, demanding the same status
and same rights as the original coastal state coalition members.
Two climate change scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean are analysed. In one
scenario, increased ocean temperature expands the blue whiting's migration pattern and
its area of distribution, making Russia a coastal state with regard to the blue whiting
stock in addition to the countries already recognized as such. In this scenario, the stability
of the coastal state coalition does not change relative to the Status Quo, i.e., Ekerhovd
(2008), although the payoﬀ to the coalition increases when Russia enters. The second
scenario looks at the consequences of a colder climate on the distribution of the blue
whiting stock. The stock no longer occupies Russian EEZs and Russia is not regarded as
a coastal state by the other countries. In this scenario, the stability of the coastal state
coalition is severely weakened such that the formation of a coastal state coalition is an
even more unlikely outcome compared to Ekerhovd (2008).
The analysis is conducted, drawing on the model described in Ekerhovd (2008), by
changing the quarterly zonal attachment shares of the blue whiting stock in accordance
with the climate change scenarios outlined in the previous paragraph.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the climate change scenarios
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and how we imagine this will aﬀect the distribution of the blue whiting stock. In Section
3.3 we presents results of the blue whiting game by applying the distributions derived in
the previous section. Finally, Section 3.4 sums up the results and concludes.
3.2 Climate Change Scenarios
In this section we outline two alternative scenarios regarding climate change in the
Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. An increased inﬂow of Atlantic water into these
areas causing the ocean temperatures to rise is described ﬁrst. Then the opposite outcome
of global warming on the ocean temperatures in the Northeast Atlantic, with a reduced
inﬂow of Atlantic water to the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, is outlined. Finally,
we describe how we imagine the blue whiting stock will be distributed geographically
under the respective climatic regimes. These distributions will later be used when we
simulate the coalition payoﬀs under the diﬀerent climate change scenarios.
The two climate change scenarios are linked to ﬂuctuations in the North Atlantic
Oscillation index. The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is a large scale oscillatory
ﬂuctuation of atmospheric mass between the Icelandic low-pressure centre and the Azores'
high-pressure ridge that normally extends from continental Europe to the Azores. It
is manifested by a weakening of the intensity in one of the centres of action and
a simultaneous strengthening in the other. The NAO index is determined from the
diﬀerence in atmospheric sea level pressure between the Azores high and the Iceland low,
for example between Lisbon, Portugal, and Stykkisholmur, Iceland. It is seen most clearly
from December to March, when the atmospheric circulation is most intense. Variability in
the NAO is associated with the strength of the westerly winds across the North Atlantic
into the Nordic Seas. A high NAO winter index is associated with the path of the
low pressures along a pressure trough that extends from the Iceland low, across the
Norwegian and Barents Seas, to the margins of Siberia (Blindheim, 2004). A high NAO
index is associated with high inﬂow of Atlantic water, while the opposite is true for a low
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Figure 3.1: Map showing the Northeast Atlantic and adjacent waters (Bailey, 1982).
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NAO index (Stenevik and Sundby, 2007; Hátún et al., 2007).
3.2.1 Scenario 1. High NAO, high inﬂow of Atlantic water and
higher temperatures in the Barents Sea
The blue whiting is one of the species that will probably expand its distribution in a
more northerly direction in response to a warmer ocean climate. Recently, in years with
relatively warm ocean climate, juvenile blue whiting has appeared in great abundance in
the south-western part of the Barents Sea. The blue whiting stock's main spawning area
is currently west of the British Isles, but some spawning activity occurs oﬀ the coast of
Norway as well as in the Norwegian fjords. With spawning occurring in the Norwegian
Sea and adolescent blue whiting growing up in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea,
the blue whiting would be able to take advantage of the production of plankton in the
Greenland Sea in a warmer ocean climate (Anon., 2008).
A more northerly distribution of blue whiting may also be caused by the increased
stock abundance due to an exceptionally high recruitment to the stock during the 1996-
2004 period. The poor recruitment in the following years, combined with a high ﬁshing
pressure, led to a signiﬁcant reduction in the abundance of blue whiting in the Barents Sea
in 2007, even though the temperature was well above the long term mean. This indicates
that the distribution of ﬁsh species also is linked to the over-all stock abundance (Anon.,
2008).
This scenario is associated with a high NAO index, and a high inﬂow of Atlantic water
into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea accompanied by an increase in temperature
(Stenevik and Sundby, 2007). Following an increase in inﬂow of Atlantic water and a
resulting increase in temperature, the character of the ecosystems in Norwegian waters
will most likely change. The borders between the temperate ecosystem in the Atlantic
and the boreal ecosystems of the Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea and the Arctic areas may
move northwards, resulting in substantial changes to the ﬁsh communities in the diﬀerent
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areas.
3.2.2 Scenario 2. Low NAO, less inﬂow of Atlantic water
With a reduced NAO index, on the other hand, the inﬂow of Atlantic water will
become weaker but broader (Stenevik and Sundby, 2007). This could lead to increased
temperature in the western part of the Norwegian Sea and changes in the migration and
spawning distribution of the blue whiting.
During a phase of negative NAO index, the inﬂow of Atlantic water to the Barents
Sea is reduced. This leads to a colder climate, particularly in the southern part of the
Barents Sea. Also, the abundance of the copepode Calanus ﬁnmarchicus, an important
zooplankton prey for blue whiting, decreases due to less inﬂow.
After spawning, blue whiting migrate from the spawning grounds west of the British
Isles, past the Faroe Islands and into the feeding areas in the Norwegian Sea during the
spring months March to early June. The changeable migratory route through Faroese
waters, as inferred from ﬁsheries statistics, is found to be closely linked to the hydrography
along the Rockall Bank, as simulated by an ocean circulation model (Hátún et al., 2007).
Furthermore, Hátún et al. (2007) suggests a variable spawning intensity around the bank
as the causal mechanism for this link. The observed variability is primarily governed by
the strength and extent of the subpolar gyre5 (Hátún et al., 2005). The blue whiting is
especially sensitive to both temperature and salinity during the spawning period and will
5Wind stress induces a circulation pattern that is similar for each ocean. In each case, the wind-driven
circulation is divided into large gyres that stretch across the entire ocean: subtropical gyres extend from
the equatorial current system to the maximum westerlies in a wind ﬁeld near 50◦ latitude, and subpolar
gyres extend poleward of the maximum westerlies. The subpolar gyres are cyclonic circulation features.
In the North Atlantic the subpolar gyre consists of the North Atlantic Current on the equatorward side
and the Norwegian Current that carries relatively warm water northward along the coast of Norway.
The heat released from the Norwegian Current into the atmosphere maintains a moderate climate in
northern Europe. Along the east coast of Greenland is the southward-ﬂowing cold East Greenland
Current. It loops around the southern tip of Greenland and continues ﬂowing into the Labrador Sea.
The southward ﬂow that continues oﬀ the coast of Canada is called the Labrador Current. This current
separates for the most part from the coast near Newfoundland to complete the subpolar gyre of the
North Atlantic. Some of the cold water of the Labrador Current, however, extends farther south.
Source: ocean. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 07 Jul. 2008
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424285/ocean>.
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only spawn in waters warmer than 8-9◦ C and salinities in excess of 35.2-3. The average
hydrography in the region east of the Rockall Bank is near these threshold values, although
the variations are considerable.
After the spawning period in March - May, the majority of the post-spawning ﬁsh
pass the Faroe Islands either on the western side through the Faroe Bank Channel or on
the eastern side through the Faroe-Shetland Channel, cf. Figure (4.1).
When the ﬁshery takes place on the western slope of the Faroe Plateau the ﬁshable
concentrations are conﬁned to a narrow and often dense band along the shelf edge which
also is associated with a sharp hydrographic front. When, on the other hand, the ﬁshery
takes place in the Faroe-Shetland Channel the shoals are more dispersed and less ﬁshable.
High values of the gyre index are associated with cold and fresh conditions in the
Northeast Atlantic. This seems to coincide with years when the stock has an easterly
distribution, while low gyre index values, associated with warm and saline conditions,
seem to coincide with years when the stock has a western distribution.
The NAO index is directly related to the westerlies through the sea level pressure
diﬀerence between Iceland and the Azores-Gibraltar region. This index showed record
high values during the early 1990s. This resulted in a relatively fresh, strong and inﬂated
subpolar gyre, and the subarctic front was moved far eastwards into the Northeast
Atlantic. The spawning/migration waters between Rockall Bank and the Faroe Islands
were fresh and cold during these years, and the blue whiting stock was small.
An extreme reversal in the NAO index in the winter 1995-1996 was followed by
a dramatic decline in the subpolar gyre, a westward shift in the subarctic front, a
temperature and salinity increase in the spawning/migration region, replacement in the
plankton community6, a threefold increase in the blue whiting spawning stock biomass,
and a clear shift from years with a persistent easterly migration route to a period of a
6Prior to 1996, an inverse relationship between the abundance of Calanus ﬁnmarchicus and NAO
winter index appeared to exist. However, with the change to the strongly negative NAO index in 1996,
when the regression predicted high abundance of Calanus, there was in fact a record low abundance.
Low abundance continued for the rest of the 1990s (Skjoldal and Sætre, 2004).
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Figure 3.2: The high seas of the NEAFC Regulatory Area (dark shaded)
inside the NEAFC Convention Area (shaded) in the Northeast Atlantic
http://www.neafc.org/about/ra.htm
persistent western migration.
Under a climate regime with a reduction in the NAO index and less inﬂow of Atlantic
water, the distribution of the blue whiting stock will move in a south-western direction,
with no blue whiting in Russia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and no spawning activity
in Norwegian waters. However, with an increased density of blue whiting on the banks
between Iceland and the Faroe Island, spawning activity in Icelandic waters is possible.
3.2.3 Distribution of the Blue Whiting Stock
In the following, we will illustrate the above scenarios by suggesting a quarterly area
distribution for each of them that is consistent with the implied spawning and migration
patterns.
The year is divided into quarters, y, whereas i denotes the respective EEZs in the
case of the EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and Russia, and NEAFC regulatory area
(RA)7 meaning international waters, shown in Figure (3.2). Thus, Si,y denotes the shares
7There are three regulatory areas within the NEAFC convention area. In the the Northeast, and of
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of the blue whiting stock available for harvest in the diﬀerent waters throughout the year.
Typically, each scenario is not characterized by a single combination of shares. Several
combinations are possible and each scenario is deﬁned by a sub-group of all possible
combinations. Therefore, three alternative combinations of shares are presented for each
scenario.
First, Table (3.1) shows the shares, Si,y, in the case where there is an increase in the
amount of Atlantic water entering the Norwegian Sea, causing an increase in sea water
temperature and salinity in both the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. This means
that the habitat of the blue whiting expands north-eastward into the Barents Sea, such
that Russia becomes a coastal state, and the blue whiting spawns in Norwegian waters
in addition to EU and Faroese waters. At times when the blue whiting is not present
in a coastal state's EEZ, the ﬁshermen from that country can only ﬁsh blue whiting in
international waters if possible8. Otherwise, they can harvest in their home waters as
well as on the high seas.
The year begins with blue whiting present in all areas except for Russia's EEZ.
Spawning takes place in the second quarter, and the stock is equally divided between
EU, Faroese and Norwegian EEZs (Scenario 1a, and 1b), or alternatively between EU,
Faroese, Icelandic and Norwegian EEZs (Scenario 1c). After spawning, the stock migrates
out into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, abandoning EU waters altogether, with
either 1/3 of the stock in international waters and 1/3 in the Norwegian EEZ (Scenario
1a) or, as in Scenario 1b, with 1/4 of the stock in international waters and 1/4 in the
Norwegian EEZ; the rest is equally divided between the EEZs of Iceland, the Faroe Islands
minor relevance in the blue whiting context, the `Loop Hole', a 67,100 km2 area in the Barents Sea,
surrounded by the EEZs of Norway and Russia, and the ﬁshery protection zone around the Svalbard
archipelago (Spitzbergen); in the Norwegian Sea, the 321,700 km2 area, known as the `Banana Hole',
surrounded by the EEZs of Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, the ﬁshery zone around
Jan Mayen, an island under Norwegian sovereignty, and the ﬁshery protection zone around Svalbard;
and ﬁnally, the area in the Northeast Atlantic with the Reykjanes Ridge in the centre, c.f Figure (3.2),
which is limited to the north by the EEZs of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and to the east
by the EEZ of the EU (Bjørndal, 2008).
8This is a simpliﬁcation that we make. In reality, bilateral agreements exist allowing foreign vessels
access to the stock in national waters.
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Table 3.1: Scenario 1: Quarterly zonal attachment of the blue whiting stock Si,y
Scenario 1a
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/3 0 1/3 1/3
European Community 1/3 1/3 0 0
Faroe Islands 1/9 1/3 1/9 1/9
Iceland 1/9 0 1/9 1/9
Norway 1/9 1/3 1/3 1/3
Russian Federation 0 0 1/9 1/9
Scenario 1b
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
European Community 1/8 1/3 0 0
Faroe Islands 1/8 1/3 1/6 1/6
Iceland 1/8 0 1/6 1/6
Norway 1/8 1/3 1/4 1/4
Russian Federation 0 0 1/6 1/6
Scenario 1c
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/4 0 1/5 1/5
European Community 1/4 1/4 0 0
Faroe Islands 1/6 1/4 1/5 1/5
Iceland 1/6 1/4 1/5 1/5
Norway 1/6 1/4 1/5 1/5
Russian Federation 0 0 1/5 1/5
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Table 3.2: Scenario 2: Quarterly zonal attachment of the blue whiting stock Si,y
Scenario 2a
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/6 1/6
European Community 1/2 1/2 0 0
Faroe Islands 0 1/4 1/3 1/3
Iceland 0 1/4 1/3 1/3
Norway 0 0 1/6 1/6
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2b
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
European Community 1/2 1/2 0 0
Faroe Islands 0 1/4 9/32 9/32
Iceland 0 1/4 9/32 9/32
Norway 0 0 3/16 3/16
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2c
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
European Community 1/2 1/4 0 0
Faroe Islands 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
Iceland 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
Norway 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0
and Russia in the third and fourth quarters. In Scenario 1c, the stock is equally divided
between the NEAFC regulatory area and the EEZs of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway,
and Russia in the third and fourth quarters.
As to Scenario 2, Table (3.2) shows the quarterly distribution of the blue whiting
stock in national and international waters when the penetration of Atlantic water into
the Norwegian/Barents Seas is reduced because of less wind-induced ocean currents.
This means colder sea water with reduced salinity, in spite of global warming, and a more
western distribution of the blue whiting stock in the Norwegian Sea. Spawning takes
place in the waters between Iceland and the Faroe Islands as well as in EU waters. The
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western distribution reduces the availability of the blue whiting in international waters
and Norwegian waters, and Russia is no longer regarded as a coastal state.
During the ﬁrst quarter the stock is equally divided between the North East Atlantic
Fisheries (NEAFC) regulatory area in Northeast Atlantic and EU waters west of the
British Isles and Ireland. Spawning takes place in the second quarter, in EU waters (1/2)
and in national waters between Iceland and the Faroe Islands (1/4 each). In Scenario 2c,
we allow for spawning in the Norwegian EEZ, as well as in the EEZs of the EU, the Faroe
Islands and Iceland, and the stock is equally divided between the zones. During summer
and autumn the blue whiting migrates into the Norwegian Sea, but because of colder and
fresher water in the eastern part, along the coast of Norway, it now has a more western
distribution, with highest densities in the EEZs of Iceland and the Faroe Islands. This
means that there will be no blue whiting in Russia's EEZ, only in the NEAFC regulatory
area in the Norwegian Sea and the EEZs of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway. For
the respective scenarios and shares we refer to Table (3.2).
3.3 The Coalition Game of the Blue Whiting Fishery
In this section, we calculate the net present values for the coalition game setting. We do
not, however, calculate the net present values for every possible coalition structure of the
game but restrict our analysis to calculate the payoﬀs of the coastal state coalition and
the payoﬀs accruing to its members from unilateral free-rider behaviour. In addition, we
calculate the individual payoﬀ to players when all act noncooperatively.
For the single-player coalitions (singletons), we assume that the countries play a
noncooperative game. This means that when a country does not belong to any coalition,
it does not cooperate, and all it can do is maximize its own proﬁt, taking into account
the strategies of the other players.
For a coalition consisting of three or four countries, the countries outside the coalition
will play noncooperatively against the coalition members. Thus, the members of the
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coalition will try to do their best, taking into account the actions of the outside countries
and vice versa.
Under full cooperation, the value of the grand coalition where all players are
cooperating, is given by maximizing the sum of net revenues of the countries.
To simulate the possible outcomes of this ﬁshery under the climatic scenarios outlined
above, an age structured bioeconomic model was used9. Assume that all the countries
participating in the blue whiting ﬁshery are represented in the game as the EU (European
Union), FO (Faroe Islands), IS (Iceland), NO (Norway), and RU (Russian Federation).
Also consider the management of this ﬁshery to be the constant eﬀort strategy10 that
maximizes the net present value of proﬁts (NPV) over a 35-year period.
Let us continue with the coalition analysis of the climate change scenarios outlined
above. First, an increase in inﬂow of Atlantic water, cf. Scenario 1 Table (3.1), in contrast
to Ekerhovd (2008) and the second scenario, cf. Table (3.2), expands the distribution of
the blue whiting eastward into the Barents Sea such that Russia will become a coastal
state, and the grand coalition (sole-owner) and the coastal state coalition is identical.
The resulting payoﬀs to the various coalition structures are shown in Table (3.3). The
ﬁrst result is the payoﬀ to a coalition consisting of all the coastal states. Next, Table
(3.3) presents the payoﬀ to the individual nations from unilaterally leaving the grand
coalition, starting with Russia, if they act as singletons (free-riding) while the other
nations remain in a coalition. The latter's payoﬀs are listed under CS in the tables. We
see that, although the grand coalition's payoﬀ of NOK 7,871 million (m) is large enough
to compensate one member its free-riding payoﬀ while the rest remain in the coalition,
and leave the remaining countries as least as well oﬀ (subtract the payoﬀs under CS in
Table (3.3) from 7,871 m, and compare the results with each coastal state's free-rider
payoﬀs), the sum of all the free-riding payoﬀs exceeds the payoﬀ of the grand coalition;
9This model is presented in Ekerhovd (2008)
10A constant eﬀort strategy (although it may seem very simplistic) corresponds to a variable catch
strategy, which depends positively on the stock level. This type of strategy is especially relevant when
there are signiﬁcant costs of eﬀort adjustment, as in the presence of high costs or diﬃculties in transferring
ﬁshing eﬀort between diﬀerent ﬁsheries (Pintassilgo, 2003).
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NOK 12,937 m, 19,328 m, and 16,214 m for the scenarios 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively,
compared to NOK 7,871 m. Therefore, in a strict sense, the grand coalition cannot be
said to be a stable coalition structure.
Let us now consider the stability of the coastal state coalition if unilateral deviations
is not an option, but any deviation from the coastal state agreement breaks down any
coalition and all the players revert to noncooperative behaviour. As is shown in Table
(3.3), there is no unique solution when all act as singletons. There are multiple strategy
combinations that can be considered best response for all players. Table (3.3) presents
average payoﬀs to each player along with maximum and minimum payoﬀs. The maximum
solutions are probably not feasible for all players simultaneously and the minimum is zero
for all players. However, if the average (mean) payoﬀs can be taken as an example of what
the players can expect to gain by acting noncooperatively, the sum of all the singleton
payoﬀs is less than the payoﬀ to the grand coalition. The sum of the payoﬀs of the
coastal states when they all act noncooperatively, NOK 4,367 m, 5,205 m, and 4,922 m
for the scenarios 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively, are less than NOK 7,871 m; the payoﬀ of
the grand coalition. Thus, the coastal state agreement can be considered stable and the
Nash equilibrium of the coalition game.
Table (3.4) shows the coalition payoﬀs of the second climate change scenario, i.e, the
stock is distributed according to the shares shown in Table (3.2), where the inﬂow of
Atlantic water to the Norwegian Sea is reduced, resulting in a more western distribution
of the blue whiting stock. The spawning takes place in the EEZs of the EU, the Faroe
Island and Iceland; in Scenario 2c in Norway's EEZ as well, and there is no blue whiting in
Russia's EEZ. Hence, Russia is not a partner in the blue whiting agreement and therefore
always operates as a free rider. We see that the beneﬁts provided in terms of payoﬀ when
all the coastal states cooperate in a coalition, NOK 3,635 m and 3,699 m with respect to
Scenario 2a, and Scenario 2b and 2c, are insuﬃcient to compensate the free-riders with
their payoﬀs acting as singletons while the others continue as a smaller coalition. Nor is
the payoﬀ earned by the coastal state coalition larger than the sum of the payoﬀs when
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Table 3.3: Scenario 1: Blue Whiting Game - Payoﬀs
Scenario 1a
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 7074 3852 3222
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 7170 3708 3462
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 7102 3801 3302
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 7481 6079 1402
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 7417 5868 1549
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 4367 1024 903 775 882 784
MAX 2178 2072 1932 2066 1743
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 1b
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 7792 1935 5857
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 6901 3565 3337
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 6887 3644 3243
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 6934 3507 3427
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 6977 3513 3464
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 5205 1095 1077 1046 1039 947
MAX 2590 2607 2482 2847 2556
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 1c
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6774 3810 2964
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 6903 3621 3282
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 6903 3621 3282
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 6903 3621 3282
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 6996 3592 3404
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 4922 1068 1019 1019 1019 797
MAX 2431 2335 2335 2335 2056
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
†Values of NPV in million Norwegian kroner (NOK).
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Table 3.4: Scenario 2: Blue Whiting Game - Payoﬀs
Scenario 2a
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6934 3635 3299
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 5640 2267 1712 1662
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 5771 2252 1814 1704
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 5771 2252 1814 1704
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 5982 2017 2283 1682
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 4886 4055∗ 1228 961 961 905 831
MAX 2546 2223 2223 1971 1820
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2b
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6972 3699 3273
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 6392 2947 2582 864
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 6535 3115 2744 676
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 6535 3115 2744 676
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 6684 2808 3198 678
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 5124 4121∗ 1193 1003 1003 922 1003
MAX 2955 2509 2509 2233 2298
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2c
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6972 3699 3273
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 5806 2017 2265 1524
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 5806 2017 2265 1524
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 5806 2017 2265 1524
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 6420 2715 2841 865
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 5128 4120∗ 1056 1021 1021 1021 1008
MAX 2494 2435 2435 2435 2357
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
†Values of NPV in million Norwegian kroner (NOK).
∗The sum of payoﬀs from the coastal states acting as singletons.
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all players act noncooperatively. The sums of the payoﬀs of the coastal states when all
players act noncooperatively, NOK 4,055 m, 4,121 m, and 4,120 m for the scenarios 2a,
2b, and 2c, respectively, are higher than NOK 3,635 m and 3,699 m; the payoﬀs to the
coastal state coalition for the scenarios 2a, and 2b and 2c, respectively. Thus, in the
scenario where global warming leads to a colder climate in Northern Europe and the blue
whiting has a more western distribution than at present, a coastal state coalition cannot
be stable under any circumstances, not even if the threat points are the noncooperative
payoﬀs.
It is important to note that in the presence of non-unique equilibrium this result was
based on the average of all the diﬀerent possible solutions. If we had chosen one of the
possible solutions, the cooperative solution could possibly be a better solution than the
sum of the singletons payoﬀs of the coastal states. However, due to the lack of a better
equilibrium selection criteria, in the presence of multiple equilibria we decided use the
average of the equilibria payoﬀs as a representation of the payoﬀs the players could expect
in the coalition structure where non-uniqueness occur.
In Scenario 1, with a high NAO index, increased ocean temperatures and salinity
in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, we assumed that the blue whiting migrated
into Russian waters and that Russia achieved the status of being a coastal state with
regard to the management of this stock. The change in status from being regarded as
a distant water ﬁshing nation by the original coastal states to be accepted and included
as a coastal state in the management of a straddling ﬁsh stock when the stock for some
reason changes its migration pattern and distribution is not necessarily a straight forward
process. It might take years before the new status is generally accepted by the others,
as the shift in the distribution can be a gradual process with a considerable amount of
short term variation, meaning that there may be considerable doubt as to whether a shift
in distribution is only a temporary change or if the ﬁsh stock actually has changed its
migration pattern and area of distribution permanently. During the period of transition,
the underlying uncertainty might put an established agreement on the management of
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the stock among the original coastal states at risk, as the emerging coastal state tries to
prove its claim to the stock by severely increasing its ﬁshing eﬀort and thus its catches
in order to establish rights to the ﬁshery and gain acceptance for their new status. The
original coastal states' members might try to limit the prospective coastal state's proﬁt
by increasing their ﬁshing eﬀorts too. If this transient period lasts for a long time and
the noncooperative behaviour is allowed to continue, it might threaten the ﬁshery, as the
stock cannot sustain a too high ﬁshing mortality indeﬁnitely without either becoming
extinct or being driven to the break-even stock level (the level at which further ﬁshing
becomes unproﬁtable).
However, when an agreement that includes all countries is ﬁnally reached, as in the
case of Scenario 1, the coastal state coalition will act as a sole owner, not as in Scenario 2
where Russia always acts as a singleton player while the coastal state coalition maximizes
its own proﬁt, taking the action of Russia as given. The sole owner payoﬀ being the
maximum attainable proﬁt, the agents in such a management agreement will never ﬁnd
themselves in a situation like Scenario 2, where the sum of the payoﬀs in a coalition
structure where some or all players act as singletons exceeds the payoﬀ to the coastal
state coalition. In the case of a low NAO index and less inﬂow of Atlantic water, Russia
is no longer regarded a coastal state; the coalition of coastal states is no longer stable even
if the coalition formation options were restricted to full cooperation among the coastal
states, where the alternative would be to revert to a state where all acts as singletons. In
the opposite case of high NAO index and increased inﬂow of Atlantic water, the coastal
state coalition would be stable if such a restriction were put on the coalition structure.
However, if this is not the case, the individual members of the coastal state coalition
would have incentives to free-ride on the agreement if the remaining coalition continued
to cooperate. What has become evident from our exercise is that if the Northeast Atlantic
should cool down in spite of global warming so that the distribution area of the blue
whiting stock would be reduced, the cooperation among the coastal states would become
even more diﬃcult than it is already and the blue whiting stock would almost certainly
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collapse.
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper analysed how diﬀerent climate change scenarios might aﬀect the formation,
stability and success of the coastal state coalition on the management of the Northeast
Atlantic blue whiting ﬁsh stock. We assume that the blue whiting will change its
migration pattern and distribution area in response to changes in ocean temperature and
salinity. Two possible climate change scenarios were analyzed. First, an increased inﬂow
of relatively warm and saline Atlantic water into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents
Sea shifts the distribution of the blue whiting in a northeasterly direction with spawning
activity in Norwegian waters and blue whiting catches in Russian waters, making Russia
a member of the coastal state coalition. In the second scenario, less Atlantic water
ﬂows into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, reducing the ocean temperatures and
salinities along the Norwegian coast as well as in the Barents Sea. In response to this,
the blue whiting would shift its distribution and spawning areas in a more south-western
direction, abandoning Russian waters altogether.
These two climate change scenarios are linked to the Northeast Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO) index. A high NAO index is associated with strong winds blowing in a
northeasterly direction across the Atlantic Ocean pushing warm and saline water into
the Norwegian Sea and further northeast into the Barents Sea. A weaker NAO index, on
the other hand, means that the winds follow an east-west path across the Atlantic, and
that less of the warm and saline Atlantic water enters the Norwegian Sea and the Barents
Sea. Based on these scenarios, we formulated three possible combinations of quarterly
shares. Each share represents the fraction of the stock available for harvest in a certain
area, i.e., the diﬀerent exclusive economic zones or international waters, at certain times.
These shares, along with the model of Ekerhovd (2008), were used to calculate the payoﬀs
to coalitions under diﬀerent coalition structures.
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Finally, this allowed us to analyse the coalition formation, success and stability, in
particular coalitions among the coastal states. The coalition analysis indicates that
the stability of the blue whiting agreement between the coastal states would remain
unchanged relative to today's agreement, cf. Ekerhovd (2008), if global warming means
an increase in sea temperatures in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. However,
if the opposite should happen, i.e., the inﬂow of Atlantic water into these waters is
reduced, and thus the distribution areas of the blue whiting stock is also reduced rather
than increased as a consequence of global warming, this would weaken the stability of
the current coastal state agreement on the management of the blue whiting stock.
Drastic changes in a ﬁsh stock's migration pattern might bring the underlying
weaknesses of a management regime into the open and the nations that harvest this stock
into conﬂict with each other (Hannesson, 2007). For instance, the coastal state agreement
on the management of the Norwegian Spring-spawning herring was suspended for two
years, 2003 and 2004 (Hannesson, 2006), when the stock failed to resume its expected
migration pattern, by spending the winter in Norwegian coastal waters rather than out
in the open Norwegian Sea. The Norwegian ﬁshermen, in particular, were not content
with their share of the catches as the stock spent most of its time within the Norwegian
EEZ. Another current potential conﬂict over a ﬁsh stock that has changed/expanded its
area of distribution is about the Northeast Atlantic mackerel, which has expanded its
migrations northwards, probably due to favourable climatic conditions, and is now found
and ﬁshed in new areas in the international waters of the Norwegian Sea and within the
EEZ of Iceland. Iceland, not being a member of the mackerel management agreement,
has landed signiﬁcant amounts of mackerel during summer and autumn in 2007 and 2008.
This, in addition to the amounts landed by the member countries, has lead to a total
harvest in excess of ICES's recommendations.
In the ﬁrst climate change scenario, when the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea
were expected to warm up and the distribution of the blue whiting stock expected to
expand northeastward into the EEZ of Russia, the coastal state coalition would be stable
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if the option of the member states to free-ride on the agreement for some reason did
not exist. Then the payoﬀ of the coastal state coalition would always exceed the sum of
payoﬀs to the coastal states acting as singletons, and the coastal states would be better oﬀ
cooperating in a coalition. However, when the coastal state coalition does not include all
the countries that participate in the ﬁshery, as is the case in the second scenario, and in
Ekerhovd (2008), Russia is excluded from participating in the coastal state coalition, the
coalition payoﬀ is less than a potential grand coalition payoﬀ would be, and a mechanism
that prohibits free-riding among the coastal states is not necessarily suﬃcient to make
the coastal state coalition stable. An example where this turns out to be true is Scenario
2 of this paper. What might help remedy this weakness is for the coastal states to
transfer some of their sovereignty over the ﬁsh stock staying in their national EEZs to
a regional ﬁsheries management organization (RFMO) and let it manage the ﬁsh stock.
According to the law of the sea, membership in a RFMO is open to all countries with
real interest in the ﬁsh stock (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). The open membership of the
RFMOs guarantees a share of the proﬁts to all interested parties as well as being able to
provide a higher payoﬀ than any partial cooperation. Furthermore, if it is able to enforce
mechanisms that will deter its members from free riding, the prospects for cooperation
will be improved.
However, it is possible that this is partially achieved in the management of the
blue whiting stock. The coastal states agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) for the
stock. This TAC is then divided among coastal states, and in addition a share thereof
is set aside to be harvested in international waters. The local RFMO, the North East
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), is given the responsibility of dividing this share
among all the interested parties, including Russia. Moreover, Russia could be further
accommodated by exchange of quota in their waters against being allowed to ﬁsh some of
the coastal states' shares in their respective EEZs. This can be seen as a way of sharing
the beneﬁts of cooperation through side-payments and, by providing higher beneﬁt than
a simple coastal state regime would be able to, a more stable management is achieved.
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CHAPTER 4. INDIVIDUAL VESSEL QUOTAS AND UNREGULATED SPECIES
Abstract
This survey of the Norwegian purse seine ﬂeet licensed to ﬁsh blue whiting
focuses on the relationship between restricted ﬁsheries, such as spring-
spawning herring, North Sea herring, mackerel, and capelin, and unrestricted
ﬁsheries, of which blue whiting is the most important. To model the behaviour
of the ﬁshermen a restricted proﬁt function is used, where species quotas
are treated as ﬁxed factors while blue whiting along with other non-quota
species are variable factors. We ﬁnd no relationship between blue whiting
and herring, and mackerel. Blue whiting and capelin are substitutes. So
are other non-quota species and spring-spawning herring. Other non-quota
species are complements to mackerel and North Sea herring.
Keywords: Individual vessel quotas, unregulated ﬁsheries blue whiting trawling,
pelagic purse seining, constrained proﬁt function.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D21, D24, Q22, Q28.
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4.1 Introduction
Most ﬁshing vessels target several stocks and species. In biological ﬁsheries management,
however, multi-species characteristics are largely ignored, managing the diﬀerent stocks
and species separately. Moreover, only the most important stocks are regulated by
individual vessel quotas (IVQs), and for the other stocks there is either a total quota,
which allows the ﬁshermen to catch as much as they can until the quota is ﬁshed, or there
is no quota restriction at all.
When some ﬁsheries are strictly regulated, and some are not, the unregulated ones
will attract more of the ﬁshing eﬀort than if none of the ﬁsheries were quota regulated.
The reasons for this are the ﬁshermen's incentive to obtain as high a share as possible of
the total quota before it is considered ﬁshed and the ﬁshery is closed, and the opportunity
to increase their income beyond what they are able to earn catching their IVQs. The size
of this extra income depends on the characteristics of the unregulated ﬁshery and, more
importantly for this work, on the opportunity cost of foregoing a unit of quota ﬁsh for one
unit of unregulated ﬁsh. If the vessels have limited ﬁshing capacity, i.e., the catching of
unregulated ﬁsh is restricted by the quota ﬁsheries, the unregulated ﬁshery is restricted
indirectly by the quotas on other species.
An important unregulated ﬁshery in the North East Atlantic is the blue whiting
ﬁshery. Fishing for blue whiting appears to be a very attractive strategy for economic
expansion for actors who otherwise operate within a system that is both closed and has
strict quota regulations (Standal, 2006). Because blue whiting is a straddling stock,
migrating through the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of several nations as well as on
the high seas, there existed no international agreement on the joint management of the
stock. Only recently (in 2005) have the largest exploiting nations reached an agreement
on a total allowable catch (TAC) for the blue whiting stock. Prior to this agreement the
nations competed in catching blue whiting in an eﬀort to establish rights in the ﬁshery
and the best possible bargaining position for a future TAC (Ekerhovd, 2003).
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Asche et al. (2007), in an empirical analysis of Norwegian purse seiners, investigated
to what extent ﬁshermen target unregulated species when IVQs are used to manage
the regulated species. Their results indicate that restricted and unrestricted outputs
are substitutes, and accordingly a reduction in the quotas induces ﬁrms to increase
production of unregulated species. Moreover, Asche et al. found the supply elasticity
for the unregulated species to be close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. Hence, it
is not the price of the unregulated species that determines catches and ﬁshing eﬀort
for these species. This supports the notion that IVQs give strong incentives to increase
ﬁshing eﬀort for unregulated species, particularly when the quotas are reduced.
What separates this work from that of Asche et al. (2007) is that while they analyse
the behaviour of purse seiners without a blue whiting ﬁshing licence, here we analyse
a subﬂeet of the purse seiners licensed to ﬁsh blue whiting in addition to the species
targeted by all Norwegian purse seiners. Instead of combining all unregulated outputs
into one index for variable output, we specify two unregulated outputs: blue whiting and
other non-quota species. This allows us to analyse the eﬀects of the quota on restricted
ﬁsheries on the landings of blue whiting. Furthermore, we can compare the quota species'
eﬀects on other non-quota species with the results of Asche et al..
Each year the purse seine vessels are given IVQs for the stocks of spring-spawning
herring, North Sea herring, mackerel, and capelin. The quotas have to be ﬁshed within
that year, otherwise they are lost to the vessels. Transferring quotas, or some of them,
given in any one year to the next year is not allowed. The purse seiners have the
opportunity to ﬁsh some non-quota species in addition to the quotas. The blue whiting
ﬁshery is one non-quota option for those purse seine vessels holding a blue whiting ﬁshing
licence. The quota species and non-quota species are targeted species-by-species, and
stock-by-stock, so by-catch is not an issue in these ﬁsheries.
The fact that the species/stocks are targeted one at a time suggests that the ﬁsheries
are not joint in production by technical interdependence. However, there is another
potential source of jointness in production: allocatable ﬁxed factors Shumway et al.
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(1984), when there is a ﬁxed input which is not fully utilized in producing a single
product at optimal scale, Leathers (1991) (p. 1086).
The Norwegian purse seine vessels face several ﬁxed factors in production: in the
short run, the IVQs allocated to each vessel each year and, in the long run, the vessel
size, in particular their capacity to catch ﬁsh. Then there is the choice of how much time
to spend ﬁshing for the non-quota species, assuming that IVQs are binding, i.e., that
the allocated individual vessel quotas will be ﬁshed by the end of the year. If all the
ﬁxed factors, IVQs, ﬁshing capacity, and time, are binding, the production of the quota-
restricted species and the non-quota species will be joint. Consequently, there will be a
substitute relationship between the non-quota species landings and the quotas of spring-
spawning herring, mackerel and North Sea herring, and capelin. A substitute relationship
means that an increase in the quota of one species, holding the quotas of the other species
ﬁxed, will decrease the landings of the non-quota species. However, if one or more of the
ﬁxed factors are not binding, either the relationships are statistically insigniﬁcant or the
non-quota species and the quota species are complements. This means that an increased
quota will lead to an increase in landings of non-quota species as well.
While the results indicate that blue whiting and capelin are substitutes, the elasticity
of intensity associated with blue whiting is close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant
with respect to spring-spawning herring, and mackerel and North Sea herring, the most
important quota-regulated ﬁsheries. Moreover, the supply elasticity for blue whiting is
positive with respect to other non-quota species and negative with respect to fuel, and
statistically signiﬁcant, while the own-price elasticity is close to zero and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Hence, it is neither the price of blue whiting nor the quotas on herring and
mackerel that determines the landings and ﬁshing eﬀort for blue whiting, but rather the
capelin quotas, the price for other non-quota species, and the operation costs, i.e., the
price of fuel.
For other non-quota species we see that the landings and ﬁshing eﬀort directed towards
these ﬁsheries is to some degree dependent on their own price and the price of fuel, but
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not on the price of blue whiting. Other non-quota species appear to have a substitute
relationship with spring-spawning herring but are complementary to mackerel and North
Sea herring.
This chapter is organized in the following way. The theory is reviewed in Section
4.2. Section 4.3 describes the industry and the data used in the estimation. Section
4.4 presents the empirical model and Section 4.5 the estimation strategies. Section 4.6
reports the results and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Theory
Proﬁt maximization can be a good approximation of the behaviour of the skippers/vessel
owners in the relatively unrestricted blue whiting ﬁshery that is free of individual
vessel quotas (Squires, 1987, 1988; Squires and Kirkley, 1991) as opposed to the
strictly regulated purse seine ﬁsheries for spring-spawning herring, mackerel and North
Sea herring, and capelin, where cost minimization is often considered the proper
representation of ﬁshermen's behaviour (Weninger, 1998; Bjørndal and Gordon, 2000;
Nøstbakken, 2006).
Both Moschini (1988) and Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) provide a framework for supply
management in agriculture. This framework is easily extended to a ﬁshery were some,
but not all, outputs are quota regulated.
Consider a production process where a vector y of I outputs is produced during a
given period using a vector x of J variable inputs and a vector z of K ﬁxed inputs.
If the maximum allowable output for some components of the vector y is constrained,
as in ﬁsheries with individual vessel quotas, total variable proﬁt is maximized when the
proﬁt from the unconstrained outputs is maximized. Thus, if the output vector y is
partitioned into a subvector y0 of I0 for which the constraint is binding and a subvector
y1 of I1 unconstrained products, and if the output price vector is similarly partitioned
into p0 and p1, the restricted proﬁt function is deﬁned as:
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piR(p1, w, y0, z) = max
y1
{p1′y1 − C(y1, y0, w, z)}. (4.1)
Given the properties of the cost function, the restricted proﬁt function piR(p1, w, y0, z)
is non-decreasing in p1 and z, non-increasing in w and y0, convex in (p1, w), and
continuous and twice diﬀerentiable. Here, piR(p1, w, y0, z) can be viewed as a form
of McFadden's (1978) restricted proﬁt function and of Diewert's (1982) variable proﬁt
function, with the explicit extension of the constraints to the output side, which implies
that the restricted proﬁt function piR(p1, w, y0, z) does not satisfy the property of non-
negativity (Moschini, 1988).
The restricted proﬁt function satisﬁes the derivative property (Hotelling's lemma):
y1(p1, w, y0, z) = ∇p1piR(p1, w, y0, z), (4.2)
x(p1, w, y0, z) = −∇wpiR(p1, w, y0, z), (4.3)
where∇ indicates a vector of partial derivatives, and y1(p1, w, y0, z) and x(p1, w, y0, z) are
the vectors of the unrestricted output supply and variable input demand that maximize
proﬁts. From a restricted proﬁt function piR(p1, w, y0, z), Hotelling's lemma allows the
derivation of an estimable system of output supplies and input demands consistent with
the constraint of the underlying technology and with proﬁt maximization under supply
constraints. This makes it explicit that the supply of products not subject to supply
management and the demand of variable inputs in general depend on the level of restricted
commodities, and this dependency can be quantiﬁed and tested in empirical applications.
The shadow value of quota holdings is measured as the value to the vessel of a unit
increase in quota holdings. The shadow value of the nth vessel, for the quota species, y0,
is written as:
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SV y
0
n = p
0
n +
∂piRn
∂y0
. (4.4)
The term, p0n, is the price paid to vessel n per unit of quota landed of output y
0, where
n = 1, ..., N . The second term on the right-hand side of (4.4) represents the change in
restricted proﬁt of non-quota landings associated with a one unit change in the quota
species in question.
A change in quota landings results in two separate eﬀects on restricted proﬁt: i)
A one-unit increase in quota landings will increase marginal costs through an increase
in the variable input factor necessary to land the additional quota. This will have an
unambiguously negative eﬀect on restricted proﬁt that is not related to quota. ii)
The change in restricted proﬁt from non-quota landings depends on whether there is
a substitute or a complementary relationship between non-quota and quota landings. If
non-quota and quota landings are substitutes, then marginal restricted proﬁt from non-
quota landings will decline as quota landings increase. A complementary relationship
will increase marginal restricted proﬁt as landings of quota species increase. The change
in restricted proﬁt from non-quota landings for each individual vessel is conditioned on
vessel characteristics and other quota holdings.
Following Dupont and Gordon (2007), the two separate eﬀects on marginal restricted
proﬁt are separated out by calculating the marginal shadow value (MSV), which focuses
only on the decline in restricted proﬁts resulting from the increase in the marginal cost
of landing an additional unit of quota.
MSV y
0
n = SV
y0
n −
∑
I1
∂y1
∂y0
p1. (4.5)
The elasticity of intensity of unrestricted non-quota outputs with respect to quota
output and the shadow value of each of the output- regulated species are two fundamental
characteristics of the production structure. The elasticity of intensity is a measure of
the change in non-quota landings caused by a one-percentage change in quota landings
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for a speciﬁc species (Diewert, 1974). The elasticity of intensity of non-quota landings
associated with quota-restricted factors is deﬁned as:
ηy1,y0 =
∂y1
∂y0
y0
y1
. (4.6)
A negative elasticity of intensity implies that an increase of one per cent in a quota
causes a decline in the harvest of the unrestricted landings indicating a substitute
relationship between the output- regulated species and unrestricted landings, whereas
a positive elasticity of intensity implies that an increase of one per cent in a quota causes
an increase in the harvest of non-quota species. In addition, standard price elasticities
can be calculated and are conditional on ﬁxed output and ﬁxed input factors.
4.3 The Industry and Data
The blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), a small gadoid, characterized as an oceanic
semi-pelagic species living in the North East Atlantic (see ﬁgure (4.1)), is one of the most
abundant ﬁsh species in the Norwegian Sea. The blue whiting stock is a straddling
stock. Straddling stocks migrate through waters under diﬀerent jurisdictions, both
national exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and international waters. This behaviour
complicates the management of these stocks compared to stocks attached only to one
or two EEZs. The international management of blue whiting has many similarities with
the management of the spring-spawning herring (Bjørndal et al., 2004).
During the period 19701997 the blue whiting ﬁshery was dominated by Russia
(former Soviet Union) and Norway, which developed it. Since the late 1990s there has
been an increased interest in the blue whiting ﬁshery, and the total landings increased
from about 650 thousand tonnes in 1997 to 2.3 million tonnes in 2003 (ICES, 2004).
Iceland, which previously had for a large part ignored the blue whiting ﬁshery, began to
substantially increase its blue whiting landings in 1998 (Ekerhovd, 2003).
Since 1999, there have been several attempts among the coastal states of the
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Figure 4.1: The blue whiting distribution in the North East Atlantic
European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland, and Denmark (on behalf of the Faroe Islands
and Greenland), and Russia to reach an agreement and set a common maximum total
allowable catch (TAC). The negotiations have failed because each nation wants a higher
share of the quota than the others are willing to accept (Standal, 2006).
The dispute has led the nations to increase their quotas unilaterally during the ﬁshing
season in an eﬀort to keep their catches at a certain level according to their claims and,
also, in response to increased quotas of other nations.
However, in December 2005 the coastal states of the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland,
and Norway signed an agreement. The agreement, starting in 2006, includes a long
run management strategy that implies annual reductions in the landings until the
management goals are reached1.
1Source: Stortingsmelding nr. 22, 20052006, Om dei ﬁskeriavtalane Noreg har ing
att med andre
land for 2006 og ﬁsket etter avtalane i 2004 og 2005, Det Kongelege Fiskeri- og Kystdepartementet (The
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Aﬀairs).
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4.3.1 The Norwegian Fishery Management System
According to 
Arland and Bjørndal (2002), two main characteristics of the Norwegian
ﬁsheries management system are restricted access through licensing schemes and
restricted harvesting levels through quotas. Capacity is restricted through licensing in
the purse seine ﬂeet. To be allowed to ﬁsh blue whiting a special licence is needed2.
Although, in reality, the licences are transferable, this system is rigid compared to
individual transferable quotas and does not lead to a reduction in overcapacity. To
facilitate this the so- called unit quota system was implemented, which allows for the
concentration of more quotas per vessel ( 
Arland and Bjørndal, 2002). However, the unit
quota system has not been as eﬀective as some had hoped for. The fact that these quota
rights only last for 13 or 18 years has made the purchase of additional quotas through
the unit quota system less attractive than it would have been had the property right to
the quota been permanent. Transfer of ﬁshing rights has to be approved by the ﬁsheries
authorities. Facilitation of approval requires the assistance of lawyers and brokers. Thus,
high transaction costs are linked to investment in quotas from other vessels (Standal,
2006).
The purse seiners are allocated individual vessel quotas (IVQs)3 for all targeted
species, except for blue whiting and other non-speciﬁed species. The blue whiting quotas,
set unilaterally by Norway or acquired through exchanging quotas with other nations,
are not divided into IVQs, but the vessels are allowed to catch as much as they can until
the total quota is ﬁshed ( 
Arland and Bjørndal, 2002). Not dividing the total quota into
IVQs gives incentives to compete for the ﬁsh as the ﬁshery may be closed once the quota
has been ﬁshed.
2A licence is issued to a particular owner and a particular vessel. If the vessel is sold or replaced by a
new one, a transfer of the ﬁshing licence must be approved by the ﬁshing authorities. Hence, implicit in
the price paid for a purse seiner, with the licence transferred to the new owner, is the value of the purse
seining licence in general and the blue whiting licence in particular.
3The IVQs are non-transferable in the sense that they cannot be rented out on a yearly basis, but
can be bought and sold as described above.
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4.3.2 The Norwegian Blue Whiting Fishing Fleet
The sample used in the estimation consists of an unbalanced panel data series of the
combined Norwegian purse seining and pelagic trawler ﬂeets from 1990 to 2003 collected
by the Norwegian Directory for Fisheries (19912004). The data include vessel length,
fuel expenditure, and information on the quantity and value of the landings of ﬁsh. The
landings are divided into spring-spawning herring, North Sea herring, mackerel, blue
whiting, capelin and other unspeciﬁed ﬁsh species4. These vessels target pelagic species,
with herring and mackerel as the most important ones, using a purse seine net to catch
schools of ﬁsh and a pelagic trawl to catch blue whiting5. Table (4.1) shows the species
targeted by the purse seiners/pelagic trawlers by area, gear type, and the time of the
year they ﬁshed the respective species6; each ﬁshing season has at least one time-overlap
with other ﬁshing seasons.
The main ﬁshing of the blue whiting stock takes place from January through April
in the North East Atlantic, in waters west of Ireland. This coincides with the capelin
ﬁshery of the coast oﬀ Finnmark (adjacent to the Barents Sea), and the spring-spawning
herring ﬁshery. The spring-spawning herring ﬁshing season lasts from October to April
the following year. This means that herring forgone in the winter season, if the vessels
choose to ﬁsh blue whiting instead, can be caught later. Blue whiting is to some extent
ﬁshed in summer and early autumn in the Norwegian Sea, but as table (4.1) shows this is
probably the busiest time of the year for these vessels, with North Sea herring, mackerel,
and capelin to catch in addition to blue whiting7. This illustrates that the vessels are
more or less fully occupied throughout the year, catching both quota-regulated ﬁsh, i.e.,
4Atlantic horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) and sprat (Sprattus sprattus) make up the largest
components of the non-quota species and are harvested in the North Sea and adjacent waters.
5After locating a school of ﬁsh, the vessel sails around it and encircles the ﬁsh with a net. By closing
the bottom of the seine, a purse is formed. When the seine is pulled, the top of the purse is drawn closed
and the ﬁsh are trapped in the net purse. Blue whiting, on the other hand, are caught using a pelagic
trawl. A trawl is a cone-shaped net pulled through deep water, scooping the ﬁsh into the trawl.
6Kart over norske fangster 2001 og 2004. Fiskeridirektoratet (Directorate of ﬁsheries), Bergen,
www.ﬁskeridir.no
7Note that individual vessel quotas are given on a yearly basis, from January 1st to December 31st,
during which the quotas have to be taken or forfeited
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of the sample vessels
Statistics Mean Min Max St. Dev.
Variables
Observations 234 0 0 0
Vessel length (metre) 65.38 49.35 77.4 5.92
Fuel expenditure 3.825 1.039 7.564 1.043
Qty. blue whiting 11,333 61.238 26,670 5,899
Qty. other non-quota 948 0 6,010 1,050
Qty. SSH 3,160 118 7,632 1,579
Qty. North Sea herring 1,069 129 2,804 428
Qty. mackerel 1,522 998 2,648 329
Qty. capelin 3,738 0 12,560 2,294
Value blue whiting 9.648 0.018 32.085 5.653
Value other non-quota 1.828 0 8.157 1.761
Value SSH 9.239 0.445 19.179 4.398
Value North Sea herring 2.754 0.389 6.449 0.977
Value mackerel 10.503 5.454 19.103 2.627
Value capelin 3.788 0 15.093 2.570
Values in million Norwegian Kroner (2001)
Quantities (Qty.) in tonnes
SSH = spring-spawning herring
spring-spawning herring, North Sea herring, mackerel, and capelin, and non-quota ﬁsh,
such as blue whiting and other non-quota species, and that a change in the quotas can
aﬀect the blue whiting quantity and vice versa.
In the analysis we only use data on purse seiners ﬁshing for blue whiting. Table
4.2 reports some summary statistics of the sample of the Norwegian purse seiners/blue
whiting trawlers.
Initial econometric work revealed a singularity problem in the regressor matrix.
Correlation coeﬃcients, shown in Table (4.3), indicated that the singularity is caused by
a high correlation between mackerel and North Sea herring. These species are harvested
within the same geographic area under similar environmental conditions and quotas are
determined based on similar regulatory principles. It was therefore decided to combine
mackerel and North Sea herring into a single restricted output, using a Fisher quantity
index for aggregation.
The purse seiners that trawl for blue whiting, in addition to the species caught by
purse seine, are a unique ﬂeet segment separable from the other purse seiners. The blue
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Table 4.3: Correlation coeﬃcients between harvest quantities
BW Other SSH NSH Mackerel North Sea† Capelin
BW 1.000
Other -0.248 1.000
SSH 0.398 -0.286 1.000
NSH -0.120 0.529 -0.419 1.000
Mackerel -0.246 0.381 -0.364 0.565 1.000
North Sea† -0.247 0.483 -0.435 0.768 0.968 1.000
Capelin -0.226 -0.047 -0.414 0.058 -0.441 0.366 1.000
† North Sea is a Fisher quantity index over the quantities of mackerel and North Sea herring.
whiting is ﬁshed with a trawl while the other targeted species are caught using a purse
seine. The purse seiners that participate in the blue whiting ﬁshery must be rigged for
both trawling and purse seining. Vessels ﬁshing in the North Atlantic during wintertime
need to be well built and the size of the pelagic trawl used in the blue whiting ﬁshery
requires vessels that are equipped with big engines. The need for power and strength,
as well as an ability to handle large catches, separates the blue whiting ﬂeet from the
conventional purse seiners. Another feature of the blue whiting ﬁshery distinguishing it
from purse seining is the management regime; in most other ﬁsheries targeted by purse
seiners the TAC is divided among the individual vessels, while for the blue whiting there
were no IVQs prior to 2006. This has lead to an expansion in the blue whiting ﬁshery in
order to increase the revenue of the vessels (Standal, 2006).
The purse seiners engaged in blue whiting ﬁshing are usually the larger vessels in the
ﬂeet with an average length of about 65 metres and displacement over a thousand tonnes.
Because of the size of the pelagic trawls, the vessels require huge engine power in order
to be able to operate the gear. Moreover, the ﬁsh are stored in the hold in refrigerated
seawater. Refrigerating and circulating the seawater, operating the gear, and sailing
between the port and ﬁshing grounds burns a large amount of fuel. Fuel expenditure
therefore constitutes the vessels main variable cost.
Blue whiting is a very important ﬁshery for these vessels; with respect to quantity, blue
117
CHAPTER 4. INDIVIDUAL VESSEL QUOTAS AND UNREGULATED SPECIES
Figure 4.2: Stock size of blue whiting, spring-spawning herring, North Sea herring,
mackerel, and Barents Sea capelin
whiting makes up about 52% of the total landings compared to 14.5% for spring-spawning
herring and only 7% for mackerel. In value terms8 blue whiting is still important but
to a lesser extent; mackerel is the most valuable ﬁsh, making up about 28% of revenue
followed by blue whiting (26%) and spring-spawning herring (24%).
Capelin and other non-quota species are not ﬁshed by all vessels every year. The
capelin ﬁshery in the Barents Sea was banned in the years 19871990, 19941998, and
again from 2004. The ﬁshery was re-opened in the winter season 1991 and again in
the winter season 1999, following recovered stocks, see ﬁgure (4.2) (ICES, 2004). Then
there is the Norwegian quota in the Iceland capelin ﬁshery, which is small compared to
the quota in the Barents Sea ﬁshery. In some years vessels skip the Iceland capelin. The
other non-quota species are reported unspeciﬁed and represent unrestricted landings, i.e.,
no IVQs are allocated for these species.
8Monetary values referred to in Table (4.2) are in real 2001 terms.
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4.4 Empirical Model
The choice of functional form to be used in estimating a restricted proﬁt function is
important because proﬁts can be positive or negative in such a constrained setting.
Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) avoid this problem by constraining inputs as well as outputs
in order to ensure that variable proﬁts are positive. In this way, they can use a standard
translog functional form. However, negative variable proﬁts require alternative functional
forms and Moschini (1988) uses a normalized quadratic equation, normalizing using one
input factor. Diewert and Wales (1987) and Kohli (1993) show that the estimated results
for this functional form depend on the normalization. These authors suggest a symmetric
normalized quadratic functional form to avoid this problem and we use this empirical
equation here.
A normalized quadratic functional form is well suited to modelling multiple-output
technologies and it is easy to impose curvature properties on the model (Diewert and
Wales, 1987; Kohli, 1993). Moreover, the restricted proﬁt function, characterized by
Lau (1976), can also illustrate the economic value of the restrictions (Moschini, 1988).
Obtaining the shadow prices per unit of a non-quota species conditioned on the vessel's
own quota holdings allows us to obtain shadow values indirectly through observed choices
(Dupont and Gordon, 2007).
We start by deﬁning a normalized quadratic restricted proﬁt function (Lau, 1976;
Diewert and Ostensoe, 1988; Moschini, 1988; Dupont and Gordon, 2007) for the
Norwegian purse seine vessels licensed to ﬁsh blue whiting over the prices of three variable
factors: The price of fuel9 (F ), as a variable input factor, and prices of blue whiting
(BW ) and other unspeciﬁed non-quota ﬁsh species (O) as variable outputs. The variable
quantities are conditioned on four ﬁxed factors: Vessel length, L, as a proxy for capital,
and ﬁsh landings under supply management: Spring-spawning herring (H), mackerel and
9The price of fuel is not included in the costs and earnings surveyonly fuel expenditure; instead,
an index for the wholesale prices for solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels and related products was used as a
proxy for the fuel prices. Source: Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no
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North Sea herring (M)10, and capelin (C). The normalized restricted proﬁt function,
assuming constant returns to scale11, can be written in the following way:
piR(p; q¯) ≡1
2
(
α′q¯
3∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
ai,kpipk
)
/pf
+
1
2
(
β′p
4∑
j=1
4∑
h=1
bj,hq¯j q¯h
)
/q¯L
+
3∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
ci,jpiq¯j,
(4.7)
where the prices of the variable quantities are indexed i and k, while the ﬁxed factor
quantities are indexed j and h. The function is normalized and thus pF and q¯L are
chosen as numèraires12.
We deﬁne matrix A with elements ai,k. Because of the linear relationship between
rows and columns in matrix A caused by linear homogeneity, the ﬁrst row and column
of A, are vectors of zeroes, aF,k through ak,F for the price of blue whiting, other non-
quota species and fuel, respectively. Similarly, we deﬁne the matrix B with elements
bj,h. Because of linear homogeneity, the ﬁrst row and column in matrix B are vectors of
zeroes, and bL,h through bh,L are for vessel length and spring-spawning herring, mackerel
and North Sea herring, and capelin landings.
Following Dupont and Gordon (2007), α′q¯ is deﬁned as a Fisher quantity index over
the ﬁxed factors, q¯j, j = L,H,M,C
13, and β′p is deﬁned as a Fisher price index over the
variable input and output prices pi, i = O,BW,F .
The normalized quadratic proﬁt function described in equation (4.7) must satisfy
the conditions required for it to represent the underlying production technology. The
10The quantity, qM , is a Fisher quantity index over the quantities of mackerel and North Sea herring.
11The constant returns to scale assumption rests upon the fact that the vessels in the sample are fairly
large and the assumption that an increase in size leads to only a proportional increase in capacity
12Given that we want to know something about the relationship between the variable and the ﬁxed
outputs, using the variable and ﬁxed inputs as numèraires seems to be the natural choice
13The eﬀective interest rate, Norwegian InterBank Oﬀered Rate (NIBOR), is used as a proxy for the
price of capital. Source: Norges Bank, The Norwegian Central Bank, Oslo.
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function is linear homogeneous, convex in prices and concave in ﬁxed factors, separately.
Symmetry in the cross-price and cross-quantity terms is obtained by deﬁning the matrices
A and B to be symmetric. The restricted proﬁt function is convex in prices and concave
in ﬁxed factors globally, as well as locally, whenever the A matrix is positive semi-deﬁnite
and the B matrix is negative semi-deﬁnite (Diewert and Wales, 1987).
Instead of estimating the restricted proﬁt function in (4.7), it is more convenient to
estimate the system of the three variable quantity equations given in (4.8), (4.9), and
(4.10). These equations, two for the supply of variable landings and one for the demand
for fuel, are obtained by using Hotelling's lemma. These equations are formulated in
actual quantities, not input or revenue shares; therefore, all three equations must be
estimated to obtain the parameters in equation (4.7).
∂piR
∂pO
= qO(pO, pBW , pF ; q¯L, q¯H , q¯M , q¯C)
= α′q¯
(
aO,OpO + aO,BWpBW
)
/pF
+
1
2
(
βO
4∑
j=2
4∑
h=2
bj,hq¯j q¯h
)
/q¯L
+
4∑
j=1
cO,j q¯j,
(4.8)
∂piR
∂pBW
= qBW (pO, pBW , pF ; q¯L, q¯H , q¯M , q¯C)
= α′q¯
(
aO,BWpO + aBW,BWpBW
)
/pF
+
1
2
(
βBW
4∑
j=2
4∑
h=2
bj,hq¯j q¯h
)
/q¯L
+
4∑
j=1
cBW,j q¯j,
(4.9)
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∂piR
∂pF
= −qF (pO, pBW , pF ; q¯L, q¯H , q¯M , q¯C)
= −1
2
(
α′q¯
2∑
i=1
2∑
k=1
ai,kpipk
)
/p2F
+
1
2
(
βf
4∑
j=2
4∑
h=2
bj,hq¯j q¯h
)
/q¯L
+
4∑
j=1
cF,j q¯j,
(4.10)
for i, k = O,BW,F and j, h = L,H,M,C.
Cross-equation and symmetry restrictions, ai,k = ak,i for i, k and bj,h = bh,j for j, h
in both equations, have already been imposed in (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10). The linear
homogeneity restrictions, ai,F = 0 for i = O,BW,F , and bj,L = 0 for j = L,H,M,C,
are imposed by dropping them from the estimating equations. βi, i = O,BW,F , may be
chosen arbitrarily14 (Diewert and Wales, 1987).
4.5 Estimation Strategy
Prior to estimation, additive disturbance terms are appended to each of the three quantity
equations (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10). The estimation begins with the linear system of
equations (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10). Zellner's iterative technique for seemingly unrelated
regressions is used. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 53 vessels, covering
the years from 1990 to 2003.
If the unobserved variables are correlated with the other explanatory variables,
estimation will yield biased results, i.e., the omitted variable problem.
Over the time period 19902003 there were signiﬁcant changes in technology and
restructuring of the ﬂeet (Standal, 2006; 
Arland and Bjørndal, 2002), in the competition
14Here, the βs are set such that they sum to one. Although several possible combinations of βi were
tested, the combination that appears to be best suited, βBW = 0.5 and βO = βF = 0.25, is used in the
estimations.
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between the blue whiting ﬁshing nations (Ekerhovd, 2003), and in the size of the ﬁsh
stocks (ICES, 2004). Taking account of these changes, the model is estimated with a
binary variable for each year15 with 2001 as the base year.
In addition to the prices of the variable inputs and outputs conditioned on the
restricted input and output factors, the restricted proﬁt in non-quota ﬁsheries is expected
to depend on the biomass of the stocks of non-quota species as well as the skills of the
owner/skipper/crew and the physical characteristics of each vessel16. Although the blue
whiting stock biomass is given in ICES (2004)17, the lack of knowledge about what species
are included in the other non-quota species component makes it diﬃcult to come up with
a good measure for stocks. Despite this, the stock eﬀect is one of several eﬀects controlled
for by the dummy variables for each year. That leaves us with the unobserved skills of
the owner/skipper/crew, a factor that needs special treatment.
The ﬁxed eﬀects method is a way of neutralizing the unobserved eﬀect of skills. This
technique is equivalent to assigning dummies for the vessels, an approach used in this
paper. Of the 53 vessels in the sample, 52 vessels were assigned dummy variables18.
If convexity and concavity are rejected by the data19, which turns out to be the
case, they can be imposed by reparameterization of the A and B matrices using the
technique described by Wiley et al. (1973) (Dupont, 1991). This reparameterization uses
the product of a matrix ∆ and its transpose to replace the A matrix, i.e., A = ∆∆′. The
15A binary variable takes the value one for a speciﬁc year, and zero for all others.
16The physical characteristics of the vessel are correlated with vessel length, which is already in the
model.
17The annual assessment of the stock is uncertain, but its accuracy improves over time (Sandberg,
2006). The inclusion the blue whiting biomass in the supply equation for blue whiting (4.9) resulted in
a negative coeﬃcient so the variable was dropped.
18Originally, the data were drawn from the Norwegian purse seiner ﬂeet providing data on pure purse
seining vessels as well as purse seiners holding blue whiting licences. Because the focus of this study is on
blue whiting, all the pure purse seiners were excluded from the sample. Introduction of the ﬁxed eﬀects
method led to further exclusions; it was not possible to estimate the model using ﬁxed eﬀect dummies
on vessels that appeared in the data for less than three years. The vessel used as the base vessel was the
vessel with the highest observed proﬁt, which was in 2001. Therefore, the ﬁxed eﬀect dummies should
be interpreted relative to this vessel in 2001.
19Failing to obtain convexity or concavity does not necessarily mean that the assumption of proﬁt
maximization is violated. Other reasons may exist, such as insuﬃcient price variation in the data,
multicollinearity, and aggregation of input or output quantities to obtain indexes (Squires, 1987; Dupont,
1991).
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equivalent for the B matrix is B = −DD′. The ∆ and D matrices are lower triangular
matrices with zeros in the ﬁrst columns.

aF,F aF,O aF,BW
aO,F aO,O aO,BW
aBW,F aBW,O aBW,BW
 =

0 0 0
δ1 0 0
δ2 δ3 0
 ∗

0 δ1 δ2
0 0 δ3
0 0 0
 (4.11)

bL,L bL,H bL,M bL,C
bH,L bH,H bH,M bH,C
bM,L bM,H bM,M bM,C
bC,L bC,H bC,M bC,C

= −

0 0 0 0
d1 0 0 0
d2 d3 0 0
d4 d5 d6 0

∗

0 d1 d2 d4
0 0 d3 d5
0 0 0 d6
0 0 0 0

(4.12)
While it is still possible to obtain separate elasticity estimates for each pair of inputs
and outputs, the reparameterization requires a non-linear estimation technique. A new
set of equations must be estimated using a non-linear maximum likelihood procedure
because the ai,k, i, k = O,BW , and bj,h, j, h = H,M,C, parameters, respectively, are
replaced by the appropriate combinations of the δ and d parameters from the ∆ and D
matrices, respectively equations (4.11) and (4.12). The correspondences between the ai,k
and δ parameters are as follows: aO,O = δ
2
1, aO,BW = δ1 ∗ δ2, and aBW,BW = δ22 + δ23.
Whereas, the correspondences between the bj,h and the d parameters are bH,H = −d21,
bH,M = −d1 ∗ d2, bH,C = −d1 ∗ d4, bM,M = −(d22 + d23), bM,C = −(d2 ∗ d4 + d3 ∗ d5), and
bC,C = −(d24 + d25 + d26).
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4.6 Results
Table (4.4) reports the estimated parameters and standard errors for the estimation of
equations (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10). The results for the ﬁxed eﬀect and the year dummies
are not reported. Tests for correlation of the data from the vessels with the highest
number of observations in the sample (eight and nine years) suggests that the problem of
serial correlation is not an issue. Furthermore, because the vessels were all fairly large and
of a homogeneous type, the possibility of heteroscedasticity in the variance is considered
small.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table (4.4) represent the elements of ∆ and D matrices, which
will be used in the reparameterization of the A and B matrices. The other columns of
Table (4.4) illustrate the eﬀect the constrained factors have on the unrestricted factors,
parameters ci,j in equation (4.7), where i = O,BW,F and j = L,H,M,C. Standard
errors are in the parentheses. The number asterisks indicate the coeﬃcients' statistically
signiﬁcance level, e.g. one for 10%, two for 5% and three for 1%. The results should be
interpreted as if keeping all other things constant (ceteris paribus).
Table (4.5) shows the price elasticities for the variable factors. Estimates use means
of the data. Throughout the asymptotic standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated
using the formula for the variance of a random variable that is a non-linear function of
several random variables (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). The landings of blue whiting
are insensitive to changes in its own price, while they appear to be sensitive with regard to
the price of other non-quota species and the price of fuel20. The landings of blue whiting
appear to increase with the price of other non-quota species, which is surprising, but, as
expected, decreasing as the price of fuel increases.
The landings of other non-quota species are insensitive to changes in the price of
blue whiting, but appear to increase with their own price and decrease with the price
of fuel. The amount of fuel increases with the price of blue whiting and the price of
20Nøstbakken (2006), and Bjørndal and Gordon (2000) also reported the input factor demand for the
purse seiners to be inelastic.
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Table 4.5: Price elasticity estimates
Variable prices Blue whiting Other Non-Quota Species Fuel
Variable quantities
Blue Whiting 0.0068 0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0139∗
(0.0053) (0.0029) (0.0079)
Other Non-Quota Species 0.0146 0.0364∗∗ -0.0707∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0160) (0.0239)
Fuel 0.0350∗ 0.0372∗∗∗ -0.0721∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0126) (0.0281)
other non-quota species, and declines as its own price increases. Hence, the combined
purse seiners and blue whiting trawlers seem not only responsive to input price changes
but also to changes in the price of the unrestricted outputs, especially the price of
other non-quota species. Thus, it is not only available excess capacity and ﬁshing
season considerations that decide the combined purse seiners' and blue whiting trawlers'
production of unrestricted output. This is in contrast to what Asche et al. (2007) found:
that the purse seiners seem not to be responsive to changes in the price of the unrestricted
outputs. Let it be stressed here that this work is not a replication of Asche et al.'s
that analyses the behaviour of purse seiners without blue whiting ﬁshing licences, but
an application of a similar framework to a segment of the Norwegian purse seiner ﬂeet
that ﬁshes blue whiting in addition to herring, mackerel, and capelin. Moreover, our
data series runs from 1990 to 2003, while their data series runs from 1992 to 1999.
Blue whiting is an important species for the participating vessels, taking up a signiﬁcant
part of their available days at sea, leaving less time to target other non-quota species.
The size of the blue whiting vessels, and the engine power required, can explain the
importance of the price of fuel on production of unregulated outputs. Thus, the other
non-quota species' contribution to the restricted proﬁt can aﬀect to what degree these
vessels produce unrestricted outputs.
Table (4.6) presents the elasticities of intensity for the quota-regulated outputs:
spring-spawning herring, mackerel and North Sea herring, and capelin. Looking ﬁrst
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Table 4.6: Elasticity of intensity
Restricted outputs Spring-spawning herring Mackerel and North Sea herring Capelin
Variable quantities
Blue whiting 0.0257 -0.0870 -0.1164∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0591) (0.0327)
Other non-quota species -0.7844∗∗∗ 2.0989∗∗∗ -0.2084
(0.1263) (0.2180) (0.5047)
Fuel -0.1029 0.4516 0.2691∗∗∗
(0.2224) (0.3461) (0.0475)
at the elasticities associated with blue whiting, for both spring-spawning herring and
mackerel and North Sea herring these are not statistically signiﬁcant, while statistically
signiﬁcant and negative for capelin. This indicates a substitute relationship between blue
whiting and capelin.
According to Table (4.1) that shows the diﬀerent ﬁshing seasons, there is an overlap
between the main season for ﬁshing blue whiting on its spawning grounds in the North
East Atlantic and ﬁshing for capelin on the coast of Northern Norway, both taking place
in winter and early spring. The capelin quotas have changed substantially over the
years and the substitute relationship implies that an increase in the capelin quota causes
a decrease in the landings of blue whiting. This is reasonable because of the overlap
in ﬁshing seasons, because the respective ﬁsheries take place in waters far apart, and
both capelin and blue whiting are low-valued species. Speciﬁcally, a 1% increase in
the capelin quota causes a 0.12% decline in the harvest of blue whiting. This low, but
statistically signiﬁcant, elasticity probably reﬂects that the expanded ﬁshing capacity
makes it possible for the vessels to accommodate substantial increases in the capelin
quotas without a similar reduction in the blue whiting harvest21.
The elasticity associated with other non-quota species with respect to spring-spawning
herring is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. A 1% increase in the quota for spring-
spawning herring causes a reduction of 0.78 % in the harvest of other non-quota species,
21Standal (2006) and Nøstbakken (2006) have documented substantial increases in capacity as well as
economies of scale in Norway's pelagic ﬁshing ﬂeet.
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implying a substitute relationship between these two ﬁsheries. Looking at the quota
eﬀect of mackerel and North Sea herring on other non-quota species, on the other hand,
revealed a strong complementary relationship, where a 1% increase in the quotas for
mackerel and North Sea herring causes an increase of 2.1% in the harvest of other
non-quota species. Because by-catch is not an issue in these ﬁsheries this result needs
further explanation. Although other non-quota species are low- value species relative
to mackerel and North Sea herring, they are ﬁshed in the same waters, i.e., mainly the
North Sea and adjacent waters, using the same technology, i.e., purse seine, under the
same environmental conditions, and an increase in the quotas for mackerel and North
Sea herring increases the time spent in these waters allowing the vessels to catch more of
the other non-quota species whenever an opportunity to do so presents itself. Hence, the
strong complementarity between mackerel and North Sea herring and other non-quota
species. Between other non-quota species and capelin there appears to be no statistically
signiﬁcant relationship.
Asche et al. (2007) found the unregulated species to be substitutes for spring-spawning
herring, and mackerel and North Sea herring, with almost a one-to-one relationship
between mackerel and North Sea herring, and unregulated species. In this work, however,
we ﬁnd that other non-quota species have close to a one-to-one substitute relationship
with spring-spawning herring, and are in a strong complementary relationship with
mackerel and North Sea herring.
The demand for fuel does not seem to be statistically signiﬁcant, as aﬀected by changes
in the spring-spawning herring, mackerel and North Sea herring quotas. Changes in the
capelin quota, on the other hand, have a strong positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the demand for fuel. Speciﬁcally, a 1% increase in the capelin quota will be accompanied
by 0.27% increase in the purse seiners demand for fuel. The capelin is not only a low-price
species but a high-cost ﬁshery too.
Once again according to Table (4.1), it is not just blue whiting and capelin that have
an important ﬁshing season in the ﬁrst months of the year; simultaneously, a substantial
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part of the quota for spring-spawning herring is caught during the ﬁrst months of the year.
However, spring-spawning herring is also ﬁshed in the late autumn, enabling the vessels
to ﬁsh all, or a part, of their quota either early or late in the year. Thus, it is possible that
in years when the winter capelin ﬁshery is open, the vessels concentrate on catching their
capelin quota and then switch to blue whiting for the rest of the season, postponing the
spring-spawning ﬁshery until autumn. By doing so they are more focused on catching
their quotas of mackerel and North Sea herring before ﬁshing for the spring-spawning
herring, leaving less time to ﬁsh other non-quota species.
Table (4.7) reports the average real prices of spring-spawning herring, mackerel and
North Sea herring, and capelin along with their respective shadow values and marginal
shadow values. Comparing the prices and the shadow values with the marginal shadow
values tells us something of the overall relationship between the non-quota species
(i.e., blue whiting and other non-quota species) and the various restricted outputs, as
well as the marginal cost of producing the restricted outputs. The shadow values of
both spring-spawning herring and capelin, both statistically signiﬁcant, are higher than
their respective marginal shadow values, only statistically signiﬁcant for spring-spawning
herring, but less than the respective prices, suggesting a substitute relationship between
the non-quota species and spring-spawning herring and capelin. For mackerel and North
Sea herring, on the other hand, the shadow value is higher than the price and higher
than the marginal shadow value; these results are statistically signiﬁcant, indicating a
complementary relationship between the unrestricted outputs and mackerel and North
Sea herring.
The diﬀerences between the prices and marginal shadow values are the marginal costs
of catching more of the quota species, holding the landings of the non-quota species
constant. For capelin the marginal cost is about 22.3% of the price, but, because the
price and the marginal shadow value are not statistically signiﬁcant, the marginal costs
are probably much higher for the majority of observations, and may in fact be higher than
the price for some. The low and variable proﬁtability of the capelin ﬁshery is probably
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Table 4.7: Prices and shadow values
Restricted outputs Spring-spawning herring Mackerel and North Sea herring Capelin
Prices and values
Real price 3.2490∗∗∗ 0.8414∗∗∗ 1.0806
(1.1919) (0.2138) (0.9260)
Shadow value 2.8824∗∗∗ 0.9602∗∗∗ 0.4904∗∗∗
(0.2229) (0.0749) (0.1270)
Marginal shadow value 3.2407∗∗∗ 0.7806∗∗∗ 0.8392
(0.1885) (0.0599) (7036231)
caused by the large volatility in the stock, with highly variable quota levels and prices,
and remote ﬁshing location north of Norway and Iceland.
Catching one extra unit of mackerel and North Sea herring comes at an expense
of 7.2% of the price. The cost of catching one extra unit of spring-spawning herring,
however, is only 0.26% of the price and statistically signiﬁcant. The relatively low quota
levels on mackerel, North Sea herring, and spring-spawning herring and the expanded
ﬁshing capacity of the vessels explain the low marginal costs. By exploiting the spare
capacity, marginal increases in the quota levels can be accommodated without increasing
the number of trips22.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
Asche et al. (2007) found the catch of unrestricted ﬁsh to be a substitute for the IVQ-
regulated ﬁsheries on spring-spawning herring, mackerel, and North Sea herring, with an
almost one-to-one relationship with mackerel and North Sea herring. Moreover, they
22These marginal costs may seem unreasonably small and a few comments may be required. Firstly, the
marginal shadow value focuses only on the change in restricted proﬁts from a change in the quota, holding
the unrestricted harvest constant. Thus, the potential gains and losses from changes in the unrestricted
outputs that occur when quotas change are not part of the marginal shadow value. Secondly, operation
costs can include costs of fuel, wages, insurance, bait and other variable costs. However, in this paper
operating costs are identical to fuel expenditure. Because some of the other costs are not reported for
all observations, including them in an operating costs index would mean a loss of observations. Because
they are only reported as expenditures, it was decided to use fuel expenditure as a proxy for operating
costs. Had other variable costs been included, marginal costs would of course have been higher too.
Finally, changes in the TACs for the restricted outputs will usually be announced in advance of, or very
early in, the ﬁshing season, thus enabling the ﬁshermen to take this into account in their planning and
land more ﬁsh per trip without having to increase the number of trips.
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found only the own price elasticity of operation costs to be diﬀerent from zero and
statistically signiﬁcant, and, thus, it is not the price of the unregulated species that
determines landings and ﬁshing eﬀort for these species. Finally, they claim that IVQs
give strong incentives to increase ﬁshing eﬀort, particular when the quotas are reduced.
What Asche et al. (2007) called unrestricted catch is comparable to what is called the
other non-quota species in this paper, where the purse seiners are licensed to catch blue
whiting in addition to other non-quota species, spring-spawning herring, mackerel, North
Sea herring, and capelin. Our results for other non-quota species and fuel expenditure
diﬀer from Asche et al.'s results regarding unrestricted catch and operation costs. We
found the catch of other non-quota species to have a close to one-to-one substitute
relationship with the quota on spring-spawning herring, and a strong complementary
relationship with mackerel and North Sea herring, such that a reduction in the quota
for spring-spawning herring would lead to more ﬁshing eﬀort directed towards the other
non-quota ﬁsheries, while a reduction in the quotas for mackerel and North Sea herring
would be followed by a strong decrease in the catch of other non-quota species. The
ﬁshing eﬀort and landings of other non-quota species are responsive to their own price
and the price of fuel. Furthermore, the price of other non-quota species seems to have
some positive eﬀects on the supply of blue whiting and the demand for fuel.
The catch of blue whiting showed no statistically signiﬁcant relationships with the
quota-regulated species, except for being a substitute for capelin but with far from even
a one-to-one relationship. Thus, the quota levels of spring-spawning herring, mackerel,
North Sea herring, and capelin seem to have little eﬀect on ﬁshing eﬀort and the catch
of blue whiting. What seem to inﬂuence blue whiting ﬁshery, however, are the price of
other non-quota species and the price of fuel.
Although blue whiting and other non-quota species are all unregulated ﬁsheries, there
are clearly diﬀerences in the ﬁshermen's behaviour towards the respective species. The
blue whiting ﬁshery is not inﬂuenced by its own price, and only to some degree aﬀected
by the capelin quotas and other factors of production. The other non-quota species, on
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the other hand, are strongly linked to the spring-spawning herring, mackerel, and North
Sea herring ﬁsheries as well as being responsive to their own price and the price of fuel.
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